Kenney v. Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose

• Decision Date: 21 October 1918
• Docket Number: Nos. 12112,12113.,s. 12112
• Citation: 120 N.E. 631,285 Ill. 188
• Parties: KENNEY v. SUPREME LODGE OF THE WORLD, LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE. GUSTIN v. SAME.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

285 Ill. 188

120 N.E. 631

KENNEY

v.SUPREME LODGE OF THE WORLD, LOYAL ORDER OF MOOSE.

GUSTIN

v.SAME.

Nos. 12112, 12113.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 21, 1918.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Kane County; Mazzini Slusser, Judge.

Actions by Thomas P. Kenney, administrator of the estate of Donald A. Kenney, and by John C. Gustin, administrator of the estate of Christopher Gustin, against the Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose. Judgments for defendant, and plaintiff in each case appeals. Affirmed.

Blum, Wolfsohn & Blum, of Chicago, and Raymond & Newhall, of Aurora, for appellants.

E. J. Henning, of San Diego, Cal., and Alschuler, Putnam & Flannigen, all of Aurora, for appellee.

COOKE, J.

Thomas P. Kenney, administrator of the estate of Donald A. Kenney, brought his action of debt in the circuit court of Kane county on a judgment obtained in the state of Alabama against the Supreme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of Moose. At the same time John C. Gustin, administrator of the estate of Christopher Gustin, brought a like suit in the same court against the same defendant. From the declarations it appears that suits were commenced in the city court of Birmingham, Ala., a court of general jurisdiction, and judgments were recovered, respectively, in the sum of $18,000 in the Kenney case and $15,000 in the Gustin case. A plea was filed in each case to the jurisdiction of the court, alleging the deceased came to his death by injuries inflicted upon his person in the state of Alabama, and that the death occurred within the state of Alabama, and that the judgment upon which suit was brought herein was for damages assessed for the negligent causing of the death. To this plea plaintiff demurred, and, the demurrer being overruled, plaintiff in each instance elected to stand by his demurrer, and judgment was rendered by the court. From this judgment plaintiff in each case appealed. The questions involved in both appeals are the same, and the causes have been consolidated.

Section 2 of our Injuries Act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1917, c. 70) provides that no action shall be brought or prosecuted in this state to recover damages for a death occurring outside of this state. In Walton v. Pryor, 276 Ill. 563, 115 N. E. 2, we held that the courts of this state had no jurisdiction of an action for damages occasioned by death occurring in another state in consequence of wrongful act, neglect, or default. In Dougherty v. American McKenna Process Co., 255 Ill. 369, 99 N. E. 619, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 568, L. R. A. 1915F, 955, we also held that the courts of this state were without jurisdiction to entertain such a cause of action, and that the jurisdictional provisions contained in the statute did not contravene the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution (article 4, § 1), or the provision of the federal Constitution entitling the citizens of each state to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several states.

The original action on which the judgments were obtained not being maintainable in Illinois, the question arises whether under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution the circuit court was concluded by the judgments of the Alabama court, or whether it could look behind the judgments to determine the nature of the causes of action upon which the judgments were based.

The full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution does not compel a state to give its courts jurisdiction against its will. Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225. In that case one Illinois corporation sued another Illinois corporation in the New York Supreme Court upon an Illinois judgment. The New York Code provided that--

‘An action against a foreign corporation may be maintained by another foreign corporation, or by a nonresident, in one of the following cases only: * * * (3) Where the cause of action arose within the state.’ Code Civ. Proc. § 1780.

It was argued there that the state could not exclude a foreign corporation from suing upon judgments obtained in another state, because to do so was to deny full faith and credit to those judgments. In passing upon the question the court said:

‘The Constitution does not require the state of New York to give jurisdiction to the Supreme Court against its will. If the plaintiff can find a court into which it has a right to come, then the effect of the judgment is fixed by the Constitution and the act in pursuance of it which Congress has passed. Rev. Stat. § 905; U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 677 [U. S. Comp. St. 1916, § 1519]. But the Constitution does not require the state to provide such a court. See Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 30 . If the state does provide a court to which its own citizens may resort in a certain class of cases, it may be that citizens of other states of the Union also would have a right to resort to it in cases of the same class.’

It follows from this holding that, so long as a state does not discriminate between its own citizens and the citizens of other states, it may limit the jurisdiction of its courts upon actions on judgments, the same as it may do with relation to any other kind of action.

It now remains to be seen how far a court may go in determining whether or not it has jurisdiction in an action brought on a judgment. Where an action is brought upon a judgment rendered in another state, the court may examine into the nature of the cause of action upon which the judgment is founded, for the purpose of determining whether it would have had jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action, and if it appears...