Kelly v. Brewer

• Decision Date: 18 February 1976
• Docket Number: No. 2--57803,2--57803
• Citation: 239 N.W.2d 109
• Parties: Warner S. KELLY, Appellant, v. Lou V. BREWER, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 109

239 N.W.2d 109

Warner S. KELLY, Appellant, v. Lou V. BREWER, Appellee.

No. 2--57803.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Feb. 18, 1976.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 1976.

John M. Thompson of Wm. F. Olinger Law Offices, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Lorna Lawhead Williams, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michael P. Murphy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Des Moines, for appellee.

Heard by MOORE, C.J., and REES, UHLENHOPP, REYNOLDSON and McCORMICK, JJ.

REES, Justice.

This is an appeal in an action brought by petitioner Warner S. Kelly under the provisions of chapter 663, The Code, 1973, in which he sought relief from his confinement in administrative segregation at the state penitentiary at Fort Madison. After hearing in trial court, the writ of habeas corpus which had previously issued was annulled. Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

The circumstances of petitioner's imprisonment in the penitentiary at Fort Madison have come to the attention of the federal courts as well as the courts of this state. Due to a substantial possibility that action by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit might have rendered moot and academic any opinion by this court on Kelly's appeal in this case, we deferred the filing of an opinion until action by the Circuit Court. That court has now taken such action and filed opinion on November 26, 1975. (See Warner S. Kelly and Samuel S. Parras, appellees v. Lou V. Brewer, Warden, appellant, No. 75--1523, and Warner S. Kelly and Samuel S. Parras, cross-appellants v. Lou V. Brewer, Warden, cross-appellee, No. 75--1562.) We therefore believe our disposition of the appeal pending in this court is now appropriate.

Petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, second degree murder for the stabbing of a prison guard at the penitentiary on June 8, 1972. Prior to that time he had been serving sentences totalling 13 years for the crimes of kidnapping, malicious injury to a building, lascivious acts with a child, and escape. Defendant took a direct appeal to this court following his conviction for murder, and we affirmed. See State v. Kelly, 224 N.W.2d 456 (Iowa 1974).

Before and after trial on the murder charge, petitioner was confined in the penitentiary under conditions described by prison personnel as 'administrative segregation.' Petitioner spent four days in Building 97 in the institution, which he described as 'the hole,' during which time he was kept in a completely darkened cell on the dark side of the building with steel flaps covering the window openings. During that time he was given no clothing, bedding, eating utensils or toilet tissue. After that four-day period and a subsequent transfer for a short time to the Iowa Security Medical Facility at Oakdale, petitioner was moved to Building 20, a maximum security lock-up facility, where his administrative segregation was accomplished. His cell there was located on the top tier of stacked cells, and was the last such cell on the east side next to the shower. The nearest inmate, and the only other one on the same tier, was 48 feet away from him with several double cells intervening, and it appears petitioner could communicate with the other inmate on that tier only by shouting.

The conditions of petitioner's confinement in Building 20 in what was termed 'administrative segregation' were more humane than the conditions imposed upon him in his four-day stay in Building 97. His cell in Building 20 measured 12 feet by 8 feet; the walls separating the cells were solid with a front constructed of bars. The cell was furnished with a small metal sink, a metal shelf, a table stool, bed and toilet. Petitioner was allowed some personal belongings, such as a television set, a radio, writing materials and toilet articles. He was afforded library privileges, smoking privileges and canteen privileges.

Interaction with other inmates, however, was extremely restricted. Petitioner was allowed out of his cell only to see visitors, to exercise for about 30 minutes a week during warm weather and to take two showers per week. Anytime he left his cell, he was handcuffed and escorted by three correctional officers. He was permitted to see a spiritual counselor from the Church of the New Song in his cell for about 15 minutes per week, but was not permitted to participate in the prison's work program.

