Kemin Foods v. Pigmentos Vegetables Del Centro, 4:02-CV-40327.

Citation357 F.Supp.2d 1105
Decision Date08 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 4:02-CV-40327.,4:02-CV-40327.
PartiesKEMIN FOODS, L.C., the Catholic University of America, Plaintiffs, v. PIGMENTOS VEGETALES DEL CENTRO S.A. DE C.V., Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Roger T. Stetson, Edward M. Mansfield, Belin, Lamson, McCormick, Zumback & Flynn PC, Des Moines, IA, Edmund J. Sease, Jeffrey D. Harty, John D. Goodhue, Christine Lebron-Dykeman, McKee Voorhees & Sease P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, Susan K. Knoll, Scott W. Clark, Howery, Simon, Arnold & White LLP, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff.

G. Brian Pingel, Michael A. Dee, Camille L. Urban, Brown, Winick, Graves, Gross, Baskerville & Schoenebaum PLC, West Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER ON POST-TRIAL MOTIONS

GRITZNER, District Judge.

Currently pending before the Court are Defendant's Renewed Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (Clerk's No. 290), Plaintiffs' Renewed Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law on Damages and Infringement of the '714 Patent (Clerk's Nos. 292, 293) and Plaintiffs' Motion for Judgment That the '714 Patent is Enforceable (Clerk's No. 291). Attorneys for Plaintiff are John F. Lynch, Susan K. Knoll, Scott W. Clark, Michelle Replogle and Ed Mansfield; attorneys for Defendant are G. Brian Pingel, Michael A. Dee, Camille L. Urban, and Adam Jones. Oral argument on these motions was held on December 21, 2004, with Mr. Lynch arguing for Plaintiff and Mr. Dee arguing for Defendant. The motions are now fully submitted and ready for ruling.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Plaintiffs, Kemin Foods, L.C. ("Kemin"), and The Catholic University of America, filed an infringement action against the Defendant, Pigmentos Vegetales del Centro S.A. de C.V. ("PIVEG"), on July 9, 2002. The Complaint alleges infringement of two patents held by Kemin, U.S. Patent Nos. 5,382,714 ("the '714 patent") and 5,648,564 ("the '564 patent"), by PIVEG. In turn, PIVEG has alleged several counterclaims against Kemin relating to the patents-in-issue.1

On January 13, 2004, the Court issued an Order on Claim Construction (Clerk's No. 120), construing the relevant claims from both the '714 patent and the '564 patent.2 The Court amended this order on May 18, 2004, when it granted PIVEG's motion to alter or amend the order on claim construction in light of the Federal Circuit's decision reversing the preliminary injunction imposed by this Court (Clerk's No. 163).3 On August 27, 2004, the Court filed an order granting Plaintiffs' motion to apply 35 U.S.C. § 295 (Clerk's No. 201), and on September 2, 2003, the Court filed an order denying the respective motions for summary judgment filed by the parties (Clerk's No. 208).4

BACKGROUND FACTS

Trial was held over ten days beginning September 13, 2004. During the proceedings and after all evidence was submitted, the parties orally moved for judgment as a matter of law on multiple grounds. The Court denied all of these motions. The jury then rendered a verdict finding neither of the patents invalid on the grounds claimed by PIVEG, finding no infringement, either literally or equivalently, of the '714 patent, while finding infringement of the '564 patent under the doctrine of equivalents. In addition, in response to special interrogatories in the verdict form, the jury rendered certain advisory findings on the issue of inequitable conduct.

ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards for Judgment as a Matter of Law

The analysis is grounded in Rule 50, which provides,

If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). After the case has been submitted to the jury to render a verdict, "[a] movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law" to determine whether the evidence reasonably supports the jury's verdict. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b).

A motion for judgment as a matter of law "is proper `[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached' so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party." Shepard v. Wapello County, Iowa, 303 F.Supp.2d 1004, 1006 (S.D.Iowa 2003) (quoting Henderson v. Simmons Foods, Inc., 217 F.3d 612, 615 (8th Cir.2000) (quoting Hathaway v. Runyon, 132 F.3d 1214, 1220 (8th Cir.1997))); see also Eich v. Bd. of Regents for Cent. Mo. State Univ., 350 F.3d 752, 761 (8th Cir.2003) (quoting Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220); Jaros v. LodgeNet Entm't Corp., 294 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir.2002); SIBIA Neurosciences, Inc. v. Cadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed.Cir.2000). Thus, the Court must determine whether sufficient evidence exists to support the jury's verdict. Children's Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 357 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2004).

