Kennedy v. State

• Decision Date: 27 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 93-254-A,93-254-A
• Citation: 654 A.2d 708
• Parties: Kevin KENNEDY et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island. ppeal.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 708

654 A.2d 708

Kevin KENNEDY et al. v. STATE of Rhode Island.

No. 93-254-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Feb. 27, 1995.

Mary Elizabeth McCaffrey, John T. McCaffrey, McCaffrey & McCaffrey, Warwick, for plaintiffs.

Jeffrey Pine, Atty. Gen., Rebecca Tedford Partington, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

OPINION

LEDERBERG, Justice.

The issue before the Supreme Court is whether the Rhode Island General Assembly violated the equal protection provisions of the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions by enacting legislation ¹ that authorized Kevin Kennedy (plaintiff) to bring suit against the State of Rhode Island (defendant) for an amount in excess of the limitation on damages set forth in the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Following the defendant's challenge to the constitutionality of the legislation, the Superior Court entered an order invalidating the act. In response to the plaintiffs' appeal, we vacate the order and sustain the validity of the act in respect to the authorization of suit by the plaintiff. We point out, however, that the act failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote of each house of the General Assembly as mandated by article 6, section 11, of the Rhode Island Constitution for bills appropriating public money for private purposes.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In the early hours of November 2, 1982, Kevin Kennedy, accompanied by his wife Denise, was admitted to the Benjamin Rush facility in the Division of Substance Abuse of the State of Rhode Island with a diagnosis of acute alcohol intoxication. Less than three hours later, Kevin Kennedy fell from a window of his third-floor room and sustained serious bodily injuries.

On October 31, 1984, plaintiffs filed suit in Superior Court alleging that the State "negligently and carelessly caused and permitted the third floor windows * * * to be and remain in a dangerous and unsafe condition" thereby causing Kevin Kennedy's injuries. In their complaint, Kevin Kennedy claimed damages of $250,000 for bodily injuries and for monies lost due to his incapacitation, and Denise Kennedy claimed damages of $50,000 for loss of consortium.

At the time Kevin Kennedy was injured, the Governmental Tort Liability Act, G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-2, as amended by P.L.1974, ch. 39, § l, limited the damages recoverable in any tort action against the state to $50,000. ² In May 1983, the House of Representatives passed 83-H 5952, a bill submitted by a legislator from plaintiffs' city. This act granted "Kevin Kennedy * * * permission to institute suit * * * against the state of Rhode Island * * * for damages in an amount not to exceed two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), inclusive of interest and costs. * * * If the court or jury shall find that said Kevin Kennedy sustained damages as a result of the negligence of the state of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations acting through its agents or servants, the court or jury shall award to and render judgment for the said Kevin Kennedy * * * but in no event in excess of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000), inclusive of interest and costs." The act also "appropriated * * * out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated, a sum sufficient for the payment of any judgment * * * entered in favor of said Kevin Kennedy."

At trial, defendant moved for partial summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, asserting that 83-H 5952 was a "special act" which violated the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions. After a hearing, the Superior Court granted defendant's motion in July 1992, and plaintiffs, pursuant to G.L.1956 (1985 Reenactment) § 9-24-1, filed a notice of appeal.

THE ISSUE

In their appeal, plaintiffs contended that the passage of 83-H 5952 (the authorizing act) was a constitutional exercise of the power of the General Assembly under the Governmental Tort Liability Act and further contended that the act does not violate the guarantees of equal protection under the state or the federal constitutions. The state, although conceding the constitutionality of the Governmental Tort Liability Act, argued that the authorizing act is unconstitutional because it denies the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed in federal and state constitutions.

