Keltner v. Suncoke Energy, Inc.

Decision Date26 May 2015
Docket NumberNo. 3:14-cv-01374-DRH-PMF,3:14-cv-01374-DRH-PMF
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois
PartiesPEGGY KELTNER, JEROME and BEVERLY JOHNSON, MELINDA DUNIPHAN and SHELBY SIEBERT, PlaintiffS, v. SUNCOKE ENERGY, INC., GATEWAY ENERGY & COKE COMPANY, LLC and UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs, Illinois citizens, filed this class action in state court asserting claims for temporary nuisance, trespass, and negligence against defendants SunCoke Energy, Inc ("SunCoke"), Gateway Energy Coke Company, LLC ("GECC"), and United States Steel Corporation ("US Steel"). Plaintiffs' complaint is based on the defendants' alleged contamination of their property through operation of a GECC facility and Steel mill located in Granite City, Illinois. Plaintiffs claim that operation of the Granite City facility regularly releases substantial amounts of particles that leave a silty deposit on nearby residents' properties and enter into nearby homes.

There is no interstate component to the present action. Rather, the putativeclass representatives are Illinois citizens, asserting common law tort claims, against an alleged source of pollution located in Illinois.

Defendants SunCoke and GECC removed the case, asserting the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 ("CAFA") and federal question as the bases for jurisdiction (Doc. 2). As to federal question jurisdiction, defendants' removal papers note plaintiffs' complaint references a lawsuit initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency against two of the defendants. The lawsuit involved conduct that allegedly violated a permit issued to GECC under the federal Clean Air Act.

The plaintiffs have filed a motion to remand (Doc. 19). Plaintiffs do not dispute that defendants have satisfied CAFA's requirements of diversity of citizenship, a proposed class composed more than 100 members, and an amount in controversy in excess of $5,000,000, but argue that this case falls within CAFA's "local controversy exception." 18 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (setting forth the local controversy exception). With regard to original jurisdiction, plaintiffs assert that they are only pursuing claims arising under state law.

SunCoke and GECC filed a response to plaintiffs' motion to remand (Doc. 23). SunCoke and GECC focus on the issues pertaining to CAFA.1 US Steel has also filed a response (Doc. 25). US Steel's responsive brief addresses federal question jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have also filed a reply (Doc. 31).

II. REMOVAL - STANDARD

A defendant may remove a case filed in state court if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction to hear the case when the plaintiff originally filed it. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 758 (7th Cir. 2009). "The party seeking removal has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction, and federal courts should interpret the removal statute narrowly, resolving any doubt in favor of the plaintiff's choice of forum in state court." Schur, 577 F.3d at 758 (citing Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993)).

III. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION

A. The Parties' Arguments

In their notice of removal, SunCoke and GECC allege plaintiffs' claims arise under federal law because plaintiffs' complaint references a lawsuit filed by the Environmental Protection Agency related to emissions from the Granite City Facility. SunCoke and GECC allege this lawsuit implicates the Clean Air Act and a consent decree issued by the Southern District of Illinois (as a result of the referenced lawsuit). In their motion to remand, the plaintiffs acknowledge the complaint references the lawsuit and the resultant consent decree, but insist they are not pursuing any claims for violations of the Clean Air Act or any other federally based claims. Instead, the plaintiffs state they are only pursuing common law claims of nuisance, trespass and negligence under state law.

In its responsive brief, US Steel insists federal question jurisdiction exists. Although the briefing is not entirely clear and the argument is not fully developed,US Steel appears to be presenting three alternative arguments related to federal question jurisdiction: (1) the face of the complaint asserts federally based claims because plaintiffs' causes of action do not expressly reference state law; (2) nuisance claims involving ambient air necessarily arise under federal law; and/or (3) plaintiffs' claims are wholly displaced by the Clean Air Act.2

The Court addresses the above arguments in turn below.

