Kelly v. Rolland
| Decision Date | 14 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-00149-CWD |
| Parties | MICHAEL A. KELLY, Plaintiff, v. KATIE ROLLAND, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Idaho |
The Clerk of Court conditionally filed pro se Plaintiff Michael A. Kelly's complaint as a result of his in forma pauperis request. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this Court must review Kelly's in forma pauperis complaint to determine whether it may be summarily dismissed. Kelly, the only party appearing in this action, consented to the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73. The Court now reviews Kelly's complaint to determine whether it, or any of the claims therein, should be summarily dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Havingreviewed the record, and otherwise being fully informed, the Court enters the following Order.
Plaintiff Michael A. Kelly filed a pro se complaint requesting in forma pauperis status on February 26, 2016, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. (Dkt. 1.) Kelly filed an amended complaint on March 1, 2016. (Dkt. 5.) On March 9, 2016, the court granted Kelly's in forma pauperis request, but ordered that service of process be delayed while the court conducted an initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). (Dkt. 2, 8.) Also on March 9, the court issued a Report and Recommendation that the case be transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, the District where Defendant Katie Rolland resides. (Dkt. 9.) The case was transferred on April 5, 2016, and assigned to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge.
Kelly's amended complaint states that, on February 5, 2016, he mailed a newspaper along with a typed letter to Kellie Drake, an inmate at the Gem County Jail. On February 19, 2016, Kelly received the same mail at his P.O. Box in Bay City, Michigan, returned from the Gem County Jail. On the envelope was a Return to Sender stamp, below which was handwritten, "no advertisements ads." Kelly asserts that this was written by or at the direction of Defendant Katie Rolland, the Jail Commander at the Gem County Jail in Emmett, Idaho, whom Kelly alleges is "the person in charge at this facility that is tasked [with] the responsibility of determining what/which inmate mails get delivered." The amended complaint also appears to allege that Rolland acted per policy,stating: "if the jail has a policy prohibiting mail/magazines/newspapers, primarily of an 'advertising nature' I haven't seen it and even if there were such a GEM CO. Jail Policy that Policy would be in violation of the 1st Amend."
Kelly alleges: (1) his First Amendment right was violated by Rolland's refusal to deliver the newspaper to Drake; (2) his First Amendment right was violated by Rolland's refusal to deliver the typed letter to Drake; and (3) his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process was violated when he was not given means by which to appeal the decision not to deliver and to return the mail he sent to Drake. Kelly seeks punitive damages totaling $1,500.00, with $500.00 to be awarded for each violation.
Once a complaint has been conditionally filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the Court may conduct an initial review of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii).
Because Kelly is proceeding pro se, the complaint must be liberally construed, and Kelly must be given the benefit of any doubt. See Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Additionally, if the complaint can be saved by amendment, Kelly should be notified of the deficiencies and provided an opportunity to amend. See Jackson v. Carey, 353 F.3d 750, 758 (9th Cir. 2003). A dismissal without leave to amend isimproper unless it is beyond doubt that the complaint "could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir. 2009).
A complaint fails to state a claim for relief under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure if the factual assertions in the complaint, taken as true, are insufficient for the reviewing court plausibly "to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. In other words, although Rule 8 "does not require detailed factual allegations, ... it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the facts pleaded are "merely consistent with a defendant's liability," the complaint has not state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although not stated in his amended complaint, Kelly's constitutional claims are brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. To state a valid claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute proximately caused by the conduct of a person acting under color of state law. Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991).
Section 1983 claims can be asserted against an individual personally or in their official capacity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985). An individual is sued in his or her official capacity when suit is brought for official actions attributable toenforcement of a policy or custom, or for a decision as a final policy maker. See id; see also Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Serv. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Kelly's amended complaint alleges Rolland is "the person in charge at this facility that is tasked [with] the responsibility of determining what/which inmate mails get delivered." The complaint alleges also that "Rolland, or someone at her direction," was responsible for returning the envelope, causing the alleged violation of Kelly's constitutional rights.
Because Kelly is alleging that his rights were violated by Rolland either through enforcement of a policy or as a result of her decision as a policy maker, the Court interprets the amended complaint as bringing suit against Rolland in her official capacity as Jail Commander.
Kelly alleges his First Amendment right to free speech and association was violated when Rolland did not deliver Kelly's mail to inmate Drake and instead returned the mail to Kelly. Incarceration does not remove with it all the rights guaranteed under the Constitution. "Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution," Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987), "nor do they bar free citizens from exercising their own constitutional rights by reaching out to those on the 'inside.'" Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989). Regulation of inmate mail implicates the First Amendment rights of both inmates and their outside correspondents. "This does not depend on whether the nonprisoner correspondent is the author or intended recipient of a particular letter." Martinez, 416 U.S. at 408. "[N]on-prisoners do indeed have a First Amendment right to correspond with prisoners." Rowe v.Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)2; Prison Legal News v. Lehman, 397 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) ("We can perceive no principled basis for distinguishing publications specifically ordered by a prison inmate from letters written to that inmate for purposes of first amendment protection." (quoting Miniken v. Walter, 978 F. Supp. 1356, 1362 (E.D. Wash. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)).
However, these rights must be weighed with "due regard for the 'inordinately difficult undertaking' that is modern prison administration" by weighing the need for order and security against the rights of inmates and non-inmates who seek to communicate with each other. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 85). Because of the security risks associated with materials entering a jail or prison, officials are given greater discretion with regard to regulation of incoming mail than with outgoing mail. Id. at 413.
"When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. Four factors are considered when making this determination:
(1) Whether the regulation is rationally related to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective; (2) whether there are alternative avenues that remain open to the inmates to exercise the right; (3) the impact that accommodating the asserted right will have on other guards and prisoners,and on the allocation of prison resources; and (4) whether the existence of easy and obvious alternatives indicates that the regulation is an exaggerated response by prison officials.
Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145,1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90).
It appears that Kelly's amended complaint may state a cognizable First Amendment claim based upon his right to correspond with inmate Drake. However, the complaint merely suggests that a policy exists but provides no details as to what that policy may be. The Court is therefore unable to determine, at this time, whether a legitimate penological interest exists. The Court finds Kelly's amended complaint, liberally construed, states plausible First Amendment vio...
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