Kelly v. Municipal Court of Marion County

• Citation: 852 F. Supp. 724
• Decision Date: 10 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. IP 91-1183-C.,IP 91-1183-C.
• Parties: David E. KELLY, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF MARION COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

852 F. Supp. 724

David E. KELLY, Plaintiff, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF MARION COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

No. IP 91-1183-C.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

May 10, 1994.

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John O. Moss, Jack C. Brown, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

Seth M. Lahn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

BARKER, Chief Judge.

David E. Kelly ("Plaintiff") believes that the Defendants in this cause violated his constitutional rights by discharging him from his employment as a bailiff in the court of Judge Wendell Mayer of the Municipal Court of Marion County and by allegedly maintaining a work environment that was hostile to blacks and Christians. This Court earlier dismissed most of the claims in the Plaintiff's second amended complaint, see Entry of March 25, 1993, leaving only his Section 1983 claims against Judge Mayer ("Defendant" or "Judge") for adjudication. The Defendant now moves the Court to grant summary judgment in his favor. For reasons that will be explained below, the Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND

The Plaintiff, who is a black male and a Jehovah's Witness, began his employment with the Defendant as a bailiff on August 22, 1989. On September 7, 1990, the Judge terminated the Plaintiff's employment after a year that both sides admit was not quiescent. Apparently, the Plaintiff failed to win the esteem of his coworkers, a situation which led to frequent squabbles in chambers among the Judge's staff concerning division of labor, lunch and rest breaks, and other matters that one would hope adults could settle among themselves without having to seek the intervention of a superior, in this case the Judge. Justified or not, it was not long after the Plaintiff began working as a bailiff that the Judge began to receive unsettling reports from his staff about the Plaintiff's behavior. These included recountings of the Plaintiff attempting to obtain the telephone numbers of females who appeared in the Judge's court or who happened to be walking in the corridors of the courthouse, see Mayer Deposition, at 87-89; leaving sexually suggestive materials in court, see id. at 93; proselytizing his religious beliefs during work hours, see id. at 175, including reading the Bible in the courtroom and its public reception area, see id. at 178-80, 190, 221, and preaching and reading the Bible to prisoners who were in a holding cell waiting to appear before the Judge, see id. at 177; failing to answer the telephone, see id. at 228; arriving late for work, see id. at 82; and creating a disturbance with court security officers, see id. at 103. These problems prompted the Judge to present the Plaintiff with a letter in June, 1990 warning him that "any continuance of the matters set out in this letter will result in your dismissal." Defendants' Exhibit A. The Judge identified six problem areas that warranted the Plaintiff's immediate attention: (1) "Witnessing", (2) "Reading Materials", (3) "Working Hours", (4) "Lunch Hour", (5) "Phones" and (6) "Absence during working hours." Id. In the Judge's view, the Plaintiff failed to make adequate progress modifying his behavior, resulting in his dismissal on September 7, 1990.

The Plaintiff believes that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and discharged because of his race and religious beliefs. He contends, inter alia., that he fell out of the Judge's favor after he refused to contribute a portion of his salary to the Republican Party and did not work at the polls on election day. His complaint sets forth claims against the Defendant for violation of his rights to freedom of religion, liberty, political affiliation and association, equal protection, and due process of law. The Court will address each of these allegations individually after describing the standard for evaluating the Defendant's motion.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Summary Judgment Standards

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the movant shows by pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Renovitch v. Kaufman, 905 F.2d 1040, 1044 (7th Cir.1990). To survive summary judgment, the nonmovant must present affirmative evidence about what might be adduced at trial and may not rely on conclusory allegations or speculation. Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1142 (7th Cir. 1988); Dale v. Chicago Tribune Co., 797 F.2d 458, 465 n. 8 (7th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1066, 107 S.Ct. 954, 93 L.Ed.2d 1002 (1987). The Plaintiff must "present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2514, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court construes all evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary judgment. Oxman v. WLS-TV, 846 F.2d 448, 452 (7th Cir.1988). "At the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In other words, "the trial court ... cannot resolve factual disputes that could go to a jury at trial, but weak factual claims can be weeded out through summary judgment motions." Collins v. Associated Pathologists, Ltd., 844 F.2d 473, 476 (7th Cir.1988). The moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2551-52, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, the Defendant has the burden of proving that the material facts are not in dispute and that he is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The Plaintiff then must "`set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511, quoting, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

B. The Plaintiff's Claims

1. Religious Discrimination

The Plaintiff's complaint and Response Brief provide the Court with little guidance as to the precise legal theory that supports his religious discrimination claims. Although he frequently refers to the First Amendment, he does not differentiate between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses; the Court will assume that he intends to proceed under both clauses.

a. The Free Exercise Claim

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." The free exercise analysis begins with an examination of "whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the burden." Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989). When making this inquiry, the court must be mindful that:

the Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that the plaintiffs engage in any set form of religious observance, so they may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices....

Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699-700, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2152, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986). Here, the Plaintiff alleges that the Judge violated the Free Exercise Clause by preventing him from reading the Bible. See Response Brief, at 10. That allegation is a bit disingenuous, however, since the record is clear that the Judge did not bar the Plaintiff from reading the Bible. Rather, he forbid the Plaintiff from reading the Bible and evangelizing while in court and in the court's public areas. See Defendant's Exhibit A, at 1. The Judge did not disapprove of the Plaintiff reading his Bible in the privacy of the jury room. See Mayer Deposition, at 180. There is no indication from the Plaintiff that reading the Bible or proselytizing in the court's public areas is a "central religious belief or practice" for him. Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. at 2148. The Free Exercise Clause is not a guarantee against inconvenience. Instead, it prevents government from interfering with the exercise of religious beliefs or practices that, by their nature, are fundamental to the particular adherent's religious sect. No such burden is implicated in this record. At a minimum, the Plaintiff remained free to study the Bible and to evangelize while not working.

The facts in this matter are easily distinguished from cases where the courts have sustained free exercise challenges: the latter have entailed a much greater infringement on religious freedom than that found here. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (requiring Amish children to attend school after the 8th grade); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (denying unemployment benefits to Seventh Day Adventist who refused to accept work requiring her to violate the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Division, 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (denying unemployment benefits to applicant whose religion forbade him to fabricate weapons). Accordingly, the Plaintiff's interest in the earlier described religious activity can not be deemed "substantial" in a...