Kelly v. Hoffman

• Decision Date: 30 June 1950
• Docket Number: L--5510--48
• Citation: 9 N.J.Super. 422,74 A.2d 922
• Parties: KELLY v. HOFFMAN et al. . Law Division
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

Page 422

9 N.J.Super. 422

74 A.2d 922

KELLY v. HOFFMAN et al.

L--5510--48.

Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division.

June 30, 1950.

Frank I. Casey, Trenton, for plaintiff.

Kenneth J. Dawes, Trenton, for defendants, Arthur D. Hoffman and Trentonian Pub. Co.

Harry Green, Newark, for defendant, Trent Broadcasting Corporation.

HUGHES, J.C.C.

By this motion for new trial, plaintiff complains of a jury verdict dismissing his cause of action, and characterizes that verdict as so contrary to the weight of the evidence, and as well, to the charge of the court, as to infect it with such an apparent basis of mistake, passion or prejudice, as to require its nullification.

The suit was one for compensatory and punitive damages for defamatory words, relating to the plaintiff, ¹ prepared and written by the individual defendant, Hoffman, the managing editor and acknowledged authorized agent of his employer, the defendant, Trentonian Publishing Company (hereinafter referred to as Trentonian). These words were then broadcast by said Hoffman over radio facilities owned and controlled by the defendant, Trent Broadcasting Corporation, and leased by the latter for periodic news broadcasts to the Trentonian.

The issues were as follows:--Plaintiff pleaded and proved the nature of the defamatory words, the innuendos thereof and their publication by at least two of the defendants. The words published were defamatory Per se as they imputed directly and by innuendos malfeasance on the part of the plaintiff as a public official of the City of Trenton. Kelly v. Hoffman, 137 N.J.L. 695, 61 A.2d 143, 5 A.L.R.2d 951 (E. & A. 1948). There was no substantial issue as to the fact of publication on the part of Hoffman and Trentonian, although the Trent Broadcasting Corporation denied it was a party to the publication, relying on the defenses available to a mere disseminator. Kelly v. Hoffman, supra.

Upon the mere proof of the publication of these words, which were defamatory Per se, plaintiff, who did not testify in the cause, became entitled to the benefit of certain presumptions running in his favor, including that of the falsity of the words and the accrual of general or substantial damages, without proof of specific injury.

The defendants joined issue generally, and pleaded the following affirmative defenses which were common to all defendants:

1. Truth, in substance and in fact;

2. The truth, the public interest, the absence of malice and the privilege arising from fair comment as to the acts of a public official, i.e., a qualified privilege 3. Privilege of the occasion, namely, the proper interest of defendants in the distribution of news through their facilities, discussing the public acts of plaintiff as a public official;

4. That defendants did not originate the charges made in the broadcast (this was in mitigation of damages);

5. That the broadcast was oral (and thus not libel as contended in some of the pleadings);

6. That the Statute of Limitations applied (based on a change in the pleadings before trial to denominate the broadcast as 'libel', this being contended to assert a new cause of action).

Additionally, the defendant, Trent Broadcasting Corporation, pleaded the exercise of the reasonable care required of a disseminator.

After the testimony closed, there was no motion to strike these defenses, nor to direct a verdict for the plaintiff as to any phase of the case. The court, however, on its own motion, considered and advised the jury of the lack of any proof of the truth of the defamatory words and struck out that defense; it charged the jury on the 'qualified privilege' defense of fair comment, that 'comment' did not include the statement of false and defamatory facts, and for that reason and to that extent, instructed the jury to disregard that defense. As to the defense that the broadcast was oral and thus not libel, the court dismissed that defense also, charging that in this type of action the medium of publication is not important, that such form of action, called 'radio defamation' for convenience, is Sui generis, in that it partakes of some, but not all, of the fundamentals of both of the common law actions of libel and slander. This reasoning also led the court to dismiss in its charge the pleaded defense of the Statute of Limitations.

