Kelly v. New Haven, (SC 17331).

• Citation: 275 Conn. 580,881 A.2d 978
• Decision Date: 27 September 2005
• Docket Number: (SC 17331).
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: JOHN KELLY ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL. PETER BECKWITH v. MELVIN WEARING ET AL. SHAWN BURNS v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

275 Conn. 580

881 A.2d 978

JOHN KELLY ET AL. v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

PETER BECKWITH v. MELVIN WEARING ET AL.

SHAWN BURNS v. CITY OF NEW HAVEN ET AL.

(SC 17331).

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 15, 2005.

Officially released September 27, 2005.

Sullivan, C. J., and Borden, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.

Thomas W. Ude, Jr., corporation counsel, with whom, on the brief, were Kathleen M. Foster, assistant corporation counsel, and Jonathan H. Beamon, assistant corporation counsel, for the appellants (defendants).

Kenneth DeLorenzo, for the appellees (plaintiffs).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The sole issue in this consolidated appeal¹ is whether the methodology for promoting police officers currently utilized by the defendants, the city of New Haven (city) and certain city officials; see footnote 1 of this opinion; whereby civil service examination scores are rounded to whole numbers and then treated as score groups, violates the New Haven charter (charter) provisions limiting the discretion that may be exercised in such promotions. The plaintiffs, certain city police officers who were passed over for promotion; see footnote 1 of this opinion; sought, in three separate actions, equitable and legal relief, alleging that this methodology violates the so called "rule of three" under the charter and the city's civil service rules and regulations (civil service rules) by allowing consideration of all the individuals in the three highest groups of scores created by rounding, rather than the three highest scoring individuals. The plaintiffs also alleged that the defendants' conduct violates the charter's provision prohibiting race-based discrimination in promotions,² and the plaintiffs' federal constitutional right to due process and equal protection under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.³

Specifically, on October 27, 2000, the plaintiff John Kelly and three other police officers initiated an action against the city; its police chief, Melvin Wearing; the city's director of personnel, Tina Burgett; and certain members of the board of police commissioners challenging Eligible List 00-16 for promotion to the rank of lieutenant and Eligible List 98-65 for promotion to the rank of detective (Kelly case). On the plaintiffs' motion, the trial court, Munro, J., issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendants from promoting certain candidates until further order of the court. On August 7, 2001, the plaintiff Peter Beckwith initiated an action against the same defendants named in the Kelly case challenging Eligible List 00-31 for promotion to the rank of sergeant (Beckwith case). On May 8, 2003, the plaintiffs Shawn Burns and Peter Beckwith, initiated an action against the city; Wearing, who had since retired; and certain city officials challenging Eligible List 03-02 for promotion to the rank of detective (Burns case).⁴ On the plaintiffs' motion in the Burns case, the trial court also issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the defendants from promoting certain candidates. Thereafter, the trial court scheduled a consolidated hearing in all three cases on the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief solely on the issue of whether the defendants' methodology violated the charter. Following a four day hearing, the trial court, Pittman, J., declared the promotional practices to be in violation of the charter and permanently enjoined the defendants from rounding competitive examination scores so as to create tie scores and from assigning candidates to score groups based on rounded scores. The trial court then rendered partial judgment in the three cases in the plaintiffs' favor.

On appeal to this court, the defendants claim that the trial court improperly concluded that: (1) the charter limits the number of applicants who may be considered for any promotion; and (2) the practice of rounding civil service examination scores violates the charter. To the extent that the claims properly are before this court; see part I of this opinion; we disagree with the defendants and, accordingly, we affirm the partial judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts that are common to all three cases in this appeal. The plaintiffs are city police officers who sat for and passed civil service examinations for promotion to a higher rank. The charter requires such competitive examination of candidates to determine eligibility for promotion.⁵ The city's civil service board⁶ oversees and certifies the examination process. In practice, that board contracts with private individuals and companies to devise and administer the examinations used to establish eligibility lists.

