Kendrick v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation

Decision Date28 September 2022
Docket Number20-cv-2900 (TNM)
PartiesJAMES DEAN KENDRICK, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Columbia
MEMORANDUM OPINION

TREVOR N. McFADDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

James Dean Kendrick submitted a FOIA request to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for records about a prior investigation of him. The agency searched for responsive records, released 147 pages to Kendrick, and withheld 46 pages under various FOIA exemptions. Dissatisfied with that response, Kendrick sued.

Both parties now move for summary judgment. The Court holds that on this record, the FBI has satisfied its disclosure obligations by conducting adequate searches and releasing all nonexempt information. The Court will therefore grant the FBI's motion and deny Kendrick's motion.

I.

This FOIA case begins with a criminal conviction. In 2016, a federal court sentenced Kendrick to “life imprisonment plus 30 years” for his involvement in a drug ring. ECF No. 937, United States v. Kendrick, et al., No 6:10-cr-6096 (W.D.N.Y.). To substantiate alleged prosecutorial errors related to his conviction, Kendrick submitted a FOIA request to the FBI. See Compl. at 1-2, ECF No. 1. He sought all records (1) pertaining to investigations of him, (2) copies of FBI access logs that federal agents and prosecutors use to retrieve information about suspects, and (3) documents listing the disposition of the case or investigation, as well as information about why the case was dismissed or the government declined to prosecute. See Decl. of Michael G. Seidel (Seidel Decl.) ¶ 5, ECF No. 32-3.

In response, the FBI released 147 responsive pages to Kendrick and withheld 46 pages. See id. ¶ 14. The FBI withheld information under FOIA Exemptions 6, 7(C), 7(D) and 7(E), see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), and Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2), see 5 U.S.C. § 552a. See id. Kendrick appealed to the Office of Information Policy (OIP), which construed his appeal as a request for an itemized index, see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and denied it as unmerited “at the administrative stage of a FOIA request.” Seidel Decl. ¶¶ 16, 21.

Dissatisfied with the agency's response, Kendrick filed this suit, pro se, arguing that he has a right to the information that the FBI withheld. See generally Compl. In response, the FBI conducted another search for responsive records and processed additional pages. See id. ¶¶ 2223 & n.4. In total, the FBI processed 1,044 pages of responsive records, released 76 unredacted pages and 300 redacted pages, and withheld 668 pages. Seidel Decl. ¶ 4. It withheld information under Exemptions 6, 7(C), 7(D) and 7(E), and Privacy Act Exemption (j)(2) or “because the pages were found to be duplicative of other pages accounted for elsewhere in the FBI's production.” Id.

The FBI moved for summary judgment, see Def.'s MSJ, ECF No. 32, and Kendrick filed a combined opposition and cross-motion for the same, see Pl.'s MSJ, ECF No. 38. The crossmotions are now ripe for decision. The Court has jurisdiction under 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

II.

To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, a party must show that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). FOIA requires “disclosure of documents held by a federal agency unless the documents fall within one of nine enumerated exemptions[.] U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. v. Sierra Club, Inc., 141 S.Ct. 777, 785 (2021). To obtain summary judgment, the agency bears the burden to show that any claimed exemptions apply. See ACLU v. DOD, 628 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2011). This burden does not shift even when the requester cross-moves for summary judgment. See Hardy v. ATF, 243 F.Supp.3d 155, 162 (D.D.C. 2017).

Courts construe FOIA exemptions narrowly, see Milner v. Dep't of the Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 565 (2011), and considers their applicability de novo, see King v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

To meet its burden, an agency may rely on declarations describing the applicability of a FOIA exemption to information that the agency has withheld. See Shapiro v. DOJ, 893 F.3d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Such declarations receive “a presumption of good faith.” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Court may grant summary judgment based solely on the agency's declarations if neither record evidence nor evidence of the agency's bad faith contradicts them. See Aguiar v. DEA, 865 F.3d 730, 734-35 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Most FOIA cases resolve at the summary judgment stage. See AARC v. CIA, 317 F.Supp.3d 394, 399 (D.D.C. 2018), aff'd, 781 Fed. App'x 11 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam).

