Kemp v. Div. No. 241, Amalgamated Gamated Ass'n of Street & Elec. Ry. Employés of America

• Citation: 99 N.E. 389,255 Ill. 213
• Parties: KEMP et al. v. DIVISION NO. 241, AMALGAMATED GAMATED ASS'N OF STREET AND ELECTRIC RY. EMPLOYÉS OF AMERICA et al.
• Decision Date: 02 October 1912
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

255 Ill. 213

99 N.E. 389

KEMP et al.

v.DIVISION NO. 241, AMALGAMATED GAMATED ASS'N OF STREET AND ELECTRIC RY. EMPLOYÉS OF AMERICA et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 21, 1912.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 2, 1912.

Appeal from Branch Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Charles M. Walker, Judge.

Action by Harry M. Kemp and others against Division No. 241, Amalgamated Association of Street & Electric Railway Employés of America, and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Court reversing a decree dismissing the bill (153 Ill. App. 344, 637), defendants appeal. Judgment of the Appellate Court reversed, and decree of the circuit court affirmed.Lowes & Richards, of Chicago (Samuel Alschuler, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

George L. Turnbull, of Chicago (Carnahan, Elsdon & Slusser, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

COOKE, J.

The circuit court of Cook county sustained a demurrer interposed by appellants to a bill for injunction filed by appellees, and entered a decree dismissing the bill for want of equity. Appellees prosecuted an appeal to the Appellate Court for the First District, and the cause was assigned to the branch of that court. For the purpose of having a final judgment in the Appellate Court, appellants, by stipulation, elected to stand by their demurrer, and the court reversed the decree and remanded the cause to the circuit court, with directions to overrule the demurrer and enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the bill. The Appellate Court granted a certificate of importance, and appellants have prosecuted an appeal to this court.

The bill was filed by eight employés of the Chicago Railways Company against Division 241 of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employés of America, a corporation, and the officers and the members of the executive board of Division 241. Its purpose was to obtain an injunction restraining the appellants, their agents, servants, and attorneys from attempting to procure, by means of threats, the discharge of the appellees from the service of the Chicago Railways Company because of the fact that the appellees are not members of said Division 241. While the bill contains numerous general allegations charging appellants with a conspiracy to cause the dismissal and discharge of appellees from the service of the Chicago Railways Company by menas of threats, coercion, and intimidation, and alleges that all the acts of appellants detailed in the bill were in furtherance of such conspiracy, the only facts disclosed by the bill are the following:

On May 8, 1908, when the bill was filed herein, appellees were, and had been for many years, employés of the Chicago Railways Company and its predecessors. After entering such service they joined, as members, Division 241 of the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway Employés of America, an organization composed of certain of the employés of the Chicago Railways Company. At the time the appellees became members of Division 241 the dues and assessments were fixed by the by-laws at 50 cents per month and 75 cents every three months, but were afterwards increased to 75 cents per month. When this bill was filed, there had been collected as dues and assessments from the members since the organization of Division 241 about $190,000, of which there remained in the treasury only about $5,000, the balance having been expended, in part, for purposes objectionable to appellees, especially the sum of $1,200 which was expended, over appellees' objection, in support of a democratic mayorality campaign, in which the principal issue was the question of municipal ownership of street railways in the city of Chicago. Appellees, having become dissatisfied with the expenditure of the funds of the association and having concluded that their membership in the organization had ceased to be a benefit to them, tendered their resignations as members of Division 241, to take effect on the 1st day of February, 1908, and from and after that date ceased to be members of the organization. Thereafter the appellant officers and members of the executive board of Division 241 caused to be appointed a committee from the members of the association for the purpose of causing the discharge and dismissal of appellees from the service of the Railways Company. The members of this committee called upon John M. Roach, an officer of the Railways Company who had power and authority to discharge appellees, and demanded that appellees be discharged from the service of the Railways Company, and gave as a reason for their demand that the appellees had ceased to be members of Division 241 and had refused to pay the dues assessed against them, and the members of the committee threatened that, unless their demands were complied with and appellees discharged from the service of the Railways Company, the members of Division 241 would call a strike of the employés of the Railways Company. The Railways Company offered to submit to arbitration the question of the discharge of appellees, but the committee refused the offer. The committee reported to the appellant officers and members of the executive board of Division 241 the result of the meeting with Roach and the demands made upon the Railways Company, and thereupon the appellant officers and members of the executive board called a meeting of some of the members of Division 241, and passed a resolution to the effect that, unless the appellees should be dismissed from the service of the Railways Company, the officers and members of the executive board, together with the members of Division 241, would call a strike of the employés of the Railways Company. Thereafter appellants caused a vote to be taken by the members of Division 241 on the question, ‘Shall we cease to work with men who after receiving benefits through our organization refuse to continue members?’ The result of the vote was that the question was carried in the affirmative by an overwhelming majority. Subsequentlythe committee above mentioned attempted to arrange a meeting with Roach for the purpose of discussing the question of the discharge of appellees, but it does not appear that any such arrangement has been perfected or any meeting had. Appellees have always been in good standing as employés of the Railways Company, and there is perfect harmony between them, as such employés, and the Railways Company, and there is no cause or reason for their discharge from the service of the Railways Company other than that they have ceased to be members of said association. They have been solicited by certain members of Division 241 to withdraw their resignations, and it is solely because of their refusal to do so that appellants have attempted to procure their discharge and dismissal from the service of the Railways Company. The bill alleges that because of the aforesaid acts of appellants appellees fear and believe that the Railways Company will be compelled to discharge them from its service without other reason or cause than as above set forth; that the employment with the Railways Company is the sole means of appellees earning a livelihood for themselves and families; that the members, officers, and executive board of Division 241, and also said Division 241, are unable to respond in adequate damages for the injuries to the appellees in the event of their discharge, and that the causing of their discharge or dismissal as employés of the Railways Company for the reasons above set forth will cause them irreparable injury.

The only reasonable conclusion to be deduced from the allegations and prayer of the bill is that appellees by this proceeding seek to restrain the union and its officers from calling a strike of its members, the obvious purpose of the injunction sought being to prevent the union employés of the Railways Company from quitting their employment in accordance with the vote previously taken, by which those employés, as members of the union, declared that they would ‘cease to work with men who after receiving benefitsthrough our organization refuse to continue members,’ appellees belonging to the class of men with which the union employés had thus declared they would no longer work. The question presented for our determination therefore is whether a court of equity is authorized, upon application by the nonunion employés, to restrain the union and its officers from calling a strike of the union employés in accordance with the vote previously taken by the union employés as members of the union, where the purpose of the proposed strike is to compel the employer to discharge the nonunion employés who are engaged in the same class of work. In order to decide this question in the affirmative, it would be necessary to hold that, had the threatened act been completed, appellees would have been entitled to maintain an action for damages against the union and its officers for accomplishing their discharge from the service of the Railways Company, and that such action at law would not afford an adequate remedy because of the financial inability of appellants to respond in adequate damages for the injuries which appellees would suffer by reason of their discharge. The inadequacy of the remedy at law sufficiently appears from the bill, and it will only be necessary to determine whether the appellees would have been entitled to maintain the action for damages had their discharge been accomplished by appellants.

[1] That appellees would sustain damages if discharged by the Railways Company, and that such discharge and consequent damages would be occasioned by the acts of the appellants, acting for and on behalf of the union employés, clearly appears from the bill. The mere fact that one person sustains damage by reason of some act of another is not, however, sufficient to render the latter liable to an action by the former for such damage, but it must further appear that ...