THE POWER OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

This court has long recognized that after the adoption of the State Constitution, the powers of the crown and parliament resided in the Legislature, "less the power taken therefrom for the federal government and also minus whatever powers were taken from it by the constitution of the State[.]" Payne & Butler v. Providence Gas Co., 31 R.I. 295, 315, 77 A. 145, 153 (1910). Unlike the Federal Constitution, which contains grants of enumerated powers, the constitution of this state sets forth limitations upon what is otherwise plenary power in the state Legislature. In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I.1984). More specifically, this court has consistently adhered to the view that the General Assembly possesses "all of the powers inhering in sovereignty other than those which the constitution textually commits to other branches of our state government and that those that are not so committed * * * are powers reserved to the general assembly." Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 525-26, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (1968); see Kass v. Retirement Board of the Employees' Retirement System of the State of Rhode Island, 567 A.2d 358, 360 (R.I.1989). Hence, the General Assembly may exercise any of such powers, subject only to those limitations expressly or implicitly found in the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. Kass, 567 A.2d at 360; In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d at 553. Consequently, in our evaluation of legislative enactments, including those in which "judges may hold views inconsistent with the propriety of the legislation in question [we are] afford[ed] no ground for judicial interference" unless the legislation at issue can be characterized "unmistakably and palpably [as an] excess of legislative power." In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d at 552 (quoting Gorham v. Robinson, 57 R.I. 1, 8, 186 A. 832, 837 (1936)).

In respect to the authorizing act in question, the plaintiffs have asserted that the enactment represents a valid exercise of legislative authority pursuant to the Governmental Tort Liability Act, chapter 31 of title 9 of the General Laws. General Laws 1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 9-31-5, as amended by P.L.1973, ch. 255, § l, provides that:

"CLAIM APPROPRIATIONS.--Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter the general assembly may make such appropriations as it shall deem proper in payment of or settlement of claims against the state, provided, however, there is hereby appropriated out of any money in the treasury not otherwise appropriated a sum sufficient to pay claims against the state settled pursuant to the provisions of this chapter and the state controller is hereby authorized and directed to draw his orders upon the general treasurer for the payment of said sum."

Thus, notwithstanding the limitations on damages set forth in § 9-31-2, see supra, the Legislature has reserved to itself the authority to appropriate funds for claims against the state. Absent a finding that the power to appropriate funds has been "commit[ted] to other branches of our state government" by the constitutional text, such power is "reserved to the general assembly" as one of the "powers inhering in sovereignty." Nugent, l03 R.I. at 525, 238 A.2d at 762. Not only does the State Constitution fail to display such a commitment, but in fact article 6, section 11, explicitly delineates the minimum "[v]ote required to pass local or private appropriations." That section stipulates that "[t]he assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house of the general assembly shall be required to every bill appropriating the public money or property for local or private purposes." (Emphasis added.) Therefore it is our conclusion that in the exercise of its "plenary power" the General Assembly may appropriate public funds for private purposes provided that the minimum-vote requirements set forth in article 6, section 11, of the Rhode Island Constitution are met.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution guarantees to all persons within the jurisdiction of any state "the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1. Although there was no specific equal protection statement in the Rhode Island Constitution at the time 83-H 5952 was passed, ³ this court has held that article 1, section 2, provided "essentially a guarantee of equal protection of the laws" ⁴ to persons of this state. City of Warwick v. Almac's, Inc., 442 A.2d 1265, 1270 (R.I.1982); Sweetman v. Town of Cumberland, 117 R.I. 134, 151, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (1976).

In ascertaining whether the authorizing act satisfies equal protection requirements, we are constrained by the well-settled principle that legislative enactments of the General Assembly are presumed to be valid and constitutional. Kass, 567 A.2d at 360; In re Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 485 A.2d at 552. Moreover, the party challenging the constitutional validity of an act carries the burden of persuading the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the act violates an identifiable aspect of the state or federal constitution. Brennan v. Kirby, 529 A.2d 633, 639 (R.I.1987).

The state argued that 83-H 5952 violates the guarantees of equal protection because the act granted to plaintiff the privilege of bringing suit against the state for an amount in excess of the statutory limitation of § 9-31-2, a privilege not generally available to other claimants. However,...