Kelly v. Nichols

• Decision Date: 23 November 1892
• Citation: 18 R.I. 62,25 A. 840
• Parties: KELLY et al. v. NICHOLS et al.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

25 A. 840

18 R.I. 62

KELLY et al.

v. NICHOLS et al.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 23, 1892.

Bill by George Kelly and others against Thomas P. Nichols and others to avoid a trust created by the will of Joseph Greene, and for an account. On bill, answer, and proofs. Decree for complainants.

Charles E. Gorman and Patrick J. Galvin, for complainants.

William P. Sheffield, William Gilpin, Thomas C. Greene,and Arnold Green, for respondents.

STINESS, J. At the October term, 1890, this case was before the court on demurrer to the bill. 17 R. I. 306, 21 Atl. Rep. 906. The bill is brought by the heirs of Joseph Greene to avoid a testamentary trust, and the question then raised was whether the gift to the trustees was valid, as a gift to charitable uses. We held that it was not. The case is now before us on bill, answer, and evidence, and the same question is again urged, upon an exhaustive review of authority. It is now claimed, upon the answer and evidence, that a practice of hospitality has grown up in the society of . Friends in freely entertaining ministers and others, members of the society, coming from a distance to attend the meetings, and that such entertainment is furnished, not as simple hospitality, but in the service of religious truth, and with a view to aid the religious meetings. It also appears that the society is accustomed to pay from its treasury for the traveling expenses and entertainment of members. Hence it is claimed that what the society itself may do may also be done by way of a charitable trust. It is to be observed at the outset that a religious society may do many things in the administration of its own affairs, usually from voluntary contributions, which would not support a charitable trust in perpetuity. For example, it is not uncommon for such societies to provide excursions or picnics for the children, but it could hardly be contended that a gift to trustees simply for that purpose could be sustained. Many societies procure portraits of their ministers, and place tablets or other monuments to their memory, but these things would not fall within any recognized division of charitable trusts. A society has necessarily a wide discretion in dealing with its own funds, which cannot be made the criterion of a valid trust. This distinction is clearly brought out in Dexter v. Gardner, 7 Allen, 243, where it was held that a gift to a religious society was valid, although it might be used for the purchase and repair of burying grounds, because all the objects to which a society, by the usages of a denomination, may appropriate its funds, are to he regarded as charitable, when similar objects cannot be regarded as charitable under a secular trust. "As the gift is to the society, for its benefit, it is not within the rule against perpetuities."

The respondents in the present case adroit that a gift for hospitality alone does not create a valid trust; but they contend that, the trust in this case being in aid of the religious meetings of the society of Friends, the gift is really to a religious use. We do not see that we can adopt this view. The connection between the gift and the result to be secured is too indirect, too remote, and too inconsequential. Suppose a gift were to be made to furnish dinners to all persons attending at church, or to provide gifts for a Christmas tree, in the hope of inducing thereby a larger attendance upon church service. We could not hold that such a gift is to a charitable use. It would be benevolence, rather than charity, as this word is understood in law. The test lies in the controlling purpose, as shown by the terms and character of the gift. The practical effect of the gift in question is simply to relieve others from extending that hospitality which it is said the Friends accept as a part of their religious duty. Its controlling purpose is to insure a continuance of such hospitality in the house where the testator and his fathers had dispensed it. It is not a gift to the society itself, for its work, nor to trustees, to apply to the benefit of the society, nor for any work of religion or public use, but for private entertainment only. It is not for ministers, nor Tor the poor, but for all "traveling to meetings or otherwise in the service of truth." It might be administered, consistently with the terms of the will, simply for the benefit of those who are neither ministers nor in need, who might be deemed to be in any way "in the service of truth," whatever that phrase may mean. It is argued that all meetings of Friends are in the service of truth, but this trust is not confined to those attending meetings. Under this will the trustees might provide a home for a traveling author engaged in writing a book on the doctrines of the society, if they were satisfied that he was engaged "in the service of truth," as the testator defined it; and other ways are equally conceivable in which the trustees might follow the terms of the will in the line of pure benevolence, instead of a trust for religious uses. As was stated in Pell v. Mercer, 14 R. I. 412, 442, if a bequest can, consistently with the will, be applied to other than charitable uses, the bequest is invalid. In that case the testator gave a portion of his property "to such works of religion or benevolence" as his executors might select. The court held that if the alternative of benevolence were to be taken in its broad sense the bequest would be invalid, but that it was apparent from other directions in the will that the term was used in a restricted and narrower sense, as synonymous with "charity." In the present case, however, the general intent is so specifically set out that we cannot restrict the provisions to a purely charitable use. The trouble does not lie in the uncertainty, but in the very definiteness, of the will. The testator has made it clear that he desired and intended to continue to keep his house open for the reception and entertainment of all who might be deemed to be engaged in the service of truth, in the same manner that he and his ancestors before him had dispensed their hospitality. This is the main purpose of the will, to which all other directions are subordinated. We are constrained to say that this is a bequest merely for hospitality, and not to a religious or charitable use. An expectation that this may result, in some indirect and indefinite way, to the benefit of a religious society, does not change its essential character, nor warrant our holding it to be a charity. There must be some limit in the interpretation of a trust, more definite than the fervid fancy of a judge. If this trust is sustainable, it is difficult to conceive of a trust in any way—however remotely—connected with religion or education which would not be equally so. We know of no definition of a legal charity more accurate, concise, and comprehensive than that given by Mr. Justice Gray In Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, 556: "A charity, in the legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift to be applied, consistently with existing laws, for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion; by relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint; by assisting them to establish themselves in life; or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works, or otherwise lessening the burden of government. It is immaterial whether the purpose is called charitable in the gift itself, if it is so described as to show that it is charitable in its nature." We do no* see how it can be claimed that this gift falls within either of these divisions of a charity, without giving a wide range to the imagination, in the hope of drawing therefrom some ulterior and possibly resultant benefit, which the testator himself has not disclosed. Undoubtedly, if a general charitable interest be disclosed in the will, the gift will be supported, even though the particular mode of administering the trust pointed out by the testator may be ineffectual. But this general Intent is to be found in the will itself. In the will before us we can find no such general intent. The idea of the testator was not to furnish funds for the use or benefit of any of the local or general meetings of Friends, nor for the poor among their number, for fear that such beneficiaries might become apostate; but his primary and predominating purpose was to provide entertainment, in a merely private way, for those who should be acceptable to his trustees on account of their soundness in faith. The gift is not, in general intent, for the benefit of the society of Friends; for in the instructions to his trustees he contemplates the contingency that the society may become so largely affected by apostacy from the faith that true believers will be deprived of their membership," and, as it were, driven into the wilderness." But still the trustees "are to follow the original principles of truth in the application of the benefits of this trust, without regard to the outward appearance, mere name, lifeless profession, numbers, or majority of such apostates." Neither is the gift for the teaching or preaching of the gospel, or for any religious use other than what his trustees may deem to be comprehended in the vague expression, "in the service of truth," which the answer, by substituting a conjectural motive for the thing itself, makes the equivalent of simple hospitality. But what is the "application of the benefits of this trust" which the testator directed? Nothing but the entertainment of traveling Friends whose belief is similar to his own. The many pious expressions in the will, and the ardor for what ho calls "the truth," may lead a superficial reader to mistake the pious expressions for the object aimed at; but a close analysis shows clearly that what he was aiming at was not the general benefit which comes from religious teaching, but a perpetuation of his own...