Kelly v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.
Decision Date | 25 October 1989 |
Docket Number | GEORGIA-PACIFIC,No. 88-1167,88-1167 |
Citation | 545 N.E.2d 1244,46 Ohio St.3d 134 |
Parties | , 116 Lab.Cas. P 56,331, 4 IER Cases 1638 KELLY, Appellant, v.CORPORATION, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where a determination in a prior federal action was not essential to the judgment obtained therein, collateral estoppel will not foreclose consideration of the issue in a subsequent state proceeding involving a different claim for relief.
2. The facts and circumstances surrounding an employment-at-will relationship, including the character of the employment, custom, the course of dealing between the parties, company policy, or any other fact which may illuminate the question, can be considered by the trier of fact in order to determine the explicit and implicit terms concerning discharge. (Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. [1985], 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, explained and followed.)
3. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable to at-will employment relationships. The test in such cases is whether the employer should have reasonably expected its representation to be relied upon by its employee and, if so, whether the expected action or forbearance actually resulted and was determined to the employee. (Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co. [1985], 19 Ohio St.3d 100, 19 OBR 261, 483 N.E.2d 150, explained and followed.)
Since 1966, plaintiff-appellant, Douglas R. Kelly, his wife and five children have resided in Wadsworth, Ohio. In 1970, he began employment with Hudson Pulp & Paper Corporation as a sales representative engaged in the sale of paper products (grocery bags, sacks and butcher paper). In 1979, defendant-appellee, Georgia-Pacific Corporation, acquired Hudson Pulp & Paper Corp. and appellant continued to be employed in the same capacity by the acquiring corporation.
At the time of the acquisition, appellant's immediate supervisor was Frank Caponera, Northeast Regional Sales Manager for appellee. The superior of Frank Caponera was Rod Vilmur--General Sales Manager of the Grocery Bag Division. During this period, Georgia-Pacific had an Operating Policy Manual and Salaried Employee Benefit Plans to guide supervisory personnel with respect to their interrelationship with employees under their supervision. Relevant sections of the manual provided as follows:
While the manual was distributed to supervisory personnel only, Caponera would frequently discuss its contents with the salesmen under his supervision. During deposition, Caponera testified as to these discussions:
During his employment with Georgia-Pacific, appellant received periodic performance evaluations. In February 1980, Vilmur wrote the following about appellant:
(Emphasis added.)
In 1983, Verlon Rowe replaced Vilmur, and was given the title of General Manager of Bag and Sack Division. In 1982, Rowe had reported to A.R. Russell. Beginning in 1983, Rowe reported to Maurice Kring, Group Vice President of Tissue, Pulp and Paperboard. On April 12, 1984, Russell wrote the following letter to appellant:
"I know you will continue to make an outstanding contribution to the Grocery Bag Division particularly because of the unique opportunity the arrangement offers and the additional product line of Tissue."
Despite positive reviews of appellant's performance by Vilmur, Caponera and Russell, appellant was terminated at the insistence of Rowe on September 4, 1984.
In August 1985, appellant instituted an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, alleging violations of federal and state law. The federal claims included allegations of handicap discrimination and violations of Section 510 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). The state claims included wrongful discharge, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, defamation, and negligent termination. Thereafter, appellee answered and moved for summary judgment on all claims. Prior to judicial resolution of the motion, appellant voluntarily dismissed the handicap-discrimination claim.
On July 29, 1986, the district court granted the motion relative to the federal claims under ADEA and ERISA. Following this ruling, the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state claims. The court also denied appellant's motion for post-judgment relief. Thereafter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the ERISA claim. The dismissal of the ADEA claim was not appealed.
On September 15, 1986, appellant instituted the present action in the Court of Common Pleas of Medina County, essentially alleging breach of express contract, breach of implied contract (promissory estoppel), and negligent termination. On April 13, 1987, appellee filed a motion for summary judgment. On September 15, 1987, the common pleas court determined that the state claims were barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) arising from the district court resolution of the federal claims. The common pleas court found further that, even if not barred by collateral estoppel, the claims were resolvable in favor of appellee on summary judgment. The court of appeals affirmed, with Judge Mahoney dissenting with respect to the collateral estoppel issue.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Nicely & Wagner, Judith A. Nicely and Katherine C. Smith, Akron, for appellant.
Denlinger, Rosenthal & Greenberg, Daniel G. Rosenthal and Mark E. Lutz, Cincinnati, for appellee.
It is the contention of appellee that appellant is foreclosed from pursuing his breach of contract and negligent termination claims in state court because the facts underlying the claims were determined in the federal proceeding. Appellee therefore relies on the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel is often termed "issue preclusion." Consequently, in order for an issue to be precluded in subsequent litigation involving a different cause of action, the issue must have actually been decided in the prior proceeding. See Taylor v. Monroe (1952), 158 Ohio St. 266, 49 O.O. 118, 109 N.E.2d 271. It is this attribute of the doctrine of collateral estoppel which differentiates it from the related concept of res judicata. Thus, in ...
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