Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery Cnty., Md.

• Decision Date: 27 June 2012
• Docket Number: No. 11–1659.,11–1659.
• Citation: 684 F.3d 462,33 IER Cases 1798
• Parties: KENSINGTON VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC.; Augustine M. Kelley; Shawn St. Claire; Bethesda Fire Department, Inc.; Paula Mackel; Cabin John Park Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; Hyattstown Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; Janeth Mora, Plaintiffs–Appellants, and Steven C. Kurtz; Deborah Rokes; Stephanie Ayton, Plaintiffs, v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND; Isiah Leggett, County Executive; Richard Bowers, Fire Chief; Joseph Adler; Joseph Beach, Defendants–Appellees, Montgomery County Council, The, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

684 F.3d 462

33 IER Cases 1798

KENSINGTON VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT, INC.; Augustine M. Kelley; Shawn St. Claire; Bethesda Fire Department, Inc.; Paula Mackel; Cabin John Park Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; Hyattstown Volunteer Fire Department, Inc.; Janeth Mora, Plaintiffs–Appellants,andSteven C. Kurtz; Deborah Rokes; Stephanie Ayton, Plaintiffs,

v. MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND; Isiah Leggett, County Executive; Richard Bowers, Fire Chief; Joseph Adler; Joseph Beach, Defendants–Appellees,Montgomery County Council, The, Defendant.

No. 11–1659.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued: March 22, 2012.

Decided: June 27, 2012.

ARGUED:Brett Alan Pisciotta, King & Attridge, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Edward Barry Lattner, County Attorney's Office, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF:John A. King, King & Attridge, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. Marc P. Hansen, County Attorney, Patricia P. Via, Chief, Division of Litigation, County Attorney's Office, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.

Before DUNCAN, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge DIAZ wrote the opinion, in which Judge DUNCAN and Judge AGEE joined.

OPINION

DIAZ, Circuit Judge:

A group of local volunteer fire and rescue departments (“LFRDs”) and several of their former administrative employees (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought suit against Montgomery County, Maryland, the County Council, and certain county officials (collectively, “Defendants”) contending that Defendants eliminated part of Plaintiffs' funding in retaliation for Plaintiffs' opposition to legislation supported by Defendants.

The district court dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint, declining to inquire into Defendants' alleged illicit motive behind an otherwise facially valid budgetary enactment, finding that certain individual defendants were protected by legislative immunity, and concluding that because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, they could not bring an abusive discharge claim under state law. We affirm.

I.

A.

The Montgomery County Fire and Rescue Service (“MCFRS”) is a “combined and integrated” operation consisting of both County employees and several LFRDs that collectively provide fire, rescue, and emergency medical services. J.A. 190. Although each LFRD is an independent corporation under Maryland law, the County traditionally funds administrative support positions at the LFRDs. Despite this unique funding relationship, the Montgomery County Code (“Code”) provides that these LFRD administrative personnel are not employees of the County. Id. 553 (“Employees of local fire and rescue departments who are paid with tax funds are not County employees.”) (quoting Code § 21–16(a)); see also id. 554 (“Nothing in this Chapter means that employees of the local fire and rescue departments are County employees, either on a de jure or de facto basis.”) (quoting Code § 21–16(c)).

In May 2010, the County Council passed Budget Resolution 16–373 for fiscal year 2011 (“FY11”). The original budget included $1.58 million for LFRD personnel, including twenty administrative support positions. The County later determined, however, that it needed to reduce its projected budget for FY11. Specifically, the County sought to offset lost revenue from the anticipated defeat of Bill 13–10—the proposed “ambulance fee” legislation—that was projected to generate $14.1 million annually and was included in the original FY11 budget.¹ Bill 13–10 encountered fierce opposition, particularly from the LFRDs. As Plaintiffs describe, the LFRDs “vehemently, publicly and forcefully advocated against the ambulance fee through the press and through the distribution of political literature.” Appellants' Br. 9. Voters ultimately rejected the bill in a referendum placed on the November 2010 ballot.

