Kendall v. Russell

• Citation: 49 V.I. 602
• Decision Date: 16 January 2008
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2007–126.
• Parties: Hon. Leon A. KENDALL, Plaintiff, v. Sen. Ronald E. RUSSELL, Luis Morales, Robert O'Connor, Jr., Robert Molloy, and Bruce Marshack, in their capacity as Members of the Virgin Islands Commission on Judicial Disabilities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands

49 V.I. 602

Hon. Leon A. KENDALL, Plaintiff,

v.Sen. Ronald E. RUSSELL, Luis Morales, Robert O'Connor, Jr., Robert Molloy, and Bruce Marshack, in their capacity as Members of the Virgin Islands Commission on Judicial Disabilities, Defendants.

Civil No. 2007–126.

District Court of the Virgin Islands, Division of St. Thomas and St. John.

Jan. 16, 2008.

Howard M. Cooper, Esq., Julie E. Green, Esq., Boston, MA, for the plaintiff.

Maria T. Hodge, Esq., St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., for the defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GÓMEZ, C.J.

This matter is before the Court for a decision following a consolidated hearing on the plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief and a bench trial on the merits conducted on December 13, 2007. The Court, having considered the parties' various pleadings, witness testimony, exhibits, and the arguments of counsel, now enters this Memorandum Opinion pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹

I. FINDINGS OF FACT AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

On September 9, 1976, the Legislature of the Virgin Islands (the “Virgin Islands Legislature” or the “Legislature”) passed Act No. 3876 (“Act 3876” or the “Act”),³ which established the Virgin Islands Commission on Judicial Disabilities (the “Commission”). Act 3876 is codified at Title Four, Sections 651 through 659 of the Virgin Islands Code, and took effect on January 1, 1977.

Act 3876 empowers the Commission to retire or remove a judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands or a justice of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. SeeV.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, § 651. The rules governing removal and involuntary retirement proceedings are found in Section 656 of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides, in part:

(a) (1) A judge of the Superior Court or justice of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands shall be removed from office upon the filing in the district court by the Commission of an order of removal certifying the entry, in any court within the United States, its territories and possessions or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, of a final judgment of conviction of a crime which is punishable as a felony under the law of the Virgin Islands.

(2) A judge of the Superior Court or justice of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands shall also be removed from office upon a determination by the Commission of—

(A) wilful misconduct in office, or

(B) wilful and persistent failure to perform judicial duties, or

(C) any other conduct which is prejudicial to the administration of justice or which brings the judicial office into disrepute, such removal to become effective upon affirmance of an appeal from an order of removal filed in the district court by the Commission (or upon expiration of the time within which such an appeal may be taken).

Id. at § 656.

Act 3876 further provides for the Commission to be composed of five members. Two members are appointed by the Governor of the Virgin Islands, two by the President of the Legislature, and one by the Board of Governors of the Virgin Islands Bar Association. Act 3876 provides for the members' compensation and authorizes the Commission to make rules and regulations for its operation. The Act also sets forth rules regarding the procedures the Commission must follow during removal and involuntary retirement proceedings. The Act further mandates that such proceedings be kept confidential and provides for orders of removal and involuntary retirement by the Commission to be reviewed by this Court. See generally id. at §§ 651–659.

In addition to providing for the establishment of the Commission, Title Four of the Virgin Islands Code more generally provides for the organization of the judicial branch of the Government of the Virgin Islands. That title sets forth, inter alia, provisions regarding the establishment and operations of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands ⁴ and the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands. See generallyV.I. Code Ann. tit. 4, §§ 71– 88, 21– 34. The judges of both the Superior Court and the Supreme Court are subject to the Commission's review. See id. at § 651.

The plaintiff in this matter, Leon A. Kendall (“Kendall”), is a sitting judge of the Superior Court. Kendall was nominated by Governor Charles W. Turnbull in 2003 and confirmed by the 25th Legislature of the Virgin Islands.

On or about April 26, 2007 and May 3, 2007, two complaints against Kendall were filed with the Commission. Neither complaint alleged that Kendall had been convicted of a felony.⁵

On November 16, 2007, the Commission notified Kendall that it would conduct hearings regarding the two complaints on December 13, 2007 and December 17, 2007, respectively.

