Kelly-Nevils v. Detroit Receiving Hosp.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1994
• Docket Number: Docket No. 156442,KELLY-NEVILS
• Citation: 526 N.W.2d 15,207 Mich.App. 410
• Parties: , 63 USLW 2528 Joyce, individually and as personal representative of the Estate of Christopher Lee Kelly, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DETROIT RECEIVING HOSPITAL and University Health Center, a Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 15

526 N.W.2d 15

207 Mich.App. 410, 63 USLW 2528

Joyce KELLY-NEVILS, individually and as personal

representative of the Estate of Christopher Lee

Kelly, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DETROIT RECEIVING HOSPITAL and University Health Center, a

Michigan corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 156442.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted May 17, 1994, at Detroit.

Decided Nov. 7, 1994, at 9:35 a.m.

Released for Publication Jan. 24, 1995.

Thurswell, Chayet & Weiner by Tammy J. Reiss and Judith A. Susskind, Southfield, for plaintiff.

Grier & Copeland, P.C. by Rhonda Y. Reid, Detroit, for defendants.

Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and CORRIGAN and CORWIN, ^* JJ.

CORRIGAN, J.

Plaintiff appeals as of right the grant of summary disposition to defendant hospital pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) (failure to state a claim) and MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no issue of material fact). In this case of first impression, we hold that the question of good-faith compliance with the provisions of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA), M.C.L. § 333.10101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.15(10101) et seq., is one of law for the court and that the circuit court correctly ruled that because defendant hospital had acted in good faith, it was entitled to immunity under the UAGA.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND RELEVANT STATUTES

On July 5, 1990, at 9:45 p.m., defendant hospital admitted John Doe # 158, an unidentified man suffering from a gunshot wound to the head inflicted in the Cass Corridor. Hospital officials were not given any additional information about the shooting of John Doe # 158, one of hundreds of unidentified victims admitted to defendant hospital each year.

John Doe # 158 was diagnosed as brain dead. In compliance with state law, he was placed on life support, with the intent to disconnect him at the legally prescribed time. Early the next morning, around 7:00 a.m., a clean-cut, young man appeared at the hospital, asking about the unidentified shooting victim. He identified John Doe # 158 as plaintiff's decedent, Christopher Kelly, and identified himself as Christopher's brother and only living relative, Shawn Kelly. Shawn Kelly then furnished hospital personnel with Christopher Kelly's date of birth and told them that they had been living together in a homeless shelter. No one asked Shawn Kelly to furnish proof of his identity. ¹

Hospital staff first informed Shawn Kelly about Christopher Kelly's terminal condition and solicited an organ donation from him. Shawn then authorized the harvesting of Christopher's liver, kidneys, corneas, and bones by executing a donor consent form. Shawn remained at Christopher's bedside, crying and grieving, until Christopher was pronounced dead at 9:00 a.m. on July 6, 1990. The hospital thereafter surgically removed several of Christopher's organs, in reliance on the consent form signed by Shawn Kelly.

In truth, nineteen-year-old Christopher Kelly had no brother. He is survived by his mother, plaintiff Joyce Kelly-Nevils, with whom he allegedly lived at the time of his death. ² Detroit police finally located plaintiff on July 9, 1990, and informed her about Christopher's death after Christopher's fingerprints were obtained at the county morgue.

When plaintiff learned that defendant had harvested Christopher's organs, she filed suit, alleging defendant's negligence. Defendant answered and supplied affirmative defenses. Plaintiff, with leave of the court, later amended her complaint to allege unlawful mutilation of Christopher's body, in violation of her common-law right to possess, control, and bury the body of her son. Defendant then moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). The circuit court subsequently held that defendant was immune by virtue of the good-faith exception established in the UAGA and granted summary disposition.

In 1969, Michigan adopted the UAGA, 1969 P.A. 189, effective March 20, 1970, to encourage and facilitate the increasing demand for human tissue and organ donation for research and for transplantation. The UAGA has been adopted in all fifty states. The UAGA was substantially reenacted in Michigan in 1978 P.A. 368, M.C.L. § 333.10101 et seq.; M.S.A. § 14.15(10101) et seq. M.C.L. § 333.10102; M.S.A. § 14.15(10102) authorizes certain individuals, apart from the donor, to donate all or part of a decedent's body. The act establishes priorities of the right to authorize donations on the basis of the individual's relationship to the decedent:

(2) Any of the following persons, in order of priority stated, when persons in prior classes are not available at the time of death, and in the absence of actual notice of contrary indications by the decedent or actual notice of opposition by a member of the same or a prior class, may give all or any physical part of the decedent's body for any purpose specified in section 10103:

(a) The spouse.