Prior to the referendum vote—but after determining that the ambulance fee legislation would likely fail—County Executive Isiah Leggett sent a budget savings plan to the County Council on October 5, 2010 “to address the potential loss of revenue” from Bill 13–10's defeat. J.A. 140. The plan called for $14.3 million in spending cuts and the elimination of 133 publicly funded positions, affecting the MCFRS and a host of other agencies. Relevant to this appeal, the plan recommended in part that the County “discontinue funding 20 LFRD civilian employees,” at a savings of $592,000, offsetting the loss of personnel by creating five new administrative positions with the County, id. 143. The plan did not cut funding for non-volunteer administrative positions within MCFRS.

As a result of the general economic slump, Leggett submitted another savings plan for FY11 in December 2010, proposing additional reductions to close the projected shortfall for fiscal year 2012. The revised plan called for deeper cuts from a range of agencies, but no additional reductions to the LFRDs' budget.

At a December 14, 2010 County Council session to discuss the revised plan, Montgomery County Fire Chief Richard Bowers spoke in support of the proposal and, according to Plaintiffs, “promoted the impression that the Council's choices [for funding priorities] lay between ‘boots on the ground’ and administrative personnel that readily could be supplanted by MCFRS operational personnel.” Id. 18. Plaintiffs also allege that one councilmember appeared to blame the LFRDs for the ambulance fee's defeat and stated that he thought LFRD budgets should be cut even further. Another councilmember assailed the proposal for imposing a “disproportionate hit on the volunteers.” Id. 19 (internal quotations omitted). Ultimately, in a 5–4 vote, the County Council passed the revised budget, authorizing reductions of $32,249,170 from the FY11 budget. Of this figure, $592,000—or about 1.8 percent—of the savings stemmed from defunding the twenty LFRD administrative positions.

Days later, Bowers sent a letter to each LFRD stating that as of the end of the year, “LFRD employees will no longer be paid by Montgomery County,” and adding that each LFRD “must immediately determine if the LFRD will retain your employee or effect a Reduction in Force (RIF).” Id. 63. Thereafter, the LFRDs notified the affected employees that they would be conducting a RIF and terminating the administrative positions.

B.

Plaintiffs filed a five-count complaint in state court alleging that Defendants' decisionto eliminate funding for the LFRD administrative positions was in retaliation for Plaintiffs' opposition to the ambulance fee legislation.² Count 1 sought a declaration that Defendants' actions were unconstitutional and illegal and an injunction barring Defendants from defunding the LFRD positions, now or in the future. Count 2 sought relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by retaliating against Plaintiffs for their opposition to the ambulance fee legislation. Count 3 alleged abusive discharge under Maryland common law. Count 4 alleged violations of the First Amendment and Article 40 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Count 5 sought a writ of mandamus compelling Defendants to comply with the RIF requirements in the Montgomery County Personnel Regulations.

After removing the case to federal court, Defendants moved to dismiss and/or for summary judgment. Finding that it could resolve the motion without considering matters outside of the pleadings, the district court treated Defendants' filing as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and granted it. The district court found that (1) Plaintiffs could not challenge the alleged illicit legislative motive behind the County's facially valid budget; (2) Defendants Leggett and Bowers were shielded by legislative immunity because they were acting in a functionally legislative role on matters related to the County budget; and (3) Plaintiffs could not bring an abusive discharge claim under Maryland law because the individual Plaintiffs were not County employees, “dual or otherwise.” Id. 773. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II.

We review de novo the district court's grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir.2011). In ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion, a court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint” and “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). In so doing, a court may consider documents attached to the complaint or the motion to dismiss “so long as they are integral to the complaint and authentic.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir.2009). To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs' complaint “must contain sufficient facts to state a claim that is ‘plausible on its face.’ ” Kolon, 637 F.3d at 440 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)).

III.

A.

Plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in refusing to inquire into the allegedly unconstitutional motive behind the County's budget. The district court's decision relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968), in which the Supreme Court declined to “strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”

O'Brien considered a First Amendment challenge to a federal statute that penalized the destruction of draft cards. Noting that the law did not facially abridge speech, the Court rejected an argument that the law was nonetheless unconstitutional because its purpose was to suppress free speech. The Court warned that it was a “hazardous matter” to inquire into legislative motives because “[w]hat motivates one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork.”...