Kent General Hospital v. Blanco

• Decision Date: 21 October 1963
• Citation: Kent General Hospital v. Blanco, 195 A.2d 553, 57 Del. 90, 7 Storey 90 (Del. 1963)
• Parties: , 57 Del. 90 KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL, Appellee-Employer Below, Appellant, v. Henry Paul BLANCO, Appellant, Claimant Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 553

195 A.2d 553

7 Storey 90, 57 Del. 90

KENT GENERAL HOSPITAL, Appellee-Employer Below, Appellant, v.Henry Paul BLANCO, Appellant, Claimant Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Oct. 21, 1963.

Joseph H. Flanzer and Alfred Isaacs, of Flanzer & Isaacs, Wilmington, for appellant.

Wilfred J. Smith, Jr., and Frank J. Gentile, Jr., of Smith & Gentile, Wilmington, for appellee.

TERRY, C. J., and WOLCOTT and CAREY, JJ., sitting.

CAREY, Justice.

The appellee-claimant was injured on November 21st, 1956 while working for his employer Kent General Hospital, the present appellant.An agreement for the payment of $33.15 per week was approved by the Industrial Accident Board.By that agreement payments were to continue until terminated in accordance with the Delaware Workmen's Compensation Law.Payments were continued until January 28th, 1957, on which date Blanco returned to work.He again quit work on July 5, 1957 whereupon payments were resumed and continued until August 23d, 1957 after which no further payments were made.

On January 27th, 1960, Kent filed a petition to terminate payments as of August 24, 1957.After a hearing, the Board granted this petition.Blanco appealed that award and the Superior Court reversed the Board's decision.In its opinion, the Superior Court held that there was no evidence in the record to support the Board's finding that Blanco had recovered from his injuries.It also held as a matter of law that the Board had no power to make its ruling retroactive.The order of the Superior Court directed a remand and required the Board to hold such further hearings as might be necessary to determine the nature and status of Blanco's disability and to make such further award as was justified.It further ordered that the Board direct the employer to pay the total sum, plus interest, of the unpaid benefits for total temporary disability from August 1957 until January 25, 1961, the date of the Board's last award.

In our opinion, the Court below was clearly correct in its finding that there was no evidence to support a conclusion of full recovery by Blanco from his injuries on the date of the hearing; in fact, at the argument before us this point was conceded by counsel.The case must therefore be referred back to the Board for further action.Because the final award must settle the rights of the parties from and after August 24, 1957, we are obliged to consider to a limited extent the important question of whether the Board has the power to make its awards retroactive.On this point, we find ourselves in disagreement with the Court below.

The Superior Court correctly held that the Industrial Accident Board has only those powers given to it by the Legislature expressly or by implication.It also correctly pointed out the absence of any express language in the Workmen's Compensation Act permitting retroactive awards.It then held--incorrectly, in our opinion--that nothing in the act impliedly permitted them.Inasmuch as its order directed the making of the original agreed payments up to January 25, 1961, which was the date of the Board's last award, we necessarily assume that the Court meant to hold that an award of termination may not even relate back to the date of the filing of the petition.If that is the correct assumption, the ruling is contrary to the very terms of T. 19 Del. § 2347, as amended on May 5, 1955 in 50 Del.Laws Ch. 66.This amendment added two paragraphs to § 2347 which are as follows:

'Compensation payable to an employee, under the provisions of this chapter, shall not terminate until and unless the Board enters an award ending the payment of compensation after a hearing upon review of an agreement or award, provided that no petition for review, hearing or an order by the Board shall be necessary to terminate compensation where the parties to an award or an agreement consent to the termination.No petition for review shall be accepted by the Board unless it is accompanied by proof that a copy of the petition for review has been served by registered mail upon the other party to the agreement or award.Within five days after the filing of a petition for review, the Board shall notify each party concerned of the time, date and place scheduled for the hearing upon the petition.

'After the filing of a petition for review the compensation payable to an employee shall be paid by the employer to the Board.The Board shall retain the funds so paid until it enters an order upon the petition for review, after which it shall reimburse the employer or turn over the funds to the employee in accordance with the terms of the order.'

It is obvious that the first sentence of this amendment cannot be applied strictly literally, for it seems to indicate that a termination by the Board cannot be made effective prior to the date of the award.However, the second paragraph of the amendment shows that this is not correct because it directs that the payments shall be made to the Board after the filing of the petition and shall ultimately be paid by the Board to the employee or back to the employer in accordance with its order.In other words, this paragraph would be meaningless if the Board had no power to make its order of termination effective as of the date the petition was filed.To that extent, certainly the power must exist by necessary implication.

It is true in this case that the employer did not make the payments to the Board as called for under the foregoing statutory language.It is, therefore, possible that the order of the Court below requiring full compensation to continue up to the date of award was based upon estoppel or laches.If that be the reason, we think the Court failed to keep an important fact in mind.At the hearing before the Board the claimant's attorney requested the Board to compel the employer to pay in those sums until final determination.This request was nothing more or less than asking the Board to require what the Act calls for; yet the Board denied that request.No reason appears in the record for the Board's ruling, other than a vague suggestion that the requirement was customarily ignored.Although the waiving of this requirement was not justified by anything in the statute, yet the employer's failure to comply with it was obviously the result of the Board's ruling.It would be unfair, in our opinion, to penalize the employer by making it pay the...