Kellum v. Bernalillo Cnty., the Bernalillo Cnty. Comm'n, Corr. Healthcare Cos.

• Decision Date: 27 January 2017
• Docket Number: No. CIV 14-00163 RB/CG.,CIV 14-00163 RB/CG.
• Citation: 250 F.Supp.3d 846
• Parties: Kristine J. KELLUM, Plaintiff, v. BERNALILLO COUNTY, The Bernalillo County Commission, Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., Timothy Trapp, Kaaki Garner, Stephanie Breen, Taileigh Sanchez, and Adela Mares, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico

250 F.Supp.3d 846

Kristine J. KELLUM, Plaintiff,

v.BERNALILLO COUNTY, The Bernalillo County Commission, Correctional Healthcare Companies, Inc., Timothy Trapp, Kaaki Garner, Stephanie Breen, Taileigh Sanchez, and Adela Mares, Defendants.

No. CIV 14-00163 RB/CG.

United States District Court, D. New Mexico.

Signed January 27, 2017

Charles N. Lakins, Lakins Law Firm, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, for Plaintiff.

April D. White, Yenson, Allen & Wosick, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, Patrick D Allen, Yenson, Allen & Wosick, P.C., Albuquerque, NM, Alfred A. Park, Kevin D. Fowler, Lawrence M. Marcus, Albuquerque, NM, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT C. BRACK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Timothy Trapp, Kaaki Garner, Stephanie Breen, Taileigh Sanchez and Correctional Healthcare Companies' Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 Motion for Summary Judgment Seeking Dismissal of Federal Claims Against it for Damages Based upon Eighth Amendment Violations, filed on December 7, 2016. (Doc. 242.) Jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. Having considered the submissions of counsel and relevant law, the Court will DENY Defendants' motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background¹

Ms. Kristine Kellum (Plaintiff) pleaded guilty to certain drug trafficking charges on October 1, 2010. (Docs. 242–1 at 3; 242 ¶¶ 1, 4; 247 ¶¶ 1, 4.) Judge Sheppard with the Second Judicial District Court entered a judgment, imposing a sentence that included 9 years (suspended), 5 years supervised probation, 60 days pre-sentence credit, and 2 years parole. (Docs. 242–1 at 3; 242 ¶ 4; 247 ¶¶ 4, A; 251 ¶ A.)

Plaintiff violated her probation on April 10, 2012. (Docs. 242–1 at 3; 247–13 ¶ 3; 242 ¶ 5; 247 ¶¶ 5, B; 251 ¶ B.) The district court issued a warrant, Plaintiff was arrested, and the district court conducted a probation violation hearing on May 31, 2012. (Docs. 242–1 at 2–3; 247–13 ¶ 3; 242 ¶ 5; 247 ¶ 5.) The district court revoked Plaintiff's probation and reinstated her probation on new terms. (Docs. 242–1 at 2; 247–13 ¶ 5; 242 ¶ 5; 247 ¶ 5.) Plaintiff's new probation terms, recorded in an Order Setting Conditions of Release, did not include a requirement to participate in a Drug Court program. (Docs. 247–2; 247–13 ¶ 5; 247 ¶¶ C–D; 251 ¶¶ C–D.)

Plaintiff violated her probation again on June 15, 2012, when she was arrested for driving while intoxicated and speeding. (Docs. 242–1 at 2; 247–13 ¶ 6; 242 ¶ 6; 247 ¶¶ 6, E; 251 ¶ E.) At the resulting July 17, 2012 probation violation hearing, the district court reinstated her probation with a new condition: Plaintiff was to attend Drug Court. (Docs. 242–1 at 2; 247–3 247–4; 247–5; 247–13 ¶ 8; 242 ¶ 6; 247 ¶¶ 6, E–G; 251 ¶¶ E–G.) The district court's 1st Amended Order of Probation imposed a "special condition," which required Plaintiff to "successfully complete the Drug Court Program." (Docs. 247–7 at 2; 247 ¶ H; 251 ¶ H.) Under the terms of the 1st Amended Order of Probation, Plaintiff agreed that her "Probation Officer ha[d] the authority to have [her] arrested without a warrant" if she "violate[d] any one of the conditions of this Order during the time of [her] probation." (Docs. 247–7 at 3; 247 ¶ H; 251 ¶ H.)

