Kemp v. Bowen
Decision Date | 24 April 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 86-1353,86-1353 |
Citation | 816 F.2d 1469 |
Parties | , Unempl.Ins.Rep. CCH 17,354 Audette KEMP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Otis R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Eric G. Melders and Jack Gray, Oklahoma City, Okl., for plaintiff-appellant.
Marguerite Lokey, Asst. Regional Counsel, Dallas, Tex. (Edwin L. Meese, U.S. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., William S. Price, U.S. Atty. W.D. Okl., Gayla Fuller, Chief Counsel, Region VI, and Patrick A. Hudson, Principal Regional Counsel, Social Sec. Disability Litigation Branch, and Joseph B. Liken, Asst. Regional Counsel, Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Dallas, Tex., were on the brief), for defendant-appellee.
Before LOGAN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges, and BROWN, Senior District Judge. *
Plaintiff Audette Kemp sought disability and widow's benefits, claiming that she became disabled in December, 1973. Her application was denied, and she filed this action for review of the final administrative decision of the Secretary. After both parties filed a Consent, the case was transferred to the United States Magistrate for decision. The Magistrate found that the Secretary's ruling was supported by substantial evidence, and the denial of benefits was affirmed. This appeal follows. Because we find that the Secretary's decision was not supported by the requisite evidence, we reverse.
Plaintiff's efforts to establish her disability have a lengthy history, dating back to April, 1974, when she first filed for disability benefits, claiming a disability due to vein insufficiency in her legs since December On June 3, 1983, following a "Notice of Periodic Review," plaintiff's disability payments were terminated upon a finding that her phlebitis was no longer disabling, and that she became able to do substantial work in June, 1983. 1
14, 1973. She was first found not to be disabled, but on reconsideration, she was granted a period of disability commencing December 14, 1973 upon a diagnosis of phlebitis.
Plaintiff requested a de novo hearing before an Administrative Law Judge, and a hearing was held on September 29, 1983, at which time plaintiff appeared and testified, represented by counsel. On October 31, 1983, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that plaintiff's disability had ceased, and on January 26, 1984, the Appeals Council found there was no basis for granting review. Plaintiff did not seek judicial review of this decision.
On January 18, 1984, plaintiff's husband died, and on January 24, 1984, she filed application for widow's disability benefits. After the Appeals Council denied review of her disability claim, plaintiff filed a new application for disability insurance benefits on her own account on January 31, 1984, alleging a disability due to phlebitis since December 14, 1973.
Both of these applications were denied, initially, and upon reconsideration. Plaintiff then requested a de novo hearing on each application, and a hearing was held on October 17, 1984. Again, plaintiff was represented by counsel and testified in her own behalf, and in addition, her personal physician, Dr. H. Jack Brown, appeared and testified concerning her disability. The Administrative Law Judge again determined that plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits or to widow's disability insurance benefits, because she was able to perform her past clerical work. Thereafter, the Appeals Council determined that there was no basis for granting plaintiff's request for review, and this action for judicial review was then filed.
Plaintiff, age 55 at time of the hearing in 1984, has a high school education and one year of commercial courses at a junior college. Her relevant work experience has been as a bookkeeper for a cotton gin, and 10 years working as a billing clerk with the water department of the city of Clinton, Oklahoma. This work included sitting and posting, billing, carrying ledger books, and considerable walking about in waiting on customers. Plaintiff has not been engaged in any substantial gainful activity since December 14, 1973, the onset date for payment of her prior disability benefits, and the alleged onset date of her present application for disability payments.
Since December, 1973, plaintiff has experienced an ongoing series of health problems which began with a "rather severe varicose veins" problem and phlebitis. Dr. Brown, plaintiff's treating physician for over fourteen years prepared several medical reports dating back as early as July, 1973, reflecting vein stripping done in December, of 1968, as well as follow-up ligation and stripping of veins done in August, 1973. In a report dated in 1974, Dr. Brown stated:
"This is to certify that Mrs. Audette Kemp has severe venous insufficiency of her left leg which has required major surgery with only partial relief.
Standing for any period of time produces severe pain in her legs, in spite of the use of elastic stockings. There is no further treatment available for this problem and the patient was advised along in 1973 that she would no longer be able to continue to work for the city of Clinton Water Department because of continued pain.
I would aniticipate that this disability would be permanent and possibly progressive."
In another report dated June, 1974, Dr. Brown recommended Mrs. Kemp avoid all occupations requiring standing or sitting for any long period of time.
In 1979 plaintiff again underwent surgery involving right leg vein stripping, and medical reports then reflected that she suffered from recurrent bouts of thrombophlebitis to both lower extremities. In a medical report dated September 28, 1983, Dr. Brown again recommended that his patient:
(Emphasis supplied).
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