Kelly v. Brewer
| Decision Date | 19 November 1975 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 75--1523,75--1562,s. 75--1523 |
| Citation | 525 F.2d 394 |
| Parties | Warner S. KELLY and Samuel S. Parras, Appellees, v. Lou V. BREWER, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, Appellant. Warner S. KELLY and Samuel S. Parras, Cross-Appellants, v. Lou V. BREWER, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, Cross-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Lorna Lawhead Williams, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, Iowa, for Lou V. Brewer, Warden.
Charles Pulaski, University of Iowa, College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa, for Warner S. Kelly and Samuel S. Parras.
Before GIBSON, Chief Judge, HENLEY, Circuit Judge, and VAN PELT, Senior District Judge. *
These two appeals arise from litigation instituted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa 1 by Warner S. Kelly and Samuel S. Parras, inmates of the Iowa State Penitentiary at Fort Madison, Iowa, against Lou V. Brewer, Warden of that institution.
Plaintiffs alleged in substance that their initial and continued confinements in 'administrative segregation' at the discretion of the defendant without prior hearings and without meaningful periodic evaluations of their cases by reference to appropriate standards constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as carried forward into the fourteenth amendment and also involved denials of due process of law and of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment itself. Subject matter jurisdiction was predicated upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983 read in connection with 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Only declaratory and injunctive relief was sought; there was no claim for money damages.
Kelly tendered his petition in September, 1973; the district court permitted the petition to be filed in forma pauperis and appointed counsel drawn from the faculty of the University of Iowa College of Law to represent the plaintiff. Counsel filed an amended complaint on behalf of Kelly. Later the same attorneys filed a similar complaint on behalf of Parras; while the complaint of Parras contains some 'class action' allegations, it appears from the record that both cases were treated by court and counsel simply as individual suits. The cases were consolidated, and we will treat them as though they were one case.
'Administrative segregation,' as it is practiced at the Iowa State Penitentiary and as applied to the plaintiffs, is a form of solitary confinement which is described in detail in the initial findings of fact and conclusions of law filed by the district court following an evidentiary hearing and reported as Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F.Supp. 447 (S.D.Ia.1974). 2 The trial court's findings and conclusions were implemented by an interlocutory order denominated a 'Judgment,' that was filed on June 6, 1974.
The record reflects that Parras was placed in administrative segregation initially after he attacked a prison guard and inflicted a non-fatal stab wound in February, 1972. Later in 1972 Parras was prosecuted in the state courts, was found guilty and received a sentence of imprisonment for thirty years. The record further reflects that Parras, a man of advancing years, who has a serious mental illness, and who is losing his sight, has a long criminal record going back to 1933.
On June 8, 1972 Kelly, who was already in administrative segregation, attacked and killed a prison guard. Kelly was charged with murder and was convicted of second degree murder in May, 1973; he received a sentence of imprisonment for ninety years to be served concurrently with the sentence or sentences that he was already serving when he killed the guard. Kelly is a much younger man than Parras, and while his criminal record is not as long as that of Parras, it is still substantial.
It is clear that both plaintiffs are recidivist criminals and both have a history of violent behavior both inside and outside prison. Following the commission of their respective acts that have been mentioned, both men were immediately placed in administrative segregation without prior hearings. They were kept in segregation prior to their convictions, and following their convictions they were immediately returned to segregation, again without any prior administrative hearings. And they remained in that status with some intermissions until released to general population in mid-July, 1975 following the final judgment of the district court which was filed on June 18, 1975. 3
The first evidentiary hearing in the district court was held on February 13, 1974. At that hearing the court heard the testimony of Kelly with respect to his confinement. The defendant did not testify, but the parties filed a written stipulation as to what his testimony would have been had he been present. In addition to that stipulation, both sides introduced documentary evidence.
