Kennedy v. James

• Decision Date: 27 April 1960
• Docket Number: No. 525,525
• Citation: 252 N.C. 434,113 S.E.2d 889
• Parties: G. Frank KENNEDY v. Viola Carter JAMES.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 889

113 S.E.2d 889

252 N.C. 434

G. Frank KENNEDY v. Viola Carter JAMES.

No. 525

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 27, 1960

John R. Boger, Jr., Clyde L. Propst, Jr., and Hartsell & Hartsell, Concord, for plaintiff, appellee.

John Hugh Williams, Concord, for defendant, appellant.

PARKER, Justice.

Defendant assigns as error the denial of her motion for judgment of compulsory nonsuit renewed at the close of all the evidence. Her argument in her brief is that her motion should have been allowed on the ground of the contributory negligence of the driver of plaintiff's automobile as a matter of law.

Plaintiff's evidence tends to show these facts: About 6:45 or 7:00 p. m. o'clock on Sunday, 27 July 1958, Kenneth R. Kennedy, son and agent of plaintiff, was driving his father's Chevrolet automobile south on Kerr Street in the city of Concord, and approaching its intersection with Moore Street. At the same time defendant was driving her Ford station wagon east on Moore Street in the city, and approaching the same intersection. Both streets are paved. Kerr Street is about 26 feet wide, and Moore Street about 25 feet wide. Kerr Street runs north and south, and Moore Street east and west. At the time there were no stop signs, stationary or signal, and no yield right of way signs at the intersection. It was a residential district of the city, and the maximum speed of automobiles there was 35 miles per hour.

About 500 feet from the intersection Kenneth R. Kennedy checked his speed, looked at his speedometer, and saw he was going 30 miles an hour. He testified on direct examination: 'As I came on into Moore Street I saw nothing in the intersection until my wife screamed and I was in the intersection most of the way across when she screamed and I looked to my right just in time to see Mrs. James' car hit my right side. * * * At the time of the collision the front end of Mrs. James' car was about three feet east of the west side of the prolongation out into Kerr Street. The front end of my car was approximately equal with the south edge of Moore Street. I was on the righthand side of Kerr Street.' He testified on crossexamination: 'I was going 30 miles per hour. I was going about the same speed at the time of the collision. I did not slow down as I approached the intersection. * * * I was familiar with the intersection. * * * I thought I had the right of way. I looked but did not slow down. I was approximately halfway across the intersection when I saw Mrs. James' car. I saw her approximately three to five feet before she struck me.'

On the northwest corner of Kerr and Moore Streets there is a house which faces on Kerr Street. It has a hedge around the yard. A witness for plaintiff testified: 'You would have to get out to the edge of Kerr Street before you could see your way safely to go ahead. You could see from Kerr Street to an automobile on Moore the same distance you could see from Moore on Kerr. The distance of visibility is the same in both directions.'

Plaintiff alleged in his complaint, 'that plaintiff's car entered the intersection that Moore Street makes with Kerr Street before the defendant's car, which was proceeding in an easterly direction on Moore Street, entered said intersection; that, after said Kenneth R. Kennedy had driven said plaintiff's automobile more than halfway across said intersection, a 1955 Ford, owned and operated at said time by the defendant, entered said intersection and violently struck the plaintiff's automobile in the vicinity of the right front door,' and Kenneth R. Kennedy testified that he was approximately half way across the intersection when he saw defendant's car three to five feet before she hit his car. This distinguishes the instant case from Taylor v. Brake, 245 N.C. 553, 96 S.E.2d 686, which is relied on by defendant.

Plaintiff has allegata and probata tending to support his theory of the case that he had the right of way by virtue of N.C.G.S. § 20-155(b). This Court said in the recent case of Carr v. Stewart, 252 N.C. 118, 113 S.E.2d 18, 21: 'The plaintiff's evidence in the instant case tends to show that he entered the intersection first. Hence, in our opinion, he is entitled to have his case heard by a jury on appropriate issues, and we so hold.' See also Downs v. Odom, 250 N.C. 81, 108 S.E.2d 65.

The question as to whether or not plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in entering the intersection at the time and under the conditions then existing was for the jury, and the trial judge correctly so held, and properly overruled defendant's motion for judgment of nonsuit entered at the close of all the evidence.

Defendant assigns as error this part of the charge in respect to the first issue: 'Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, as I say, you've got to take into consideration all of the surrounding circumstances for the purpose of determining who had the right of way. If a person enters an intersection at a lawful rate of speed, all other things being...