Because Kendrick proceeds pro se, the Court “liberally construe[s] his filings. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). That accommodation does not, however, allow him “to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Oviedo v. WMATA, 948 F.3d 386, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2020); see also Raven v. Sajet, 334 F.Supp.3d 22, 28 (D.D.C. 2018) (noting that for pro se plaintiffs, “the ultimate standard remains the same”), aff'd, 2019 WL 2562945 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 2019) (per curiam). Kendrick still must show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the agency has inappropriately withheld records. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).

III.

Kendrick challenges the adequacy of the FBI's searches and its invocation of claimed FOIA exemptions. See generally Pl.'s Opp'n and Cross-Mot. for Summ. J. (Pl.'s Opp'n), ECF No. 38. The Court first analyzes the searches and then the exemptions.

A.

Kendrick questions six categories of documents he believes are missing from the FBI's record production. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 4-5.[1] He posits that the FBI's failure to release these documents and to list them in the Vaughn Index is proof of an inadequate search. See id. But the adequacy of a search “is generally determined not by the fruits of the search, but by the appropriateness of the methods used to carry out the search.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311, 315-16 (D.C. Cir. 2003). So the key question “is whether the search was reasonably calculated to discover the requested documents, not whether it actually uncovered every document extant.” SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d at 1201.

Reasonableness “depends . . . upon the facts of each case.'” Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The agency may prove the reasonableness of its search through “a reasonably detailed affidavit setting forth the search terms and the type of search performed.” Iturralde, 315 F.3d at 313-14. Once the agency has done so, the plaintiff must produce “countervailing evidence” showing a genuine dispute of material fact about the search's adequacy. Id. An agency's declaration that describes the search in reasonable detail and shows “that all files likely to contain responsive materials (if such records exist) were searched” suffices. Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). And courts afford agency declarations “a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by purely speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of other documents.” Id.

The FBI has carried its burden. Its experienced declarant first explains the FBI's various record-keeping systems. Seidel Decl. ¶ 26.[2] Crucial is the “extensive” Central Records System (CRS) that “spans the entire FBI organization and encompasses the records of FBI Headquarters, FBI field offices, and FBI legal attache offices worldwide,” including investigative and intelligence files. Id. The CRS “is where the FBI indexes information about individuals, organizations, events, and other subjects of investigative interest for future retrieval.” Id. ¶ 43. The declarant also describes how the FBI's subsidiary systems function as indices of individual cases, and how the FBI has digitized and merged these systems over time to preserve records. See id. ¶¶ 30-35. He also explains that some of the FBI's records remain preserved in “manual indices,” or hard copy records, at the FBI's headquarters and various field offices. See id. ¶¶ 3639.

The declarant attests that the FBI “conducted a search reasonably calculated to locate records responsive to [Kendrick's] request.” Id. ¶ 43. The FBI queried CRS using the search terms: “Kendrick, James Dean,” “Kendrick, James D,” and “Kendrick, James,” and the nickname located within the search, “Boobie.” Id. ¶ 42. The FBI searched its CRS system because “given [that] Plaintiff's request seeks information about himself, such information would reasonably be expected to be located in the CRS.” Id. ¶ 43. The FBI also searched through manual indices at its headquarters and Buffalo field offices. See id. ¶ 42. And the FBI identified potentially responsive records through its searches, including “eight files, subfiles, and serials.” See id. ¶¶ 40 n.8, 42.

Kendrick's speculation about potentially responsive records in an unconfirmed database, see Pl.'s Opp'n at 17, does not cast doubt on the FBI's otherwise thorough searches. Kendrick claims that during this litigation, he “learned that VICAP is the name of the FBI's National Database, which agents access, in order to retrieve information about individuals that are the target of an investigation.” Pl.'s Opp'n at 17. Thus, he submitted a new FOIA request in November 2020 asking for records in the VICAP database pertaining to himself. See id. So Kendrick concludes that the FBI's “complete failure to search for the . . . VICAP access logs qualifies as an unreasonable search for responsive records.” Id. at 19.

But the November 2020 FOIA request is beyond the scope of this litigation, and when, as here, the “request does not specify the locations in which an agency...

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