In early 1974 defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court challenging the circumstances of his confinement, and alleging that his indefinite administrative segregation deprived him of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and violated the proscription of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual punishment. While the federal district court rejected the claim of cruel and unusual punishment insofar as it related to the conditions of petitioner's imprisonment subsequent to the four-day stay in Building 97, that court did perceive merit in petitioner's allegations of deprivation of due process, and accordingly ordered that the prison administration develop meaningful standards for periodic review to determine whether Kelly should be returned to the prison's general population. Kelly v. Brewer, 378 F.Supp. 447, 455--456 (S.D.Iowa 1974).

On June 17, 1975, the federal district court ordered prison authorities to release Kelly into the general prison population because of the State's failure to implement a plan designed to correct the constitutional deficiencies of the earlier procedure. On the following day Kelly was released to the general prison population.

As above noted, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered the appeal and the cross-appeal and filed opinion on November 26, 1975. The plan ordered by the federal district court for review of petitioner's status was set aside as too rigorous and as substantially exceeding the constitutional necessities of the case. Nonetheless, guidelines for satisfying due process were imposed upon the warden of the penitentiary for review of the petitioner's situation, with review of the warden's determination in federal district court. We must assume petitioner's present confinement, whether it be in administrative segregation or with the general population of the institution, is the result of constitutionally permissible considerations and procedures consistent with due process of law. We must also assume the warden of the institution has acted, and will act, scrupulously in conformity with the direction of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.

Accordingly, we turn to a consideration of Kelly's action in our state court, which is on appeal to us here, and which turns upon issues of statutory interpretation rather than considerations of constitutional deficiencies.

Petitioner instituted the instant action on September 26, 1974, by filing a petition in the District Court of Lee County alleging he was unlawfully detained in the penitentiary in 'solid lock-up status.' At a hearing on October 9, 1974, petitioner and the respondent warden testified to conditions of petitioner's imprisonment and the reasons for his detention in administrative segregation. The heart of petitioner's claim was that he had been confined in 'solitary imprisonment' contrary to § 246.31, The Code, 1973.

After hearing, the District Court of Lee County held, Inter alia, that petitioner had not been, and was not being, subjected to 'solitary confinement' within the meaning of the above statute, and that he had failed to establish grounds for release from administrative segregation. This appeal was taken from that finding and concomitant conclusion of law.

The one issue stated for review by petitioner, although argued in four parts, is that trial court erred in holding petitioner was not subjected to 'solitary imprisonment' within the meaning of § 246.31, The Code.

After due consideration, we conclude this case must properly be resolved upon a different ground, I.e., construction of the word, 'discipline' in the above cited statute. 'It is our duty to affirm if any proper basis appears for the ruling of the trial court even though it is not the one on which it was put or on which the court acted. (citations) Many a learned court is occasionally right for the wrong reason * * *. A court decision which is proper on any ground shown by the record will not be disturbed merely because the decision is based on an unsound or erroneous reason.' General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Keil, 176 N.W.2d 837, 841--842 (Iowa 1970).

Therefore, the issue might be stated: Does § 246.31, The Code, render unlawful defendant's imprisonment in administrative segregation?

I. We have reached the conclusion the proper resolution of this appeal turns not upon the judicial construction of the words 'solitary imprisonment' in § 246.31, The Code, but rather upon an interpretation of the word 'discipline' in the same statute. Said statute provides:

'Hard labor and solitary imprisonment. All commitments to either of said institutions must be at hard labor. Solitary imprisonment of prisoners shall not be employed except for the purpose of discipline.'

A good portion of petitioner's brief on appeal is devoted to the argument that any confinement which prevents a prisoner from serving his sentence at hard labor is 'solitary imprisonment.' As mentioned above, trial court concluded petitioner's status in administrative segregation did not constitute 'solitary imprisonment.'

The respondent warden in his brief supports trial court's line of reasoning, but urges more pointedly that petitioner is in error in attaching too narrow a meaning to the term 'discipline' as used in § 246.31. Petitioner's original brief assumes that 'discipline' refers only to sanctions imposed for infractions of specific prison rules, and if this assumption is correct it would appear solitary imprisonment can be imposed only as punishment for such...