Kem Mfg. Corp. v. Howland
| Decision Date | 29 May 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-227-A,77-227-A |
| Citation | 401 A.2d 1284,121 R.I. 601 |
| Parties | KEM MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. Matthew C. HOWLAND. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an appeal in a civil action that the plaintiff brought seeking injunctive relief against the defendant, a former employee, for breach of a restrictive covenant contained in an employment contract. 1 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had violated the contract by selling chemical products to the plaintiff's customers during the 2-year period delineated in the restrictive covenant. A Superior Court justice sitting without a jury found that the contract, including the covenant, was in effect until the defendant's employment terminated in 1976. The trial justice also found that the defendant had made sales that violated the covenant. As a result of this decision, the trial justice enjoined and restrained the defendant from doing any further business in violation of the covenant and found that the defendant was in contempt of an earlier preliminary injunction issued by the court. He awarded the plaintiff $3,839.25 for the defendant's breach of the covenant as well as further damages equal to the defendant's gross sales made in violation of the injunction. Finally, the trial justice ordered the defendant to make available to the plaintiff on a monthly basis invoices of his future sales for a 2-year period. After an entry of judgment for plaintiff, this appeal followed.
The record discloses that the parties entered into an employment contract on January 23, 1970. The contract called for defendant to serve as plaintiff's chemical sales representative in southern Rhode Island and eastern Connecticut. In August, 1973, defendant undertook limited managerial responsibilities within the company while he continued his sales duties. The defendant discontinued his managerial duties, however, after 5 months and resumed his full-time sales duties. He continued his sales work until May, 1976, when his employment ended. At this time, defendant began his own chemical business, Shawnmark Chemical, and entered into competition with plaintiff.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial justice erred in finding that his employment contract remained in effect until the 1976 termination. The defendant contends that in 1973, when he began his managerial duties, he became a district manager and his employment contract with plaintiff terminated. He testified that following his appointment he was asked to sign a division/district manager contract, but that he refused. He also testified that, upon his return to sales after 5 months, he refused to sign a new salesman's contract. Because his duties changed and he was asked to sign new contracts, defendant argues that his employment contract terminated in 1973.
The plaintiff argues that defendant was given a temporary assignment as a district manager in training and that this appointment did not terminate his original contract. The plaintiff supports this argument by referring to the testimony of its employee, James Garvey, who indicated that defendant continued to operate as a salesman during his 5-month assignment. The plaintiff presented further testimony that, although defendant was placed on a salary, he was paid the equivalent of his commissions for sales during his temporary assignment. The plaintiff concludes therefore that defendant remained a salesman until 1976 and that his contract was not terminated until that time.
We have established on numerous occasions that the findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial justice was clearly wrong or has overlooked or misconceived material evidence. Gim v. Jan Chin, Inc., 117 R.I. 39, 43, 362 A.2d 143, 146 (1976); Raheb v. Lemenski, 115 R.I. 576, 579, 350 A.2d 397, 399 (1976). The trial justice found that defendant's...
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...the justice's finding of fact unless he was clearly wrong or has overlooked or misconceived material evidence. Kem Manufacturing Corporation v. Howland, R.I., 401 A.2d 1284 (1979); Duffy v. Mollo, R.I., 400 A.2d 263 (1979). 6 The petitioner contends that the justice was clearly wrong to dis......
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