The 1974 findings, conclusions and order of the district court are set forth in full in Kelly v. Brewer, supra, and all of them need not be restated here. Suffice it to say that the 1974 decision of the district court was in part favorable to Kelly and in part adverse to him. Some of the district court's findings and conclusions are applicable to the case of Parras; some are not.
The most significant 1974 holding of the district court, and the principal one involved in this case, relates to the post-conviction confinement of Kelly in administrative segregation. As to that confinement, the district court found that Kelly's conviction of murder in itself justified the defendant in isolating Kelly without prior hearing at least for a limited period of time. The district court held, however, that it is a violation of due process of law for a prison administrator to retain an inmate in administrative segregation, involving solitary confinement and certain deprivations to which the general inmate population was not subject, for a prolonged or indefinite period of time without meaningful periodic evaluations, to be made in the light of appropriate criteria, to determine whether the inmate is still a security risk who should be kept in segregation or whether it has become safe to return him to general population.
The district court found that while inmates situated as was Kelly were supposed to have their cases evaluated once a month by staff panels which would presumably make recommendations to the Warden, in point of fact the question of whether or not an inmate would be returned to population was one that addressed itself to the unfettered discretion of the Warden, and that the monthly evaluations were mere shams and were of no practical value to the inmates involved.
On this aspect of the case the district court's initial judgment declared, among other things, that Kelly's continued confinement in indefinite administrative segregation constituted a violation of due process of law 'given there is no meaningful review under appropriate standards to determine whether the plaintiff remains a threat to the security of the institution and thus be continued in 'indefinite administrative segregation." (378 F.Supp. at 455.) And the court affirmatively ordered that (378 F.Supp. at 455--56.)
In due course, the Warden submitted a plan, and counsel for the plaintiffs submitted a counter-plan. 4
The Warden's plan promised periodic evaluations of inmates confined in administrative segregation, including annual psychiatric evaluations, and set out a number of criteria, most of which were non-objective. Under the plan ultimate determination of whether an inmate should be retained in segregation would be made by the Warden personally, subject to review by his own administrative superiors and also subject to possible judicial review.
The counter-plan was much more objective than the Warden's plan. The counter-plan conferred authority to evaluate the case of an inmate in segregation upon a Segregation Review Committee consisting of three persons. The Committee was required to conduct its review in the light of the standards set out in the plan. Should the Committee decide that the inmate in question no longer posed a threat to institutional security, it was required to order his return to population, and such a decision could not be reversed by the Warden. The counter-plan did recognize that the Warden had the power at any time to release a convict from his segregated status.
While the plans of both sides were drawn as what may be called 'class plans,' the district court made it clear at the commencement of the second hearing which was held on April 29, 1975, that it was primarily interested in a plan to be applied to Kelly and Parras, and that it would not approve any 'class plan' unless counsel on both sides were able to agree on one. This counsel were avowedly unable to do, at least with respect to convicts in the particular situation of Kelly and Parras. 5
In the course of the hearing the district court received in camera the testimony of the Prison Ombudsman, 6 who expressed the view that the plans put forward by the Warden would accomplish nothing except to formalize the existing procedures which the district court had found to be meaningless.
Based on its review of the conflicting proposals and on its familiarity with the case the district court concluded that the plan submitted by the Warden did not provide any...
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Ruiz v. Estelle
...that his status be reviewed periodically, to determine whether there is a valid reason for his continued segregation. Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975), McCray v. Bennett, 467 F.Supp. 187, 192-193 (M.D.Ala.1978). TDC's current review policy does not meet the requirements of......
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...permissible only if administrative justifications continue to exist. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals observed in Kelly v. Brewer, 555 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975): "While . . . administrative segregation is not inherently unconstitutional, its validity depends upon the relative huma......
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Thorpe v. Clarke
...at 226, 125 S.Ct. 2384 (warning against placing prisoners in solitary confinement "for insufficient reason"); see also Kelly v. Brewer , 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975) (recognizing, as early as 1975, that the "validity" of administrative segregation under the Fourteenth Amendment depends......