Kennedy v. Gibson

Decision Date12 March 1904
Docket Number13,326
Citation68 Kan. 612,75 P. 1044
PartiesDAVID KENNEDY AND MAGGIE KENNEDY v. CHARLES E. GIBSON
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided January, 1904.

Error from Ellis district court; LEE MONROE, judge.

STATEMENT.

This was an action brought by Charles E. Gibson to recover on a promissory note for $ 600, executed by David Kennedy and wife in favor of L. N. Bessette, and to foreclose a mortgage given to secure its payment. The note and mortgage were transferred to one Jenness and by him to Gibson. The note contained a stipulation that if default was made in the payment of interest, or there was non-compliance with the requirements of the mortgage, the principal and interest should all become due and payable at once, at the option of the holder. The mortgage, on the other hand, contained a provision that if default was made in the payment of interest or taxes, or if the insurance was not kept up, the mortgage should become absolute and the whole of the debt should become due and payable. A demurrer to the petition was presented, which raised the question whether or not the action was barred by the statute of limitations, but it was overruled. The answer was, first, a general denial; second, an allegation that the notes were without consideration, and void, as the defendants were never indebted to Bessette, Jenness or Gibson when the notes were executed, nor since that time, in any sum of money; third,

"That the said notes were obtained from the said defendants by and through the fraud, false representations, oppression and coercion of one E. C. Waldo, who was the agent of the said L N. Bessette mentioned in plaintiff's petition filed herein, at the time the said notes purport to have been given by these defendants, and taken in the name of the said L. N Bessette, and that the said notes were procured by the fraudulent means and false representations of the said E. C Waldo, agent as aforesaid, in this, to wit:

"That prior to the time of the alleged giving of the notes sued upon in this action, on, to wit, during the months of July and August, 1892, the said defendants sought to secure an extension of the time of payment upon a then existing mortgage upon the premises described in the plaintiff's petition, which said mortgage and the note, the payment of which it was given to secure, became due and payable on the 1st day of September, 1892; that the said E. C. Waldo claimed to represent the then reputed owner and holder of the said note and mortgage last above mentioned, one John Leighton, of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and to whom they had, before that time, paid the interest on the note which the last above mortgage was given to secure; that the said E. C. Waldo represented to these defendants that he had heard from their man, John Leighton, and requested them to come into his office in Ellis, Kansas, and sign up papers to complete said extension, and that said request was made at or after the time the said note and mortgage became due and payable; that said defendants, relying upon said representations of the said E. C. Waldo, came at the time and place appointed by the said E. C. Waldo, for the purpose of extending the time of payment of the mortgage aforesaid, and for no other purpose that the said E. C. Waldo then presented these defendants with the note and mortgage sued upon in this action, and that these defendants then and there objected to signing the same for the reason that they were not made payable to the said John Leighton, who was represented to be the then owner and holder of the note and mortgage, the payment of which was sought to be extended by these defendants; that these defendants then and there, and before that time, told the said E. C. Waldo, agent as aforesaid, that they wanted an extension of the time of payment on the old note and mortgage and nothing else, and to contract for the same with the said John Leighton, and no other person, as he was represented by the said E. C. Waldo to be the owner and holder of the said note and mortgage, the payment of which was sought to be extended, and these defendants then and there refused to contract with the said L. N. Bessette.

"Thereupon the said E. C. Waldo represented to these defendants that the said L. N. Bessette was a partner of the said John Leighton, who lived in Portsmouth, N. H., and that he, the said L. N. Bessette, was interested in the old mortgage, and assured these defendants that by contracting with the said L. N. Bessette they were contracting with the said John Leighton, which representations were wholly false and untrue, as the said E. C. Waldo well knew at the time, and were so wilfully and falsely made by the said E. C. Waldo, for the purpose of procuring the notes and mortgage sued upon in this action, and that at the time the notes sued upon in this action purport to have been given by these defendants they did not receive the return of the old note and mortgage, nor any release thereof, nor any money or any other consideration from the said L. N. Bessette, nor at any other time; that shortly after the said fraudulent procurement of the notes and mortgage sued upon in this action these defendants learned that the said representations of the said E. C. Waldo were wholly false and untrue, and that the said L. N. Bessette was the cashier of the Merchants' State Bank, of Ellis, in Ellis county, Kansas, and was in the bank at the time said notes and mortgage were procured, but never revealed his whereabouts or identity to these defendants; that when these defendants learned the same, and that the aforesaid representations of the said E. C. Waldo were wholly false and untrue, they went to the said E. C. Waldo and the said L. N. Bessette, at the Merchants' Bank, of Ellis, and told them, as they had done all along, that they did not want to contract, and would not contract with any person connected with said bank or any other person other than the said John Leighton, and demanded the return of the notes and the mortgage sued upon in this action and other papers connected with the transaction; that said E. C. Waldo and L. N. Bessette refused to return said notes and mortgage and other papers, and thereupon these defendants then and there notified the said E. C. Waldo and L. N. Bessette that by reason of the aforesaid fraud, misrepresentations and want of consideration they would never pay a cent of said note; that said defenda...

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19 cases
  • Casper v. Bell's Estate
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 14, 1949
    ... ... 879; ... Burnes v. Ballenger, 76 Mo.App. 58; Givens v ... Rogers, 182 S.W. 115; Walter v. Kilpatrick, 191 ... N.C. 458, 132 S.E. 148; Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan ... 612, 75 P. 1044; Bowman v. Rutter, 47 S.W. 52; ... Sherwood v. Wilkins, 65 Ark, 312, 45 S.W. 988; ... Insurance Co. of N.A ... ...
  • Ivy v. Evans
    • United States
    • Mississippi Supreme Court
    • July 2, 1923
    ... ... v. Worley, 26 Mo. 253; Hawes v. Mulholland, 78 ... Mo.App. 493; Bircher v. Payne, 7 Mo. 462; Atwood ... v. Lewis, 6 Mo. 392; Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan ... 612; Gorrell v. Home Life Ins. Co., of New York, 63 ... F. 371; Lane v. Manning, 8 Yerger (Tenn.), 435; ... Goddard ... ...
  • Clark v. Paddock
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • May 22, 1913
    ...in the mortgage of the payees named in the note was not fatal to the security and that the note itself would prevail. In Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 75 P. 1044, the provided that a default should mature the whole debt at the option of the holder thereof, while the mortgage provided that......
  • Voris v. Birdsall
    • United States
    • Oklahoma Supreme Court
    • January 23, 1917
    ...which created no presumption that facts impeaching its validity were brought to the notice of the bank or its managers. Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 75 P. 1044. This rule of law placing the burden upon the holder of paper fraudulently obtained appears to have been overlooked; as the cour......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Judicial Foreclosures in Kansas: Recent Developments Following the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 83-8, September 2014
    • Invalid date
    ...the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the holder exercises the option to accelerate the entire amount. Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 617, 75 P 1044 (1904). If the holder elects not to exercise the option upon default, then "the statute would not run earlier than the time ......
  • Judicial Foreclosures in Kansas: Recent Developments Following the Subprime Mortgage Crisis
    • United States
    • Kansas Bar Association KBA Bar Journal No. 83-9, September 2014
    • Invalid date
    ...the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the holder exercises the option to accelerate the entire amount. Kennedy v. Gibson, 68 Kan. 612, 617, 75 P. 1044 (1904). If the holder elects not to exercise the option upon default, then “the statute would not run earlier than the time......

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