Kennedy v. State
Decision Date | 10 July 2015 |
Docket Number | CR–12–2084. |
Parties | Carlos Edward KENNEDY. v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Kathryn Elizabeth Miller, Charlotte Morrison, and Randall S. Susskind, Montgomery, for appellant.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Kristi Deason Hagood, deputy atty. gen., and James C. Crenshaw, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Carlos Edward Kennedy was convicted of one count of capital murder for killing Zoa White during the course of a first-degree burglary, see § 13A–5–40(a)(4), Ala.Code 1975. The State's evidence at trial tended to establish that, at some point between the late evening hours of June 27, 2010, and the early morning hours of June 28, 2010, White was brutally murdered in her home, which, the State argued, occurred during the course of a first-degree burglary and which, the State theorized, was accomplished by using a claw hammer. Although when questioned by law enforcement Kennedy initially denied having known White or having ever been in her house, the State presented evidence, which was confirmed by DNA analysis, indicating that Kennedy's blood was on several items in White's house and evidence, which was confirmed by a latent-fingerprint examination, indicating that two of Kennedy's palm prints were found in White's house.
During the penalty phase of Kennedy's trial, the jury, by a vote of 11 to 1, recommended that Kennedy be sentenced to death. After receiving a presentence-investigation report and conducting a sentencing hearing, the circuit court followed the jury's advisory recommendation, finding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, and sentenced Kennedy to death. Kennedy did not file any Rule 24, Ala. R.Crim. P., posttrial motions. This appeal, which is automatic in a case involving the death penalty, followed. See § 13A–5–53, Ala.Code 1975.
On appeal, Kennedy raises several issues. One issue, however, is dispositive of this appeal—namely, whether the circuit court committed reversible error when, after it initially determined that Kennedy could represent himself at trial, the circuit court rescinded that initial determination and revoked Kennedy's right of self-representation, finding that Kennedy had not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to counsel and appointing counsel to represent Kennedy at trial.1 For the reasons set forth below, we reverse and remand.
The resolution of the question Kennedy raises on appeal requires this Court to first set out the lengthy procedural history regarding Kennedy's request to represent himself at trial, the circuit court's initial determination that Kennedy could represent himself at trial, and the circuit court's subsequent decision to revoke Kennedy's right of self-representation.
Kennedy, after having been indicted on March 26, 2011, appeared in the circuit court on July 11, 2011, with counsel for arraignment. At arraignment, Kennedy's counsel advised the circuit court that Kennedy "has decided he wants to represent himself" at trial. (R. 10.) The circuit court confirmed with Kennedy his request to represent himself at trial and "urge[d] [him] not to do that and [to] think very seriously about it because [he was] in a very bad situation." (R. 12.) Before it decided whether to honor Kennedy's request, however, the circuit court ordered that Kennedy undergo a psychological evaluation.
On October 12, 2011, Doug McKeown, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist, conducted a psychological examination on Kennedy. Dr. McKeown concluded that, although Kennedy had a history of marijuana and alcohol use, Kennedy was competent to stand trial, had "no indication or history of a mental health related disorder," had "[n]o indication of psychological defects or intellectual limitations," and had "no indication of a lack of capacity for appropriate decision making." (C. 87.)
Thereafter, at a hearing held on December 15, 2011, Kennedy appeared without counsel in the circuit court.2 At that hearing, the circuit court explained to Kennedy Dr. McKeown's findings and also addressed Kennedy's request to represent himself at trial. As to Kennedy's request to represent himself at trial, the following exchange occurred:
(R. 29–34.) The circuit court then asked Kennedy about his background and education. Kennedy explained that he had graduated from a private high school in Mobile and also attended the University of Mississippi for two years. Kennedy further, explained, that, since 2000, he had been "[w]orking with [his] father installing satellite dishes" (R. 35) and that he knows some computer programming.
After engaging Kennedy in this colloquy, the circuit court commented that Kennedy is an "above average intelligent person and ... understand[s] what's going on here." (R. 36.) The circuit court then...
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