KENT CTY. DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASS'N v. KENT CTY. SHER.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: PER CURIAM.
• Citation: KENT CTY. DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASS'N v. KENT CTY. SHER., 616 N.W.2d 677, 463 Mich. 353 (Mich. 2000)
• Decision Date: 19 September 2000
• Docket Number: Docket No. 115823.
• Parties: KENT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF and Kent County Board of Commissioners, Defendants-Appellees.

616 N.W.2d 677

463 Mich. 353

KENT COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENT COUNTY SHERIFF and Kent County Board of Commissioners, Defendants-Appellees.

Docket No. 115823.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

September 19, 2000.

Hankins & Flanigan, P.C. (by Dan E. Hankins and Timothy G. Holland), Okemos, MI, for plaintiff-appellant.

Miller, Johnson, Snell & Cummiskey, P.L.C. (by Peter H. Peterson), Grand Rapids, MI, for defendants-appellees.

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

When two jail guards were disciplined, the plaintiff union filed grievances and began preparing for arbitration. Its efforts included a request under the Freedom of Information Act for copies of the reports on which the sheriff based the disciplinary decisions. The sheriff refused to provide a portion of the material, and the union sued. The circuit court ruled in favor of the union, but the Court of Appeals reversed. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, though we reject two of the three grounds for its decision.

I

In February 1995, the Kent County Sheriff suspended a jail guard for twelve days and imposed other restrictions on his work duties. This was done because the sheriff was persuaded that the guard had used excessive force against inmates on three occasions. The guard, represented by the plaintiff union, filed a grievance. The matter was scheduled for hearing before an arbitrator.

In January 1996, the Kent County Sheriff fired a second guard because of an off-duty incident at a local restaurant, which resulted in a criminal investigation. The written discharge told the guard, "You have brought discredit to yourself, the Department, and all police officers in general." Again, a grievance was filed to bring the matter to arbitration.

To prepare for the arbitration hearings, the union requested that the sheriff provide copies of all reports on which the disciplinary decisions were based. These requests were made under both the Michigan Freedom of Information Act¹ (FOIA) and the Employee Right to Know Act.² The sheriff responded with certain documents pertaining to the guard who had been suspended. Regarding the case of the guard who had been fired, the sheriff replied that he already had given copies of all the material that he was required to provide.³

The union filed suit in circuit court,⁴ seeking various forms of relief.⁵ For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that the union sought copies of the reports generated during the sheriff's internal investigation of these matters.

Each side moved for summary disposition. The circuit court granted the union's motion with regard to its FOIA claim⁶ and denied the motion filed by the county defendants.

The Kent County defendants appealed, and persuaded the Court of Appeals to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. 238 Mich.App. 310, 605 N.W.2d 363 (1999).

The union has applied to this Court, seeking leave to appeal.

II

A

In its opinion of reversal, the Court of Appeals addressed three issues, each related to the FOIA.⁷ The first was whether the circuit court even had jurisdiction of this matter.⁸

In this regard, the Court of Appeals explained:

The [public employment relations act][⁹] governs public sector labor law, and its provisions have been held to take precedence over other conflicting laws to ensure uniformity, consistency, and predictability in the critically important and complex field of public sector labor law. Rockwell v. Crestwood School Dist., 393 Mich. 616, 629, 227 N.W.2d 736 (1975). The MERC is the sole state agency charged with the interpretation and enforcement of this highly specialized and politically sensitive field of law. Id., 630, 227 N.W.2d 736; MCL 423.216; MSA 17.455(16).

* * *

In the labor law arena, unions frequently seek information and materials from management that the union asserts is necessary to bargain collectively (regarding, for example, wages, overtime, and pensions). In the private sector, under the federal Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 USC 141 et seq., the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor practice disputes. 29 USC 160. Unless the information is protected from disclosure, an employer's failure to comply with the union's request for information and documents constitutes an unfair labor practice—a failure to bargain in good faith. General Motors Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 700 F.2d 1083, 1088 (C.A.6, 1983); 29 USC 158(a)(5). See also AFSCME [American Federation of Government Employees,] Local 2343 v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 330 U.S.App.D.C. 136, 144 F.3d 85 (1998); NLRB v. U.S. Postal Service, 888 F.2d 1568, 1570 (C.A.11, 1989). Analogously, in Michigan's public sector, the employer's failure to release nonprotected information constitutes an unfair labor practice under the PERA, as interpreted and enforced by the MERC. M.C.L. § 423.210(1)(e); MSA 17.455(10)(1)(e). Questions of what information is vital to bargaining—and thus subject to disclosure—and what information is proprietary and confidential—and thus protected from disclosure—go to the heart of the collective bargaining and grievance arbitration law of labor management relations. See Detroit Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 440 U.S. 301, 303, 99 S.Ct. 1123, 59 L.Ed.2d 333 (1979); NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 76 S.Ct. 753, 100 L.Ed. 1027 (1956).

