Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
Decision Date | 08 May 1953 |
Docket Number | No. L--4328,L--4328 |
Citation | 25 N.J.Super. 601,96 A.2d 720 |
Parties | KENNEDY et al. v. WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP. |
Court | New Jersey Superior Court |
Milton Stavis, Newark (Gross & Blumberg, Newark, attorneys), appeared for the plaintiffs.
William Dill, Jr., Newark (Stryker, Tams & Horner, Newark, attorneys), appeared for the defendant.
CONLON, J.C.C. (assigned).
This is a class action brought by the eight plaintiffs on behalf of themselves and of some 700 fellow members of the United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America (U.E. Local No. 456) to recover compensation for hourly employment for Labor Day which fell on September 3, 1951. The compensation for each plaintiff is stipulated at amounts varying between approximately $14 and $20. The case was tried without a jury and from the evidence adduced the court finds the following facts:
During the summer of 1951 the plaintiffs were employed in the defendant's elevator plant in Jersey City. They were members of the aforementioned union, and their employment was controlled by a formal written agreement dated November 1, 1950 between the union and the defendant. The plaintiffs contend that the contract was an undertaking of the union and the local and consequently was not binding on the individual members. This contention is not tenable since a collective bargaining agreement is the joint and several contract of the members of the union made by the officers of the union as their agents. Dooley v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co. of Pa., 130 N.J.Eq. 75, 21 A.2d 334 (Ch.1941), affirmed 131 N.J.Eq. 468, 25 A.2d 893 (E. & A.1942); Christiansen v. Local 680 of the Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees of N.J., 126 N.J.Eq. 508, 10 A.2d 168 (Ch.1940).
The pertinent provisions of the agreement which bear upon the present dispute are the following:
'Section VII--Strikes, Stoppages, and Lockouts.
'Section XII--Holidays and Vacations.
'(b) All hourly paid employees who have completed three (3) month's continuous service immediately preceding the holiday will be paid for their established shift hours on a holiday observed between Monday and Friday both inclusive.
'(d) The above payment will be made only to hourly paid employees who are on the active roll as of the day before the holiday within the week and who earn some wages during the week in which the holiday falls or any of the four preceding weeks.'
With the foregoing binding contractual relations existing between them, the evidence establishes that the following events transpired:
During the summer of 1951 the parties were negotiating a supplement to the contract which had to do with seniority rights. Obviously the negotiations were not progressing to the satisfaction of the employees and beginning on July 12, 1951 they instituted a practice of refusing to work for the full eight hours of their prescribed employment. Thus, from July 12 to August 24 they worked only six hours a day. On August 27 and 28 they worked full eight hours, but beginning August 29 and continuing until September 11 they worked from 3 1/2 to six hours a day. On Friday morning, August 31, the officers of the Union were notified that if the employees did not work the full day they would not be paid for the following Monday which was Labor day, and hence a holiday for which the contract provided they should be paid without working. In spite of this warning the employees worked only 5 1/2 hours. On the following September 11 the employees were informed that if they did not work a full day the plant would be closed down. They only worked 6 1/2 hours, and on September 12 the plant was actually closed down so far as the hourly-paid employees were concerned. On September 13 when they returned to work the pay checks delivered to the employees did not include compensation for Labor Day. Thereafter the employees continued to work full time.
The defendant contends that the action of its employees constituted an unwarranted 'stoppage of work' in violation of the contract. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that there was no work stoppage, but that on the contrary the employees took off from work to attend essential union meetings to discuss the pending negotiations surrounding the proposed supplemental contract. That factual contention must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Without discussing the evidence in detail, the conduct of the employees and the literature disseminated by the union among its members clearly indicates that the cessation from work each day under the guise of attending union meetings was in fact a method of the union to put unwarranted pressure on the employer to make concessions in the then pending negotiations. The court, therefore, finds as a fact that the actions of the employees constituted a work stoppage which was interdicted by section VIII(A) of the contract, and that as a consequence the plaintiffs deliberately and illegally violated the terms of the existing agreement.
By virtue of the foregoing finding of facts the defendant contends it was justified in withholding the holiday pay by reason of the breach of...
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Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
...a jury and resulted in judgment for the plaintiffs from which the defendant appeals. The opinion of the trial court is reported 25 N.J.Super. 601, 96 A.2d 720, where the essential facts of the controversy are fully set The contract between the union and the defendant company, upon which thi......
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Milk Drivers and Dairy Emp., Local 680 v. Cream-O-Land Dairy
...the plaintiff has to enforce the agreement? To sustain the theory of agency, defendants rely on Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 25 N.J.Super. 601, 603, 96 A.2d 720 (Law Div.1953), but the case was reversed. The Supreme Court in that case, 16 N.J. 280, 285, 286, 108 A.2d 409, 411 (1954)......
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Kennedy v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
...of 21 of defendant's plants. Plaintiffs recovered judgment in the Superior Court, Law Division, after a trial without a jury, 25 N.J.Super. 601, 96 A.2d 720 (1953). The Appellate Division reversed, 29 N.J.Super. 68, 101 A.2d 592 (1953). We allowed certification on plaintiffs' petition, 15 N......