Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litig. Series Kelvin Manbodh v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 324/1997.,324/1997.
• Citation: 47 V.I. 375
• Parties: In re: KELVIN MANBODH ASBESTOS LITIGATION SERIES Kelvin MANBODH, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION, et. al., Defendants. HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION, Third Party Plaintiff, v. LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, et al., Third Party Defendants. LITWIN CORPORATION and Litwin Pan–American Corporation, Third Party Plaintiffs, v. UNIVERSAL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, et al., Third Party Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

47 V.I. 375

In re: KELVIN MANBODH ASBESTOS LITIGATION SERIES

Kelvin MANBODH, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION, et. al., Defendants.

HESS OIL VIRGIN ISLANDS CORPORATION, Third Party Plaintiff,

v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION, et al., Third Party Defendants.

LITWIN CORPORATION and Litwin Pan–American Corporation, Third Party Plaintiffs,

v.UNIVERSAL OIL PRODUCTS COMPANY, et al., Third Party Defendants.

No. 324/1997.

District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix.

March 6, 2006.

Britain H. Bryant, Bryant, Barnes, Moss, & Beckstedt LLP, St. Croix, VI, for Third–Party Plaintiff Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp. Kevin A. Rames, Kevin A. Rames, P.C., Christiansted, St. Croix, VI, for Shell Oil Company and Exxon–Mobil Corporation.

Maria Tankenson Hodge, Adam G. Christian, Hodge & Francois, St. Thomas, VI, for Chicago Bride & Iron, N.V. and Parsons Infrastructure and Technology Group, Inc., and CBI Services, Inc.

Richard H. Hunter, Hunter, Cole & Bennett, Christiansted, St. Croix VI, Childers Products Co.

W. Mark Wilczynski, Wilczynski & Garten, St. Thomas, VI, for Third–Party Plaintiff Litwin Corp.

Terri Griffiths, Mackay & Hodge, St. Thomas, VI, for Nalco Company.

Simone R.D. Francis, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak, & Stewart LLC, St. Thomas, VI, for 3M, a/k/a Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. and 3M of Puerto Rico.

John H. Benham, Watts, Benham, & Sprehn P.C., St. Thomas, VI, Resco Products, Inc.

MEMORANDUM OPINION CONVERTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS THIRD PARTY COMPLAINTS AND CROSS–CLAIMS

CABRET, Presiding J.

FOR PUBLICATION

MEMORANDUM OPINION

THIS MATTER is before the Court on fourteen Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment filed by Third–Party/Cross–Claim Defendants ¹ [hereinafter “TPDs”] concerning the common law contribution and indemnification counts of the Third–Party Complaints and Cross–Claim Complaints of Third–Party Plaintiff/Cross–Claimant Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation [hereinafter “HOVIC”] and Third–Party Plaintiff Litwin Corporation [hereinafter “Litwin”]. HOVIC and Litwin opposed all motions, to which several TPDs replied.² Subsequently, other TPDs joined in many of these motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment.³ The Court heard oral arguments from all parties to these motions on May 4, 2005.⁴ For the reasons contained herein, after a review of the memoranda and the hearing transcript, the Court will convert all motions to dismiss to motions for summary judgment. In so doing, this Court will allow all parties to these motions reasonable time to present all material made relevant by this opinion.

I. BACKGROUND

To resolve pre-trial matters, this Court, in May 1997, consolidated in a single docket, In re Kelvin Manbodh Asbestos Litigation Series, lawsuits filed on behalf of Plaintiff Kelvin Manbodh and 210 additional parties against HOVIC, Litwin, and some twenty-six other defendants. Litwin and HOVIC filed motions seeking leave to file third-party complaints in October and November 2001, respectively. These initial motions, granted shortly thereafter, sought to implead parties only with respect to the four cases set for trial. HOVIC's third-party claims and cross-claims and Litwin's third-party claims were severed from the first-party matters in October 2002. After claims between HOVIC, Litwin and First–Party Plaintiffs were settled in January 2003, subsequent motions to amend by HOVIC and Litwin, impleading previously named and additional defendants in all remaining first-party cases, were granted in October 2004. In all, some eighty-seven additional companies, including the movants, were brought into this litigation as third-party defendants.