In a dispute that involved the same parties and the precise issue now before us, the MERC determined that defendant law enforcement agency was not obliged to provide the association with copies of internal affairs records relating to association members' alleged misconduct. Kent Co. v Kent Co. Deputy Sheriffs Ass'n, 1991 MERC Lab Op 374; 4 MPER 194 (1991). Recently, the MERC reiterated this position in Battle Creek v. Police Officers Labor Council, 12 MPER 25 (1998), which also involved a police officer's union['s] [attempt] to obtain internal affairs records. In an apparent attempt to avoid an unfavorable ruling from the MERC, the association here sought to get the information by using the FOIA. Therefore, the issue of first impression is raised by this appeal: Does a public sector labor union's FOIA request for information from a public sector employer create an unfair labor practice issue that falls within the MERC's exclusive jurisdiction? We answer yes and hold that the circuit court lacks jurisdiction over the association's FOIA and [Right to Know] action. [238 Mich.App. at 313-315, 605 N.W.2d 363.]

Later in its opinion, the Court of Appeals elaborated that discussion in considerable detail. 238 Mich. at 318-326, 213 N.W. 131.

B

The Court of Appeals would be correct that MERC has exclusive jurisdiction over this dispute if it were true, as the Court said, that "the association's claim is, in substance, an unfair labor practice claim." 238 Mich.App. at 320, 605 N.W.2d 363. This Court explained in Rockwell that "MERC alone has jurisdiction and administrative expertise to entertain and reconcile competing allegations of unfair labor practices and misconduct under the PERA." 393 Mich. at 630, 227 N.W.2d 736. This point was again emphasized in Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Federation of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 117-124, 252 N.W.2d 818, 84 A.L.R.3d 314 (1977).

However, the Court of Appeals has reasoned from an incorrect premise. The union is not presenting the circuit court with an unfair labor practice, i.e., it is not asking the court to remedy a violation of the PERA or of the collective bargaining agreement.¹⁰ Rather, the union is simply asking for information available to any proper party, for any purpose, under a broadly written statute designed to open the closed files of government.

In Bradley v. Saranac Community Schools, 455 Mich. 285, 565 N.W.2d 650 (1997), the father of a student in the Saranac schools made an FOIA request for the personnel file of the child's teacher. The teacher objected to the release of performance evaluations, disciplinary records, and complaints filed against her. The Court's Bradley opinion also resolved a companion case,¹¹ in which a group of Lansing parents asked for copies of written performance evaluation of nine principals employed by the district. In separate suits, the Saranac teacher and the Lansing Association of School Administrators (LASA) asked the circuit court to enjoin disclosure.¹²

This Court held in Bradley that "the requested records must be disclosed because they are public records and are not within any exemption under the FOIA." 455 Mich. at 288-289, 565 N.W.2d 650. For present purposes, the essential element of our analysis was this statement regarding the breadth of the FOIA:

The Michigan FOIA provides for the disclosure of "public records" in the possession of a "public body." Plaintiffs do not dispute that their school districts are "public bod[ies]," or that the contents of their personnel records are "[p]ublic records."

The FOIA requires the full disclosure of public records, unless those records are exempted under [MCL 15.243; MSA 4.1801(13)]. The exemptions in [MCL 15.243; MSA 4.1801(13)] are narrowly construed, and the burden of proof rests on the party asserting the exemption.[¹³] If a request for information held by a public body falls within an exemption, the decision becomes discretionary. [455 Mich. at 292-293,565 N.W.2d 650.]

Further, the fact that some of the information sought in Bradley appeared to be subject to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction or cause the FOIA to be without effect:

Separately, LASA contends that the FOIA permits public bodies to exempt the deliberative process of their subordinates from public scrutiny. Both parties agreed in their collective bargaining agreement that the evaluation of school administrators would be conducted according to the appellee school district's Administrative Performance Review Handbook. The handbook's evaluation form declares that "[t]his evaluation

...