These binding instructions by the court had the effect of reducing the issues to (1) the existence of actual malice as supporting the claim for punitive damages; (2) the validity of the affirmative defense of privileged occasion, i.e., the area of privilege accorded the defendants as news distributing facilities in discussing the public acts of the plaintiff; and (3) as to the defendant, Trent Broadcasting Corporation, the defenses available to a mere disseminator.

Moreover, while acknowledging that under the principle of Kelly v. Hoffman, supra, the crucial norm of responsibility of a broadcasting company leasing its facilities to another, was its liability as a disseminator rather than as a publisher, the court nevertheless left to the jury the question as to whether the broadcasting company, by reason of the proved activity of its representative in control of its facilities, in editing, revising and approving the proposed broadcast script, did not so aid and abet the publication as to become itself a publisher and responsible as such. Since this is a narrow and questionable point of law under the judicial policy of our State, Kelly v. Hoffman, supra, the court sought to protect the parties by requiring the jury, in the event of a general verdict against defendants, to answer certain interrogatories under Rule 3:49--2, ² in order to leave such point available for appeal.

These interrogatories, mainly relevant to plaintiff's verdict, went unanswered in view of the verdict returned for all defendants.

It remains to subject this verdict to a critical appraisal, in order to determine its validity in the face of the present motion. On presentation to the jury, as noted, the structural pattern of the case had been reduced to comparatively few issues. Taking up these issues, the testimony was legally sufficient, although factually minimal, as to actual malice in the publication of the defamatory words. Aside from the enormity of the words themselves (as mitigated by the legal vulnerability of a public official to types of criticism of his public acts), the sole proof of malice was the admission into evidence of an editorial, hostile in its terms, published by the defendant, Trentonian, of the plaintiff. It thus appears that the verdict, insofar as it denied the plaintiff punitive or exemplary damages, was well within the scope of jury determination, and for that reason legally unassailable.

From the standpoint of its finding in exculpation of the defendant, Trent broadcasting Corporation, there again, the verdict is completely within the area of proper jury function. There was ample proof entitling this jury to find (1) that such defendant was not a culpable actor in the publication itself; and (2) that, as a mere disseminator, it had exercised reasonable care. It is immaterial that the court itself, if sitting as a trier of the facts, would have reached a different conclusion, or that the verdict, as it resolved this issue, might be considered as discordant with the weight of the evidence. Bowen v. Healy's, Inc., 16 N.J.Misc. 113, 197 A. 655 (Cir.Ct.1938). The exercise of reasonable care by the broadcasting company, under the facts here, was well and properly within the province of jury determination.

Hence, the only apparently valid criticism of the verdict in whole, seems to me to come down to the question of whether, under the evidence, there was a factual basis for the jury verdict denying the plaintiff compensatory damages as against the defendants, Hoffman and Trentonian. While proof of special damages, where the words published are defamatory Per se, is unnecessary, and the presumption of damage justifies the award of general and substantial damages without proof thereof, it is clear that a jury is not compelled to award such damages, but may return a verdict for a nominal amount. The court's charge in this case would have permitted it to return such a nominal verdict. Quaere: Was its failure to do so so shocking to reason as to indicate its motivation in mistake, passion or prejudice?

From the standpoint of the factual evidence available in support of the affirmative defenses pleaded, I do not see that this verdict, as it concerned the suit for the compensatory damages against the defendants, Trentonian and Hoffman, can otherwise be explained. The plaintiff's Prima facie case, of publication of words defamatory Per se, entitled him to compensatory damages, even if in a nominal amount, without more, unless there was evidence in the case to support the affirmative defenses. A critical study of that evidence, and the court's charge on the issues at law pertaining thereto, indicates that the affirmative defenses were unsupported. The defendants argue with especial fervency that the publication, which is the basis of this lawsuit, was a communication on a privileged occasion and constituted only fair comment and criticism upon the public acts of a public official. As stated, this defense was pleaded...