B. Federal Claims are Not Asserted on the Face of the Complaint

Federal question jurisdiction lies over state law claims that implicate significant issues of federal law. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S.Ct. 2363, 162 L.Ed.2d 257 (2005). Federal question jurisdiction does not merely exist when federal law applies; rather there must be an actual dispute regarding federal law. Id. at 315 n. 3.

In order to determine the scope of Plaintiffs' claims, the Court employs the well-pleaded-complaint-rule:

Ordinarily, a court must determine the presence or absence of a federal question by examining only the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint. This rule requires that a federal question appear on the face of the complaint. The plaintiff, as the master of his own complaint, may avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading only state-law claims.

Nelson v. Stewart, 422 F.3d 463, 466 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted)3 The plaintiffs' complaint does not reference any law - state or federal. Plaintiffs merely assert common law claims for nuisance, trespass and negligence without further specification. Defendants assert because plaintiffs' complaint fails to characterize its causes of action as based on state rather than federal law, federal question jurisdiction exists. For the purpose of addressing this argument, the Court assumes without deciding that private citizens can assert nuisance claims against private entities relating to localized pollution under federal common law.

Defendants have not identified any authority requiring the plaintiffs to bring their common law claims under federal rather than state law.4 Defendants argue, nonetheless, the ambiguity in plaintiffs' complaint must be resolved in favor of applying federal law. Defendants' argument is unpersuasive. Here, defendants have the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction and the Court must resolve any doubt in favor of applying state law. Schur, 577 F.3d at 758 (citing Doe v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 985 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the Court will credit plaintiffs' statement in their motion to remand that they are only asserting state law claims. See Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co, 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (stating "the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely on.");See also Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 n. 6 (1986) ("Jurisdiction may not be sustained on a theory that the plaintiff has not advanced."); Duncan v. Stuetzle, 76 F.3d 1480, 1485 (9th Cir.1996) (stating that "if she can maintain her claims on both state and federal grounds, she may ignore the federal question, assert only state claims, and defeat removal"). Further, the Court finds the plaintiffs' passing reference to the lawsuit initiated by the Environmental Protection Agency and the resultant consent decree is insufficient to sustain federal question jurisdiction.

B. Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineers Does Not Require Application of Federal Law

The Court next considers the defendants' argument with regard to federal common law and ambient air. Defendants urge Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineers 758 F.3d 892 (7th Cir. 2014), requires a finding of federal question jurisdiction on the theory that plaintiffs' claims arise under the federal common law dealing with ambient air.

In Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineers, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged, in the context of an interstate nuisance involving governmental entities and federal rights, there is a federal common law when dealing with air and water in their ambient or interstate aspects. However, the Court notes that at least four important factors were present in Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineers that are not present here. The first is the fact that the plaintiffs were governmental entities (five states and an Indian tribe); the second was the interstate nature of thenuisance involved (the threat posed to Great Lakes by an invasive carp species); the third was the fact that one of the defendants was an agency of the federal government (the Army Corps of Engineers); and the fourth was the fact that the plaintiffs were actually seeking to pursue federal common law claims.

In the instant case, private plaintiffs are asserting state common law claims against private entities. Moreover, the alleged harm is local and does not - in any way - involve an interstate nuisance. Given these significant differences, the Court is not persuaded that Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineersrequires a finding of federal question jurisdiction. As the Court must resolve any doubt in favor of applying state law, the Court concludes Michigan v. US Army Corps of Engineers does not mandate application of federal law in the instant case.5

C. Defendants Have Failed to Establish Complete Preemption Over Plaintiffs' State Law Claims

Finally, the Court considers the defendants' argument as to whether federal law wholly displaces plaintiffs' state law claims.6 Generally, the "well-pleaded complaint" doctrine guides jurisdictional matters. Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 112-13, 57 S.Ct. 96, 97-98, 81 L.Ed. 70 (1936). The "allegations of the complaint determine whether the claim arises under state or federal law," makingthe plaintiff "master of his pleadings." Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 1073, 1075 (7th Cir. 1992); see...

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