Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 15169

Citation575 P.2d 705
Decision Date14 February 1978
Docket NumberNo. 15169,15169
PartiesKENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SALT LAKE COUNTY, Defendant and Appellant.
CourtSupreme Court of Utah

R. Paul Van Dam, Salt Lake County Atty., Bill Thomas Peters, Special Deputy County Atty., Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellant.

James B. Lee, Kent W. Winterholler, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent.

MAUGHAN, Justice:

Plaintiff, paid its 1976 ad valorem property taxes under protest to Salt Lake County and subsequently filed this action for a refund. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff's motion was granted. Defendant appeals. We reverse, and remand to the district court with instructions to grant defendant judgment.

The facts in this action are not in dispute, the only issue is whether the provisions in Sections 59-9-6.3 and 17-36-31, U.C.A. 1953, as amended, regarding the time period in which the board of county commissioners must perform its statutory duty in levying a property tax, are directory or mandatory.

On August 9, 1976, the Salt Lake County Board of Commissioners set the general property tax levy at 14.42 mills. On September 20, 1976, the Board reset the levy, by adopting a general property tax mill levy of 16 mills. The trial court ruled that the Board was without legal authority to reset the mill levy after the date prescribed in the statutes on the ground that the provisions as to time were mandatory.

59-9-6.3, provides:

The board of county commissioners of each county must levy a tax on the taxable property of the county between the last Monday in the seventh month of each fiscal year and the second Monday in the eighth month of each fiscal year to provide funds for county purposes . . . . (Emphasis added.)

17-36-31, provides:

On or before the second Monday in August of each year, the governing body shall levy a tax on the taxable real and personal property within the county. . . . (Emphasis added.)

The trial court expressed the opinion that use of the words "shall" and "must" is indicative of a mandatory effect.

There is no universal rule by which directory provisions may, under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are mandatory. The intention of the legislature, however, should be controlling and no formalistic rule of grammar or word form should stand in the way of carrying out the legislative intent. . . .

. . . The statute should be construed according to its subject matter and the purpose for which it was enacted. . . .

Generally those directions which are not of the essence of the thing to be done, but which are given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of the business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute, are not commonly considered mandatory. Likewise, if the act is performed but not in the time or in the precise manner directed by the statute, the provision will not be considered mandatory if the purpose of the statute has been substantially complied with and no substantial rights have been jeopardized. 1

The legislature has expressed its purpose in the chapters under which the subject provisions were enacted. Section 59-9-6.1 provides the purpose of the act is to provide a maximum mill levy for counties according to asserted value. The State Tax Commission has the duty to ascertain that the statutory maximum has not been exceeded, Section 59-9-9. 17-36-2 specifies the purpose of the act is to codify and revise the law relating to county fiscal procedures in order to establish uniform fiscal procedures for all counties.

In State ex rel. Wight v. Park City School District 2 this court stated:

The general rule is that a statute, prescribing the time within which public officers are required to perform an official act, is directory only, unless it contains negative words denying the exercise of the power after the time specified or the nature of the act to be performed, or the language used by the Legislature shows that the designation of time was intended as a limitation. . . .

In applying the rule in Wight, this court examined the nature of the duty to be performed under the statute in question and determined whether an inference would be justified that the legislature intended that if the duty were not performed within the time specified that it should not be performed at all. In Wight, this court held the time specified was directory and not a limitation on the exercise of the power conferred.

An issue similar to the instant case was involved in Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper. 3 The reasoning of the court in reaching the conclusion that the statute was directory is particularly applicable here. First, the command "shall" in the statute did not go to the date, but to the duty to be performed by the state officer. Secondly, the court considered whether the phraseology of the statute was such that the designation of time must be considered as a limitation on the power of the officer. The purpose of the statute was to maintain a fund for the benefit of the firemen. The court observed that if the officer had made no assessment at all, it could hardly be said there was intent the fund was to become insolvent. To deny the duty of the officer to perform his statutory obligation would defeat the legislative purpose, for the manner of performing was not essential to the purpose of the statute and was not the essence of the thing to be done. Third, the court found the statute was merely a guide for the conduct of business and for orderly procedure rather than a limitation of power; and, therefore, should be construed as directory only. Finally, the court found there were no negative prohibitions in the statute, either as to time, or performance. The court applied the rule that an affirmative...

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17 cases
  • Board of Educ. of Granite School Dist. v. Salt Lake County, 17175
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1983
    ...INTERPRETATION Furthermore, Judge Banks' application of the "substantial compliance" rule outlined in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, Utah, 575 P.2d 705 (1978) to the Treasurer's practice in transferring collected school district revenues was also in error. Preliminarily, the fund......
  • ASC Utah, Inc. v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C.
    • United States
    • Utah Supreme Court
    • November 19, 2010
    ...and by the failure to obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute." Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake Cnty., 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have stated in the past that the Utah Arbitration Act is a procedural, rath......
  • Salt Lake City Corp. v. Kunz
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 2020
    ...v. Property Tax Div. , 922 P.2d 758, 764 (Utah 1996) (time to complete review of property tax appeal); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County , 575 P.2d 705, 707 (Utah 1978) (time for setting tax levy); Southwick v. Southwick , 2011 UT App 222, ¶ 11, 259 P.3d 1071 (recitation of statuto......
  • Moore v. Schwendiman
    • United States
    • Utah Court of Appeals
    • February 17, 1988
    ...a mandatory duty to file the sworn report within five days. While "shall" has been interpreted as directory, Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake City, 575 P.2d 705 (Utah 1978), "it is usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such in this and other jurisdictions." Board of Educ......
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