(b) An adult son or daughter.

(c) Either parent.

(d) An adult brother or sister.

(e) A guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of the death.

(f) Any other person authorized or under obligation to dispose of the body. [M.C.L. § 333.10102; M.S.A. § 14.15(10102).]

The act plainly authorizes an adult brother to consent to organ donation, unless someone of a higher priority opposes donation. M.C.L. § 333.10108(3); M.S.A. § 14.15(10108)(3) also plainly excepts persons, including hospitals, who act in good faith from liability for damages:

A person, including a hospital, who acts in good faith in accord with the terms of this part or with the anatomical gift laws of another state or a foreign country is not liable for damages in any civil action or subject to prosecution in any criminal proceeding for the act.

In Lyon v. United States, 843 F.Supp. 531 (D.Minn.1994), the federal district court described the purposes of the UAGA:

The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act is clearly designed to balance two competing policy interests. There is a need for donations of eyes and other organs for transplantation and research purposes. Time is usually of the essence in securing donated organs at the time of the donor's death. The Act allows hospitals and physicians to ascertain with a high degree of certainty when someone is willing to donate organs, and to arrange for the prompt removal and preservation of organs. The Act also recognizes the religious and moral sensibilities of those who do not wish to donate organs. The Act does not compel organ donations nor does it establish a presumption that organs will be donated. The good faith exception to civil and criminal liability is designed for situations ... where because of confusion, an organ is removed without genuine consent. [Id. at 536].

On appeal, plaintiff presents four claims of error: (1) whether a hospital's compliance with the good-faith provision of the UAGA is a question of fact; (2) whether defendant failed to comply with the good-faith section of the UAGA; (3) whether defendant waived the good-faith defense by failing specifically to plead the defense in its first responsive pleading; and (4) whether summary disposition was premature because further discovery was necessary.

II. GOOD FAITH--A QUESTION OF LAW FOR THE COURT

Plaintiff contends that whether defendant hospital acted in good faith is a question of fact for the jury. She specifically argues that defendant's failure to investigate Shawn Kelly's representation that he was Christopher's brother and only surviving relative presents a question of fact for the jury regarding defendant's good faith.

Although the general question of the parameters of the good-faith inquiry under the UAGA is one of first impression in Michigan, courts in other jurisdictions have discussed the good-faith immunity provisions of the UAGA. Remarkably, in two cases somewhat resembling the present case, purported relatives authorized organ donations. Nicoletta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 136 Misc.2d 1065, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1987) (purported wife); Hinze v. Baptist Memorial Hosp., 1990 WL 121138 (Tenn.App.) (purported grandson).

In Nicoletta, supra, the plaintiff father brought an action for damages because the hospital and eye bank wrongfully enucleated his deceased son's eyes. The decedent's live-in girl friend and the mother of his two children had falsely identified herself as the decedent's wife in the hospital emergency room.

The New York court first held that the question of good-faith compliance pursuant to the UAGA is one of law for the court, after acknowledging that whether certain behavior satisfies a good-faith standard is usually a factual issue. Following an extensive review of good-faith decisions, the court rejected the view that in the UAGA context good faith is a factual question:

In those cases, most of which involved dealings of a corporate or commercial nature, there was no express or specific criteria of a statutory nature incorporating such a 'standard of conduct' against which an individual's conduct could be measured, without submitting evidence in the form of in-court testimony to a trier of fact.

In the instant case, however, the Court believes that the Legislature has created an objective standard by which the good faith of a donee could be measured. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act establishes a statutory scheme which outlines the means of effecting an anatomical gift, the classes of individuals entitled to effect such a gift, and the circumstances under which such a gift must be deemed null and void. None of the previous good-faith cases have involved such a definitive standard by which to judge a defendant's conduct. [Nicoletta, supra at 1068-1069, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928.]

Pennsylvania has also held that the issue of compliance with the good-faith requirement of the UAGA is for a court to decide. Brown v. Delaware Valley Transplant Program, 420 Pa.Super. 84, 615 A.2d 1379 (1992). The reasoning in the Nicoletta and Brown cases is persuasive. Unlike good-faith questions in cas...