A total examination score of 70 percent or higher is required for an applicant to be placed upon an eligibility list. The examination consists of written and oral components. Each component is scored separately; however, those candidates who do not score 70 percent or higher on the written examination are not invited to participate in the oral examination. A computer program utilized by the testing company yields scores calculated to at least two decimal points. The scores are then weighted,⁷ combined to create a total raw score, also calculated out to at least two decimal points, and provided to the city. The personnel director's office creates an eligibility list for each rank for which there is a vacancy, which in turn is approved by the civil service board.

Once an eligibility list has been certified by the civil service board, the list has no more than a two year life.⁸ A candidate whose place in the ranking is not reached for promotion before the expiration of a list, or who has been passed over for promotion, can participate in the next examination when it is offered and attempt to make the new eligibility list.

When a vacancy occurs for a position, the chief of police chooses which candidate to promote among a prescribed number of candidates on the eligibility list and sends that recommendation to the board of police commissioners. The board of police commissioners is the appointing authority, but, as a practical matter, it routinely approves the recommendations of the police chief. Commonly, multiple appointments to a higher rank are made at one time.

The prescribed number of candidates who may be considered for promotion are set forth under the "rule of three" adopted by the city. First adopted in 1909, the rule of three was expressed as a requirement that promotion be made from "those applicants, not exceeding three, who shall stand highest" on the eligibility list. The city's civil service rules, promulgated by the civil service board under authority granted to it pursuant to the charter, similarly limit such promotion.⁹ As early as 1972, however, the city adopted the practice of treating candidates with tie scores as being equally eligible for promotional consideration, thus creating a score group. In 1993, a revision to the charter changed the language setting forth the rule of three to provide that promotions from the eligibility lists must be from among "those applicants with the three highest scores."¹⁰ The civil service rules continue to require that promotions be made from "those applicants, not exceeding three, who shall stand highest" on the eligibility list.

In practice, before at least 1990, the defendants considered the individuals with the top three scores, calculated to at least two decimal points, for each open position. Because tie scores were relatively rare, the police chief and the board of police commissioners typically would be able to choose among three to four candidates for each open position.

Sometime between 1990 and 1994, the city changed the methodology it uses for promotions within the police department to the one at issue in the present appeal. Under the new methodology, the city personnel director rounds to the nearest whole number the computer generated scores given to the city by the outside testing company.¹¹ Under this methodology, raw scores with a decimal component below 0.50 are rounded down to the nearest whole number and those with a decimal component of 0.50 and higher are rounded up. Thus, computer generated scores of 89.51 and 90.49 both would become 90 percent. Scores below the seventieth percentile are not rounded up, however, to reach the passing grade.

After the personnel director rounds the scores, she creates an eligibility list by placing those candidates with tie scores into score groups. Thus, the defendants consider all of the candidates equally within the top three score groups created by rounding, rather than the top three individuals, for each promotion vacancy.

The following additional facts relate to the Burns case, the third action filed, but in substance are typical of all three cases. Between January and February, 2003, Beckwith and Burns sat for and passed the examination for promotion to detective and were certified on Eligible List 03-02. Beckwith's raw score was 82.08, and Burns' raw score was 82.83. Before the scores were rounded, of the fifty-six people who passed the examination, Burns had the eleventh highest score, Beckwith had the fourteenth highest score, and the only pair of candidates with tie scores had the thirty-fourth highest score. After the city rounded the scores, there were fourteen groups of tie scores; Beckwith was in the seventh score group with four other candidates, and Burns was alone in the sixth score group.

In the first round of promotions from this list, the defendant members of the board of police commissioners, on the recommendation of Wearing, promoted thirteen candidates from Eligible List 03-02. All ten candidates from score groups one through five were promoted. Also promoted were one of the four candidates from group seven and two of the four candidates in group eight. Burns, in group six, and Beckwith, in group seven, were among the six passed over by the intended promotions. Thus, candidates whose raw scores would...