Thereafter, Kendall brought this two-count action,⁶ generally alleging a violation of the Revised Organic Act of 1954 (the “ROA”).⁷ Specifically, in Count One, Kendall seeks a declaration from this Court that (1) the principle of separation of powers, as contemplated by the ROA, prohibits the Commission from conducting removal proceedings against him, and (2) Act 3876 is ineffective to authorize such proceedings because the legislative branch of the Government of the Virgin Islands may not grant itself the power to remove a member of the judicial branch. In Count Two, Kendall seeks injunctive relief to prevent the Commission from commencing or continuing removal proceedings against him.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Jurisdiction

1. Federal Question

While not stated explicitly, Kendall's challenge requires this Court to review a violation of Act 3876.⁸ That is, the threshold issue with which this Court must be concerned is whether there is some legal organic authority that underpins Act 3876, the absence of which would obviate the thing of which Kendall complains. If Act 3876 was enacted without legal authority, the necessary consequence would be enjoining the Commission from pursuing removal proceedings. This Court has jurisdiction because that question implicates the ROA, a federally-enacted statute. See28 U.S.C. § 1331.

2. Standing

While a violation of a federal statute is within this Court's jurisdiction, the Court must determine at the outset whether Kendall has standing to bring this action.⁹See, e.g., Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton, 411 F.3d 399, 405 (3d Cir.2005) (“As a threshold matter, ... we must first address whether [the plaintiff] has standing to bring its ... claims in federal court.”). In addition to being a constitutional inquiry, standing is also subject to certain prudential limitations that reflect the need for judicial restraint.¹⁰See, e.g., Joint Stock Soc'y v. UDV N. Am., Inc., 266 F.3d 164, 179 (3d Cir.2001) (“The requirements of prudential standing serve to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.”) (internal quotations omitted).

The Supreme Court has

frequently explained, [that] a plaintiff must meet three requirements in order to establish Article III standing. First, he must demonstrate “injury in fact”—a harm that is both “concrete” and “actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Second, he must establish causation—a “fairly ... traceable” connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. And third, he must demonstrate redressability—a “substantial likelihood” that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. These requirements together constitute the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing, which is an “essential and unchanging part” of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement, and a key factor in dividing the power of government between the courts and the two political branches.

Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000) (internal citations omitted). The Court “must accept as true all material allegations set forth in [the plaintiff's] complaint and must construe those facts in favor of the plaintiff [ ].” Mariana v. Fisher, 338 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see also Storino v. Borough of Point Pleasant Beach, 322 F.3d 293, 296 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)).

Here, Kendall alleges that

he faces loss of his career, livelihood and reputation. The Commission's actions threaten to subject him to politically-motivated public humiliation....

(Verified Compl. ¶ 31.) Kendall further alleges that the true harm to his reputation will result not merely from already-published news articles, but from the Commission's removal proceedings themselves.

The Supreme Court has long recognized that an injury to reputation may satisfy the injury element of standing. See, e.g., Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472–77, 107 S.Ct. 1862, 95 L.Ed.2d 415 (1987) (holding that a potential distributor of foreign films had standing to challenge the Justice Department's characterization of films as “political propaganda” since it would affect “his personal, political, and professional reputation” and impair his ability to practice his profession); Joint Anti–Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 139, 71 S.Ct. 624, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (holding that charitable organizations designated as “Communist” by the Attorney General had standing to challenge their designations because of, inter alia, “damage [to] the reputation of the organizations in their respective communities”); accord United States v. Accra Pac, Inc., 173 F.3d 630, 633 (7th Cir.1999) (holding that “being put on a blacklist ... is treated as immediately redressible harm because it diminishes (or eliminates) the opportunity to practice one's profession even if the list ... does not impose legal obligations”).¹¹

Similarly, in McBryde v. Comm. to Review Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders of the Judicial Conf. of the United States, 264 F.3d 52 (D.C.Cir.2001), cert. denied,537 U.S. 821, ...