Kennie v. Natural Resource Dept. of Dennis

• Decision Date: 29 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06-P-463.,06-P-463.
• Citation: 69 Mass. App. Ct. 158,866 N.E.2d 983
• Parties: Steven KENNIE & another<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. NATURAL RESOURCE DEPARTMENT OF DENNIS<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> & others.<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL>
• Court: Appeals Court of Massachusetts

866 N.E.2d 983

69 Mass. App. Ct. 158

Steven KENNIE & another¹ v. NATURAL RESOURCE DEPARTMENT OF DENNIS² & others.³

No. 06-P-463.

Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Barnstable.

Argued December 6, 2006.

Decided May 29, 2007.

Douglas H. Wilkins, Cambridge, for the plaintiffs.

John J. Davis, Boston, for Alan S. Marcy.

Deidre Brennan Regan, Boston, for Natural Resource Department of Dennis.

Present: GELINAS, GREEN, & GRAINGER, JJ.

GRAINGER, J.

The plaintiffs, Steven Kennie and his wife Julie Lane Hagen, appeal the grant of summary judgment dismissing their claims under the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act (act), G.L. c. 12, § 11I. We affirm.

Background. "We recite the material facts in the light most favorable to [the plaintiffs], as the nonmoving party." Lyons v. Nutt, 436 Mass. 244, 245, 763 N.E.2d 1065 (2002). The plaintiffs applied for an "order of conditions" (permit) to build a dock from their property in the town of Dennis (town) extending into the Bass River (river). They claimed that Alan Marcy, the town shellfish constable, wrongfully planted shellfish in the riverbed to generate artificially high results in a shellfish survey, thereby causing them to abandon their application for their preferred dock site ("location # 3"), in light of their certainty that, based upon the artificially inflated survey results, the town conservation commission (commission) would inevitably reject their application.⁴ They claim further that they were thereby forced to expend time and money pursuing a new application for an alternative site ("location # 4"), which the commission eventually approved.

On April 19, 2001, the plaintiffs filed their application with the commission for a permit to build a dock from their property into the river at the westernmost spot (location # 3). Section 6 of the "Wetlands Protection Bylaw of the Town of Dennis" (by-law) provides in pertinent part:

"The applicant shall have the burden of proof by a preponderance of credible evidence that the work proposed . . . will not have an unacceptable significant and immediate or cumulative effect upon the wetland values protected by [the] Bylaw."

To show that their proposed dock would not have a negative impact on the shellfish population in the river, the plaintiffs commissioned a shellfish survey by Jacob Bruinooge, an experienced shellfish survey consultant, who conducted three surveys over the course of fifteen months. The Bruinooge survey found a very low density of quahogs, .0036 per square foot, in the area around location # 3. The plaintiffs contend that this low density falls below the level considered to be "significant," and that therefore installation of a dock at location # 3 would not interfere with shellfish protection.

In January, 2002, Marcy enlisted the help of the Massachusetts Department of Marine Fisheries (DMF) to conduct a shellfish survey so that the commission would have more than one survey to consider. The DMF's January survey found in excess of one hundred times more quahogs than the Bruinooge survey, with a density of at least .5 per square foot. The plaintiffs do not dispute the findings of the DMF survey; rather, they claim that the increase in quahogs resulted from clams planted by Marcy.

Claiming that the hearings were tainted by Marcy's planting of quahogs in the river in advance of the DMF survey, the plaintiffs filed the present action in Superior Court against both Marcy and the town's natural resource department (department) in May, 2002, several months before the commission hearings on their application closed. They claimed that Marcy individually, and the department, acting through Marcy in his official capacity, had violated their civil rights and caused them financial and emotional damage as a result of Marcy's planting shellfish in the riverbed, thereby sabotaging their application for a dock permit in location # 3.⁵ The commission eventually denied the permit on December 6, 2002.⁶

Discussion. 1. Standard of review. We begin with the familiar principle that "[t]he standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, all material facts have been established and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 410 Mass. 117, 120, 571 N.E.2d 357 (1991). See Mass.R.Civ.P. 56(c), 365 Mass. 824 (1974). Our review is de novo, see Matthews v. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 426 Mass. 122, 123 n. 1, 686 N.E.2d 1303 (1997); Ritter v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 439 Mass. 214, 215, 786 N.E.2d 817 (2003), and "[w]e may consider any ground supporting the judgment." Augat, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra.