Plaintiff asserts that when she enrolled in the Drug Court Program, she signed an agreement which provided for certain automatic sanctions.² (Doc. 247–13 ¶ 11; see also Docs. 247–12 ¶¶ 8, 10–11; 247 ¶ Q; 251 ¶ Q³ .) On September 26, 2012, an "Order on Drug Court Violation" and "Drug Court Remand Order" were entered, and Plaintiff served three days at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) for a "violation of [the] conditions of [her] release." (Docs. 242–1; 247–9; see also Docs. 247–13 ¶ 13; 247 ¶ I; 251 ¶ I.) There is no evidence that the court held or required a probation violation hearing for this sanction, and Plaintiff asserts that "it was an automatic sanction according to the Drug Court Agreement." (Doc. 247–13 ¶ 13; see also Docs. 247–8; 247–9; 247 ¶ J; 251 ¶ J.)

Early in October 2012, Plaintiff failed to report to her probation officer, call in daily to report her status, or submit to urinalysis as required. (Docs. 247–13 ¶ 14; 247 ¶ K; 251 ¶ K.) Consequently, the district court entered an "Order on Drug Court Violation" and "Drug Court Remand Order" on October 17, 2012, remanding Plaintiff to "the custody of the [MDC] ... until completion of" the Addiction Treatment Program (ATP). (Docs. 247–10; 247–11; see also Docs. 242 ¶ 8; 247 ¶¶ 8, L; 251 ¶ L.) The ATP is a four-week program based at the MDC that uses therapy, education, "relapse prevention planning," and "living skills groups" to help individuals "who have been identified as having addiction treatment needs ...." Addiction Treatment Program, available at http://www.bernco.gov/addiction-and-treatment-services/addiction-treatment-program.aspx (last accessed Jan. 26, 2017). On October 17, 2012, Plaintiff's probation officer arrested Plaintiff, transported her to the MDC, and remanded her into the MDC's custody. (Docs. 247–13 ¶ 16; 242 ¶ 7; 247 ¶¶ 7, M; 251 ¶ M.) Again, there is no evidence that the court held or required a probation violation hearing for this sanction.

Plaintiff asserts that the arrest and remand to the MDC was in accordance with the 1st Amended Order of Probation and the terms of the agreement she had signed. (Docs. 247–7; 247–13 ¶ 17; 242 ¶ 8; 247 ¶¶ 8, T; 251 ¶ T.) Plaintiff submitted an affidavit from Ms. Catherine Hartman, the Supervisor of the Second Judicial District Drug Court, who stated that "[p]articipants in the Drug Court program do not have to go before a Judge for [a] hearing in order for sanctions, such as remand to MDC, to be imposed for violation of Drug Court program rules." (Docs. 247–12 ¶ 13; 247 ¶ P; 251 ¶ P.)

II. Summary Judgment Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, determines "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Garrison v. Gambro, Inc. , 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). A fact is "material" if it could influence the determination of the suit. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A dispute over a material fact is "genuine" if a reasonable trier of fact could return a verdict for either party. Id. The moving party bears the initial responsibility of "show[ing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc. , 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ).

Once the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(e)"requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ) (quotation marks omitted). The party opposing a motion for summary judgment "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc. , 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). Rule 56(c) provides that "[a] party asserting that a fact ... is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials ...." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). The respondent may not simply "rest on mere allegations or denials of [her] pleadings." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 259, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see also Otteson v. United States , 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir. 1980) ("However, once a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in his complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried.") (quotation omitted)). Nor can a party "avoid summary judgment by repeating conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by specific facts, or speculation." Colony Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Omer , No. 07-2123-JAR, 2008 WL 2309005, at *1 (D. Kan. June 2, 2008) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) ; Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc. , 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006) ). "In a response to a motion for summary judgment, a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial." Conaway v. Smith , 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).

III. Analysis

A. The Definitions of a Pretrial Detainee vs. an Incarcerated Person

The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff's status at the time of the events described in her Complaint was closer to that of a pretrial detainee or an incarcerated person.⁴ "Pretrial detainees are protected under the Due Process Clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, while incarcerated persons are protected under the Eighth Amendment. Glover v. Gartman , 899 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1133 (D.N.M. 2012) (quoting Lopez v. LeMaster , 172 F.3d 756, 759 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal citation omitted)). Ultimately, the Court finds that Plaintiff was closer to the definition of an incarcerated person for purposes of the Court's analysis of her claims.

"The classification of a plaintiff as ... a pretrial detainee" or an inmate "can have an impact on how a court analyzes the plaintiff's constitutional claims." Gmyr–Maez v. Schneider , 169 F.Supp.3d 1172, 1182 (D.N.M. 2016). In excessive...