In applying this standard, the Court looks at all of the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Shepard, 303 F.Supp.2d at 1006 (citing Warren v. Prejean, 301 F.3d 893, 900 (8th Cir.2002)). "`[T]he court must assume as proven all facts that the nonmoving party's evidence tended to show, give [him] the benefit of all reasonable inferences, and assume that all conflicts in the evidence were resolved in [his] favor.'" Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Hathaway, 132 F.3d at 1220); see also Lawrence v. Bowersox, 297 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir.2002). Thus, the movant must demonstrate that all the evidence points in its direction and "`is susceptible to no reasonable interpretation sustaining'" the nonmovant's claims. Shepard, 303 F.Supp.2d at 1007 (quoting Ogden v. Wax Works, Inc., 214 F.3d 999, 1006 (8th Cir.2000)); see Children's Broadcasting Corp., 357 F.3d at 863; Garcia v. City of Trenton, 348 F.3d 726, 727 (8th Cir.2003). In addition, "the Court `may not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence'" in considering a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Shepard, 303 F.Supp.2d at 1007 (quoting Garcia, 348 F.3d at 727); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

Thus, a party seeking to overturn a jury verdict must prove either that sufficient evidence does not exist from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, or under the correct governing law, there could be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "`A mere scintilla of evidence is inadequate to support a verdict,' and judgment as a matter of law is proper when the record contains no proof beyond speculation to support the verdict." Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1452 (8th Cir.1996) (citations omitted).

Moreover, advisory verdicts are just that: advisory. Gragg v. City of Omaha, 20 F.3d 357, 358-59 (8th Cir.1994) ("The district court was free to accept or reject the jury's advisory verdict in making its findings."); Harris v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Army, 119 F.3d 1313, 1320 (8th Cir.1997) (same). However, "`[a] finding of fact must stand unless [the movant] shows that on an entirety of the evidence of record, including that which detracts from the weight of the favorable evidence, and taking into account the required quantum of proof, no reasonable juror could have made the finding'." Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 292 F.3d 728, 736 (Fed.Cir.2002) (quoting Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 821 (Fed.Cir.1992)).

B. Plaintiffs' Motions

Plaintiffs filed three post-trial motions, renewing their motion for judgment as a matter of law made at trial on multiple issues and filing an additional motion on an issue reserved to the Court to decide post-trial. Plaintiffs' first motion seeks judgment as a matter of law that the '714 patent is enforceable. This issue was not determined by the jury, though the jury was asked to render advisory findings on two elements of inequitable conduct. Plaintiffs' second motion requests judgment as a matter of law that PIVEG infringed the '714 patent. Finally, Plaintiffs' third motion seeks judgment as a matter of law on the issues of damages for patent infringement and willful infringement.

1. Enforceability of the '714 Patent

The Court submitted special interrogatory questions to the jury as part of the verdict form. Specifically, the jurors were required to answer the following:

10. Do you find that PIVEG has proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that Kemin withheld information that was material during the application and prosecution of the '714 patent?

11. If Kemin did fail to disclose information to the PTO in conjunction with the '714 patent, do you find that PIVEG has proved by clear and convincing evidence that Kemin withheld the information with an intent to deceive the PTO?

Final Verdict Form. The jury answered "yes" to each of these questions. Kemin now moves for the Court to rule, despite the advisory findings of the jury, that Kemin did not fail to disclose material information with an intent to deceive, or if it did, that it was not so culpable as to render the '714 patent unenforceable.5 PIVEG, on the other hand, seeks a finding consistent with the jury's advisory findings and requests the Court find the '714 patent unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.

Failure to disclose information material to patentability with intent to deceive the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") may constitute inequitable conduct, which may require the Court to find a patent unenforceable. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1233 (Fed.Cir.2003) (citing...

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  • Kemin Foods v. Pigmentos Vegetales Del Centro
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa
    • 9 Mayo 2005
    ...be entered on these issues pursuant to Rule 54(b). IT IS SO ORDERED. 1. Available at Kemin Foods, L.C. v. Pigmentos Vegetables del Centro S.A. de C.V., 357 F.Supp.2d 1105 (S.D.Iowa 2005). 2. Kemin filed the Supplement Motion on April 11, 2004, just as the Court was ready to issue a ruling o......

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