2. Violation of the act. To prove a violation under the act, the plaintiffs must show not only that Marcy interfered or attempted to interfere with their exercise of "rights secured by the constitution or laws of the commonwealth," but that he did so "by threats, intimidation or coercion." G.L. c. 12, § 11H, inserted by St.1979, c. 801, § 1.⁷ See Rosenfeld v. Board of Health of Chilmark, 27 Mass. App.Ct. 621, 627, 541 N.E.2d 375 (1989). The plaintiffs claimed that on three separate occasions Marcy made statements that he would prevent them from installing the dock, that these statements constituted "threats, intimidation or coercion," and that Marcy's statements interfered with the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected rights.⁸

The Supreme Judicial Court has specifically defined each of these terms, and we examine Marcy's statements⁹ to determine whether they rise to the level of either threats, intimidation, or coercion, as is required to state a cause of action under the act. We apply the objective standard of whether a reasonable person would be threatened, intimidated, or coerced by Marcy's behavior. See Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 474-475, 631 N.E.2d 985, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 188, 130 L.Ed.2d 122 (1994).

A "threat" is "the intentional exertion of pressure to make another fearful or apprehensive of injury or harm." Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. 489, 505, 845 N.E.2d 322 (2006), quoting from Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, supra at 474, 631 N.E.2d 985. The threatened harm need not be physical. See Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. 635, 647-648, 783 N.E.2d 399 (2003) (comparing §§ 11H and 11I "civil violation to use `threat, intimidation or coercion' . . . with G.L. c. 265, § 37, ... criminal violation to use `force or threat of force'").¹⁰

In this case, although Kennie admitted that he was "not in fear of physical harm," he stated that he "definitely was in fear of financial harm," and Hagen claims that she feared both physical and financial harm. The question is whether their fears were objectively reasonable. We conclude that in the context in which Marcy spoke to them, an objectively reasonable person seeking a dock permit would have understood Marcy's words to refer to the permitting process. The town had established rules and procedures for applying for a permit, and when Marcy allegedly said that he was "mandated to do whatever it takes" to keep the dock from going in, the reasonably objective interpretation of that statement is that Marcy's view of his duties required him to offer vigorous opposition to the dock permit at the hearings. It is not reasonable to assume that Marcy was expressing an intent to inflict physical harm. Moreover, to the extent that Marcy's opposition might reasonably cause the plaintiffs to anticipate expending funds in pursuit of their permit application, this does not qualify as financial harm under the act. See Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., 438 Mass. at 648, 783 N.E.2d 399, quoting from Sena v. Commonwealth, 417 Mass. 250, 263, 629 N.E.2d 986 (1994) ("[g]enerally, by itself, a threat to use lawful means to reach an intended result is not actionable under § 11I").

"Intimidation" is "putting [one] in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct." Haufler v. Zotos, 446 Mass. at 505, 845 N.E.2d 322, quoting from Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. at 474, 631 N.E.2d 985. Kennie claimed that his fear of the financial harm that would result from continued pursuit of a dock permit for location # 3 after Marcy had planted the shellfish "forced" him to modify the application and spend more money on a new application, for location # 4. This claim does not fall within the meaning of "intimidation" under Massachusetts law. Marcy's words, fairly considered, were no more than a promise of vigorous opposition. While such a promise would reasonably stimulate a reconsideration of the effort and expense necessary to secure the permit, it does not rise to the level of intimidation defined in Haufler, supra. The plaintiffs themselves have demonstrated this to be true by their reaction, which was to work successfully within the permitting process to discredit Marcy and, material to our consideration, eventually obtain a permit (see note 6, supra).

Hagen testified to fear of "repercussions" from Marcy because he carried a firearm while on duty. We do not believe that this constitutes an objectively reasonable conclusion, again considering the context of Marcy's statements. Hagen had no objectively reasonable basis to assume that Marcy would use his firearm to prevent her from installing a dock on her property, especially given the absence of any accompanying overt physical threat.

"`Coercion' is `the application to another of such force, either physical or moral, as to constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.' Buster v. George W. Moore, Inc., [438 Mass. at] 646 , quoting Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Blake, supra. See also Freeman v. Planning Bd. of W. Boylston, 419 Mass. 548, 565 [646 N.E.2d 139, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 931, 116 S.Ct. 337, 133 L.Ed.2d 235] (1995), quoting...