In both their Motions to Dismiss and Motions for Summary Judgment, TPDs assert as their primary contention that dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate under the provisions of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability because HOVIC cannot as a matter of law establish all essential elements of its common law contribution and indemnification claims. In particular, TPDs argue that HOVIC fails to establish or even allege that it discharged TPDs' liability to the Plaintiffs. TPDs maintain that for HOVIC to assert such claims it must confer this benefit on the TPDs. HOVIC maintains that Virgin Islands law does not require a discharge of TPDs' liability. Additionally, HOVIC claims that the running of the statute of limitations of the Plaintiffs' claims against the TPDs operates the same as releases from liability by settlement or judgment such that they all constitute discharges of liability.

TPDs level similar arguments against Litwin. Litwin contends that the grant of summary judgment or a dismissal is improper for several reasons. Among them, Litwin argues that the Plaintiffs' claims against it are still contingent. Litwin insists that because its initial complaint was filed before a settlement was achieved with the First–Party Plaintiffs and no stipulation for dismissal has been entered in that matter, it may therefore rest on the allegations in its complaint to withstand motions to dismiss. Alternatively, Litwin argues, like HOVIC, that if a discharge is required, the running of the statute of limitations constitutes a discharge by application of law sufficient for common law indemnification and contribution causes of action to stand. Finally, Litwin asserts that because the Virgin Islands follow the principles of joint and several liability, a settlement by one tortfeasor automatically discharges any other potential tortfeasor. Since the Court will convert the Motions to Dismiss to Motions for Summary Judgment, it will reserve comment on the factual arguments articulated by the parties until they have been allowed a reasonable opportunity to present all relevant material.

II. STANDARDS FOR DISMISSAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Motions to Dismiss before this Court assert that the common law contribution and indemnification counts contained in HOVIC's and Litwin's pleadings fail to state claims upon which relief can be granted. SeeSuper. Ct. R. 7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) shall deny the motion unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [its] claim which would entitle [it] to relief.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). In applying this standard, a court shall assume all reasonable factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all fair inferences from such allegations. Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Lansdale, 172 F.Supp.2d 636, 649 (D.V.I.App.Div.2001). Allegations will not be reasonable, nor will inferences in favor of the plaintiff be fair, where they contradict facts either contained in the public record or judicially noticed by the Court. See Johns v. Town of East Hampton, 942 F.Supp. 99, 104 (E.D.N.Y.1996); Employers Ins. of Wassau v. Mussick Peeler & Garrett, 871 F.Supp. 381, 385 (S.D.Ca.1994) (citations omitted). See generally Gov't Guarantee Fund of the Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F.Supp. 441, 448–49 (D.V.I.1997).

The standard governing summary judgment in the Superior Court is found in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Super. Ct. R. 7; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; see Green v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 29 V.I. 27, 30 (Terr.Ct.1994) (applying Federal Rule 56 to a motion for summary judgment). Summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). While substantive law will determine if a fact is material, whether a dispute of material fact is genuine instead turns on the presence of evidence “such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Courts deciding whether such genuine issues exist shall view the facts in a light most favorable to, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Christopher v. Davis Beach Co., 15 F.3d 38, 40 (3d Cir.1994). Consequently, the initial burden of proof for summary judgment lies with the moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970). Once the moving party has carried its burden of establishing the absence of genuine issues of material fact, however, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to material facts.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). The nonmoving party must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

Where the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial and the essential elements are at issue, “it must by affidavits or by the depositions and admissions on file ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element essential to that party's case.” ’ Equimark Commercial Fin. Co. v. C.I.T. Fin. Servs. Corp., 812 F.2d 141, 144 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)). Thus, if the non-movant's evidence is merely “colorable” or is “not significantly probative,” the court may grant summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50. Nevertheless, a trial court should act with an abundance of caution in granting summary judgment, and may deny summary judgment where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial. Id. at 254.

III. CONVERSION STANDARD

Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instructs this Court when a conversion from a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment is appropriate. It provides:

If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading...