Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson

Decision Date13 November 2000
Docket NumberNo. S00G0815.,S00G0815.
CitationKennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 538 S.E.2d 742 (Ga. 2000)
PartiesKENNESTONE HOSPITAL, INC. v. HOPSON.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Browning & Tanksley, Henry D. Green, Jr., David V. Johnson, Marietta, for appellant.

Beltran & Associates, Frank J. Beltran, Douglas V. Chandler, Atlanta, Bernadette C. Crucilla, Macon, for appellee.

FLETCHER, Presiding Justice.

In response to a request for discovery from a non-party under OCGA § 9-11-34(c), Kennestone Hospital produced Sherri Hopson's mental health records to her former husband in their divorce action.Hopson filed a claim alleging that the hospital was liable in tort for releasing records that were privileged, but the trial court granted summary judgment to Kennestone.Reversing, the Court of Appeals for the State of Georgia held that a patient's failure to object within ten days to a request for a nonparty to produce documents does not amount to a waiver of the patient's privileged communications with a psychiatrist.1Because we agree that there is no implied waiver of the mental health privilege based on the patient's failure to object to a request for a nonparty to produce mental health records, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Sherri Hopson agreed to undergo treatment in a drug rehabilitation program as part of the settlement agreement with her husband in their divorce action.After her former husband sought to terminate his alimony payments based on her failure to receive treatment, Hopson participated in a two-week outpatient drug treatment program at Kennestone Hospital.Her ex-husband served Kennestone with a nonparty discovery request under OCGA § 9-11-34(c), seeking production of any hospital documents concerning Hopson's attendance and completion of drug rehabilitation programs at the hospital.Hopson did not object within ten days, the hospital produced Hopson's records, and the alimony action was settled.

Later Kennestone sued Hopson to collect an unpaid medical bill, and Hopson filed counterclaims against Kennestone for negligence, invasion of privacy, tortious interference with a confidential relationship, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.She contended that the hospital improperly released records and documents that contained confidential and privileged communications between Hopson and her psychiatrists concerning her treatment without her consent or a court order.Rejecting her arguments, the trial court granted summary judgment to Kennestone on its complaint and Hopson's counterclaim.The court of appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment on the counterclaim, and this Court granted certiorari.

DISCOVERY PROCEDURES

The Georgia Civil Practice Act provides for the discovery of "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action."2A party's failure to object to a discovery request within the time required generally will result in a waiver of the right to object.3The issue in this appeal is whether the general rule should apply to requests under OCGA § 9-11-34(c) to nonparties for the production of documents that are protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege.

OCGA § 9-11-34 deals with discovery rules concerning the production of documents, the inspection of things, and the entry upon land to inspect property or objects.Subsection (c) applies the code section to discovery against persons who are not parties in the underlying action;subsection (d) provides that the code section shall not repeal the confidentiality provided by other statutes concerning mental illness, mental retardation, and alcohol and drug treatment.4

Paragraph (c)(1) of OCGA § 9-11-34 sets out the procedure for obtaining discovery and gives the nonparty or any party the right to object;paragraph (c)(2) applies the code section specifically to discovery against a nonparty who is a practitioner of the healing arts, hospital, or health care facility.The party desiring discovery must serve all parties with the request, and the nonparty or any party may file an objection with the court.If an objection is filed, the nonparty shall not furnish the requested materials until further order of the court and the party seeking the discovery may file a motion to compel discovery."If no objection is filed within ten days of the request, the nonparty to whom the request is directed shall promptly comply."5

There is no federal rule comparable to paragraph (c)(2) or (d) of OCGA § 9-11-34, and neither provision was part of the Georgia Civil Practice Act when it was originally enacted in 1966 or substantially revised in 1972.6The legislative history of the two provisions consists of the preamble of two acts passed in 1986 and 1988.Given the ambiguity in the first act concerning the "privileges" covered and the stated purpose of the second act to keep mental health records confidential, this limited legislative history does not clarify the legislature's intent in enacting subsections (c) and (d).7

PSYCHIATRIST-PATIENT PRIVILEGE

As a matter of public policy, this state has long provided for the confidentiality of communications between psychiatrist and patient.8In 1995, the legislature expanded the list of mental health providers whose communications with patients during the psychotherapeutic relationship are privileged.The mental health privilege now includes confidential communications between patient and psychiatrist, licensed psychologist, licensed clinical social worker, clinical nurse specialist in mental health or psychiatry, licensed marriage and family therapist, or licensed professional counselor.9

"The purpose of the privilege is to encourage the patient to talk freely without fear of disclosure and embarrassment, thus enabling the psychiatrist to render effective treatment of the patient's emotional or mental disorders."10In recognizing a testimonial privilege for communications between psychotherapist and patient, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the privilege serves important private and public interests by facilitating appropriate treatment and thus promoting the mental health of the country's citizenry.11

Although the fact that a patient has undergone psychiatric treatment and the dates of the care are not subject to the psychiatrist-patient privilege,12 confidential communications between the psychiatrist and patient generally are protected.13As a result, the patient must waive the privilege either expressly or implicitly as a precondition of discovery.14This Court has found an implied waiver at trial when a criminal defendant called a psychiatrist as a witness to testify about the defendant's mental condition.15In contrast, we refused to find that a witness in a criminal trial waived the privilege by allowing her psychiatrist to testify in her workers' compensation case.16

IMPLIED WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE

Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment of a known right and may be established by express statements or implied by conduct.17An implied waiver is one shown by a "party's decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive."18Ordinarily, silence is insufficient to establish a waiver unless there is an obligation to speak.19

In at least three cases, the court of appeals has considered the relationship between the statutes providing for the discovery of nonparty documents and those providing for the confidentiality of communications between psychiatrist and patient.The court first identified the issue as whether the psychiatrist-patient privilege "is ever subject to waiver or is an `absolute' privilege," but declined to decide the issue.20Subsequently, the court held in Price v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co.21 that a patient's failure to object within ten days under § 9-11-34(c)(2) waived the patient's right to object to a discovery request seeking documents protected by the psychiatrist-patient privilege.However, when the full court considered the issue again in this case, it overruled its prior decision in Price and held that a patient's failure to object did not constitute an affirmative waiver of privileged communications with a psychiatrist.22

Considering the protection afforded by the mental health privilege, we conclude that a patient's failure to file an objection within ten days of the request for privileged communications from a nonparty is not the type of decisive and unequivocal conduct that justifies inferring an intent to waive the privilege.The only previous instance where we have found an implied waiver of the privilege was based on the affirmative act of a party in calling a psychiatrist as a witness.23In contrast, the implied waiver in this case would be based on the party's silence or failure to act.

Given the importance of the privilege in encouraging and protecting confidential communications concerning the emotional and mental health of individuals, we hold that a party's silence and failure to act in response to a request for privileged matter from a nonparty health care provider or facility under OCGA § 9-11-34(c)(2) does not waive the party's privilege by implication.Because we agree with the court of appeals that Hopson did not waive her psychiatrist-patient privilege by failing to object to the request for her records from Kennestone, we affirm its decision reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospital.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur.

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23 cases
  • Brown v. Howard
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 16, 2015
    ...fact of employment of or treatment by a mental health provider and the dates thereof do not fall within the mental health privilege and may be disclosed.” Herendeen,279 Ga. at 327, 613 S.E.2d 647(citations omitted); Kennestone Hosp.,273 Ga. at 148, 538 S.E.2d 742; Mincey v. Ga. Dept. of Community Affairs,308 Ga.App. 740, 746(1), 708 S.E.2d 644 (2011).Our review of the records at issue shows, among other things, dates of service; the names of several persons whoseremanded with direction.ANDREWS, P.J., and MILLER, J., concur.1 On appeal, the medical providers do not argue that the trial court erred by concluding that Howard had not waived the applicable privilege. See generally Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson,273 Ga. 145, 149, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000)(“[A] party's silence and failure to act in response to a request for privileged matter from a nonparty health care provider or facility under OCGA § 9–11–34(c)(2)does not waive the party's privilege...
  • State v. Herendeen
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • May 23, 2005
    ...affirm the denial of a party's attempt to depose another party's psychiatrist. Without an express statement of waiver executed by the patient or the patient's "decisive unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive," (Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, supra, 273 Ga. at 148, 538 S.E.2d 742), these matters are not subject to revelation pursuant to the grand jury subpoena. However, the fact of employment of or treatment by a mental health provider and the dates thereof do nottherapist, and licensed professional counselor. Ga. L. 1995, p. 858, § 1; OCGA § 24-9-21(7). In light of that expansion, it is appropriate to refer to the privilege at issue as the "mental health privilege." See Kennestone Hospital v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000). Protecting confidential mental health communications from disclosure serves an important private interest and a public interest. Jaffee v. Redmond, supra, 518 U.S. at 10-11, 116 S.Ct. 1923. As far as the individual...
  • Munoz v. Selig Enters., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit
    • December 04, 2020
    ..."decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Georgia law does not support inferring a waiver from contractual silence as to whether a right is waived. Id. at 148–49, 538 S.E.2d 742 ("Ordinarily, silence is insufficient to establish a waiver unless there is an obligation to speak."). See also Mullis v. Bibb Cty. , 294 Ga. App. 721, 725, 669 S.E.2d 716 (2008) ("Summary judgment is appropriatethe mark by a country mile." Clover , 176 F.3d at 1351.Particularly as to waiver, Georgia law11 defines a waiver as the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Kennestone Hosp., Inc. v. Hopson , 273 Ga. 145, 148–49, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000) (emphasis added). Although it is possible to prove an implied waiver, an implied waiver must be supported by "decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).Inc. v. Hopson , 273 Ga. 145, 148–49, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000) (emphasis added). Although it is possible to prove an implied waiver, an implied waiver must be supported by "decisive, unequivocal conduct reasonably inferring the intent to waive." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Georgia law does not support inferring a waiver from contractual silence as to whether a right is waived. Id. at 148–49, 538 S.E.2d 742 ("Ordinarily, silence is insufficient to establish...
  • Mullis v. Bibb County
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 19, 2008
    ...See Division 1, supra. 21. See Miller v. Clayton County, 271 Ga. 135, 136(1), 518 S.E.2d 402 (1999) (no claim for estoppel where government official lacked authority to change or expand legislatively-prescribed definition of parties entitled to benefit). 22. Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000) (punctuation and footnotes 23. West v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 456, 458(2), 479 S.E.2d 722 (1997). 24. See Athens-Clarke County, supra...
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4 books & journal articles
  • "i Didn't Volunteer for This @&#%!": the Application of Georgia's Psychologist-patient Privilege to Court-ordered Mental Health Treatment - John Scott Husser, Jr.
    • United States
    • Mercer Law Reviews Mercer University School of Law
    • Invalid date
    ...Wiles, 264 Ga. 594, 595-96, 448 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1994)); Kimble v. Kimble, 240 Ga. 100, 101, 239 S.E.2d 676, 676 (1977); Wilson v. Bonner, 166 Ga. App. 9, 16-17(5), 303 S.E.2d 134, 142 (1983)). 28. Kennestone Hospital v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 147-48, 583 S.E.2d 742, 744 (2000). The statute the court referenced was O.C.G.A. Sec. 24-9-21(7) (1995). This statute provides, in pertinent part, that: [t]here are certainsuch treatment was voluntary or not. John Scott Husser, Jr. --------Notes: 1. 279 Ga. 323, 613 S.E.2d 647 (2005). 2. Kennestone Hospital v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 147-48, 538 S.E.2d 742, 744 (2000). 3. Herendeen, 279 Ga. at 326-27, 613 S.E.2d at 650 (citing Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704-05, 177 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1970)). 4. Id. at 326-27, 613 S.E.2d at 650, overruling In the Interest of M.N.H., 237...
  • The Medical Records Subpoena After King: the Medical Records Custodian's Perspective
    • United States
    • Georgia Bar Journal State Bar of Georgia
    • Invalid date
    ...Section 9- 11-34 constituted a waiver. 32. Id. at 147, 538 S.E.2d at 743. 33. Id., 273 Ga. at 149, 538 S.E.2d at 748. See also Hopson v.Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 831, 526 S.E.2d 622, 625 (1999), aff'd, 273 Ga. 145, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000), in which the Court of stated, somewhat ambiguously, "By not objecting to the request, [the patient] waived only the objections that she might have made to the production of her medicalvia the nonparty request to produce. Id. at (d). 27. King, 272 Ga. at 794, 535 S.E.2d 497. 28. O.C.G.A 9-11-5(b) (1993). 29. See supra note 10. 30. Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 538 S.E.2d 742 (2000), affirming, Hopson v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 526 S.E.2d 622 (1999). 31. Id. The decision overrules Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 Ga. App. 792, 510 S.E.2d 582 (1998),...
  • Sword and Shield: the Georgia Supreme Court Adopts Third-party Waiver of Attorney-client Privilege
    • United States
    • Mercer Law Reviews Mercer University School of Law
    • Invalid date
    ...293 Ga. at 422, 746 S.E.2d at 103.16. Ga. R. & Regs. St. Bar 1.6 cmt. 5 (2015).17. Id.18. Id. 19. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-26 (2020).20. Id. (emphasis added).21. Kennestone Hosp. v. Hopson, 273 Ga. 145, 148, 538 S.E.2d 742, 745 (2000).22. Id.23. Osborn v. State, 233 Ga. App. 257, 260, 5o4 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1998).24. Id.25. Christenbury v. Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell, LLP, 285 F.R.D. 675, 681 (N.D. Ga. 2012).26. Id. (quoting Cox v....
  • The Absolute Privilege Between Patient and Psychiatrist in Civil Cases
    • United States
    • Georgia Bar Journal State Bar of Georgia
    • Invalid date
    ...510 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1998), overruled by, Hopson v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 5526 S.E.2d 622 (1999), aff'd, 273 Ga. 145, 5538 S.E.2d 742 (2000). 30. Hopson, 241 Ga. App. at 830, 526 S.E.2d at 624. 31. Hopson, 273 Ga. at 145, 538 S.E.2d at 745 32. O.C.G.A. 9-11-34(c)(2) (Supp. 2000) states in pertinent part that "This Code section shall also be applicable with respect to discovery889, 890, 434 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993); Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 Ga. App. 792, 794, 510 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1998), overruled by, Hopson v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 5526 S.E.2d 622 (1999), aff'd, 273 Ga. 145, 5538 S.E.2d 742 (2000). 30. Hopson, 241 Ga. App. at 830, 526 S.E.2d at 624. 31. Hopson, 273 Ga. at 145, 538 S.E.2d at 745 32. O.C.G.A. 9-11-34(c)(2)S.E.2d 152, 158 (2000). 27. Dynin v. Hall, 207 Ga. App. 337, 338, 428 S.E.2d 89, 90 (1993). 28. Hopson v. Kennestone Hosp., Inc., 241 Ga. App. 829, 5526 S.E.2d 622 (1999), aff'd, 273 Ga. 145, 5538 S.E.2d 742 (2000). 29. Jones v. Abel, 209 Ga. App. 889, 890, 434 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1993); Price v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 Ga. App. 792, 794, 510 S.E.2d 582, 584 (1998), overruled...