Kennedy v. Rutter
Decision Date | 02 May 1939 |
Docket Number | No. 364.,364. |
Citation | 6 A.2d 17 |
Parties | KENNEDY et al. v. RUTTER et al. |
Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
Appeal in Chancery; Walter H. Cleary, Chancellor.
Suit by James E. Kennedy, administrator of the estate of Susan S. Dwyer, deceased, and others, against Harvey T. Rutter, administrator of the estate of Edward Dwyer, deceased, and others, to have the ownership of the westerly half of certain premises located in the City of Burlington decreed to plaintiffs. From a decree sustaining defendants' demurrer to the bill, plaintiffs appeal.
Decree affirmed and cause remanded.
Argued before MOULTON, C. J., and SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, and STURTEVANT, JJ., and CUSHING, Superior Judge.
Charles H. Darling and J. A. McNamara, both of Burlington, for plaintiffs.
M. G. Leary, Guy M. Page, and M. G. Leary, Jr., all of Burlington, for defendants.
This case is here on plaintiff's appeal from the decree of the chancellor sustaining defendants' demurrer to the bill. Plaintiffs seek to have the ownership of the westerly half of certain premises located in the city of Burlington decreed to them.
The facts material to the determination of the questions before us as appear from the bill are as follows:
On September 15, 1880, Edward Dwyer acquired by purchase from one H. S. Kimball and wife certain lands with a building thereon now known as the Dwyer block located on the northerly side of Cherry Street in the city of Burlington. Certain furniture in said building at that time also passed to him as a part of his purchase. Edward Dwyer married Susan S. Dwyer April 21, 1896. He deceased February 21, 1919, and on June 19, 1919, Harvey T. Rutter was appointed administrator of his estate. Susan S. Dwyer deceased August 21, 1933, and James E. Kennedy was duly appointed administrator of her estate.
Said Edward and Susan occupied said premises as their homestead from the time of their marriage to the time of his death in 1919, and Susan continued to live on said premises until the time of her death in 1933. There are five children of said Edward Dwyer by a former marriage now living and there are several grandchildren who are sons or daughters of deceased children of said Edward, and these children and grandchildren are all and the only heirs-at-law of the said Edward. The plaintiffs other than said Kennedy are brothers and sisters of the said Susan S. Dwyer.
On January 1, 1912, said Edward and Susan S. Dwyer conveyed said premises by quitclaim deed to one Albert G. Whittemore, then a practicing attorney in Burlington. On the same day said Whittemore reconveyed said premises by quitclaim deed, the material parts of said deed being in words and figures as follows: "Quitclaim Deed.
"Know All Men by These Presents— That I, A. G. Whittemore, * * * have remised, released and forever quit-claimed, and do hereby remise, release and forever quit-claim unto the said Edward Dwyer and Susan Dwyer, their heirs and assigns all right and title which I, the said A. G. Whittemore, have in and to the following described piece or parcel of land situated in the City of Burlington, in said Chittenden county, viz." [Then follows description of property].
On September 25, 1913, said Edward and Susan made, executed and delivered to said Whittemore a second quitclaim deed of the aforesaid premises and on the same day said Whittemore made, executed and delivered to said Dwyers a quitclaim deed describing said premises, the material parts of said last mentioned deed being as follows:
The plaintiffs claim that by force of the last above mentioned deed, dated September 5, 1913, they own and have a vested title in and to the westerly half of said premises and a homestead and homestead rights in the easterly half thereof. Defendants contend that under the facts set forth in the bill, all of said premises became vested in title and right of possession in the children and children of deceased children of said Edward Dwyer at the decease of Susan S. Dwyer, said Edward having died several years before that time. Defendants base this claim upon the deed above mentioned which is dated January 1, 1912.
The answer to the claims so made by the parties depends upon the construction of said deed from Whittemore, dated January 1, 1912, and we first address our attention to this instrument, having in mind the following principles relative to construction of deeds, namely: "Our master rule of construction of deeds is that the intention of the parties, when ascertainable from the entire instrument, prevails over technical terms or their formal arrangements." Vermont Kaolin Corporation v. Lyons, 101 Vt. 367, 376, 143 A. 639, 642: Johnson et al. v. Barden et al., 86 Vt. 19, 83 A. 721, Ann.Cas.1915A, 1243; DeGoosh v. Baldwin & Russ, 85 Vt. 312, 82 A. 182; Robinson v. Missisquoi Railroad Co., 59 Vt. 426, 10 A. 522; Collins v. Lavelle, 44 Vt. 230, 231; Flagg v. Eames, 40 Vt. 16, 94 Am.Dec. 363; Mills v. Catlin, 22 Vt. 98; State v. Trask, 6 Vt. 355, 27 Am.Dec. 554.
"Then, too, while the language of a written instrument governs in determining its effect and operation, in construing such language, the situation of the parties, the subject-matter, and the object and purposes sought to be accomplished may be considered." Vermont Kaolin Corporation v. Lyons, supra, 101 Vt. 376, 143 A. 642; City of Burlington ex rel. v. Mayor of City of Burlington, 98 Vt. 388, 398, 127 A. 892; Crosby v. Montgomery, 38 Vt. 238; Walker v. Pierce, 38 Vt. 94; Robinson v. Missisquoi Railroad Co., supra.
While plaintiffs do not seriously dispute the principle that if the grantor in a deed clearly expresses his intent and same is a legal one and docs not violate the law, such intent must control, they insist, however, that in the deed in question the grantor's intent is not clear and that the clause next following the description hereinafter referred to as the purpose and intent clause is repugnant to the granting clause. They contend that therefore the granting clause alone should be given force and that we should disregard the very clause which purports to set forth the "purpose and intent" of the conveyance. We cannot agree with this contention. In the granting clause appear the words "* * * do hereby remise, release and forever quitclaim unto the said Edward Dwyer and Susan Dwyer, their heirs and assigns, all right and title * * *." Then follows a description of the property and this is immediately followed by the purpose and intent clause. While it is true as stated in the case of Bennett et al. v. Bennett et al., 93 Vt. 316, 107 A. 304, 305, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Davidson v. Vaughn.
...applicable only when the meaning of the instrument is doubtful, and not where, as here, the meaning is clear and obvious. Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 342, 6 A.2d 17; Blair v. Blair, 111 Vt. 53, 60, 10 A.2d 188; Bragg v. Newton, 98 Vt. 102, 105, 126 A. 494; Hartness v. Black, 95 Vt. 190,......
-
Owens v. Tergeson
...is that all parts of the deed shall be examined together for the purpose of ascertaining the intention"); Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 6 A.2d 17, 20 (1939) ("Our master rule of construction of deeds is that the intention of the parties, when ascertainable from the entire instrument, prev......
-
Spero v. Bove
...the instrument was executed, may be considered.' Stratton v. Cartmell, 114 Vt. 191, 194, 42 A.2d 419, 421; Kennedy, Adm'r v. Rutter, Adm'r, 110 Vt. 332, 339, 6 A.2d 17; Freeguard v. Bingham, 108 Vt. 404, 406, 187 A. 801; Vermont Shade Roller Co. v. Burlington Traction Co., 102 Vt. 489, 502,......
-
Nugent v. Shambor
...joint tenant has title only to his "aliquot part"). The most distinguishing feature of the estate is survivorship. Kennedy v. Rutter, 110 Vt. 332, 340, 6 A.2d 17, 21 (1939); Coolidge v. Coolidge, 130 Vt. 132, 133-34, 287 A.2d 566, 568 (1971). But since the defendant took no separate appeal ......