Kent, Matter of
Decision Date | 19 December 1977 |
Citation | 31 Or.App. 1219,572 P.2d 1059 |
Parties | In the Matter of Darren Lee KENT, a child. STATE ex rel. JUVENILE DEPARTMENT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, Respondent, v. Darren Lee KENT, Appellant. |
Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Phillip M. Margolin, Portland, argued the cause and filed the brief for appellant.
Kathleen Dahlin, Certified Law Student, Salem, argued the cause for respondent. With her on the brief were James A. Redden, Atty. Gen., and Al J. Laue, Sol. Gen., Salem.
Before SCHWAB, C. J., and TANZER and ROBERTS, JJ.
The issue presented by this appeal is whether the juvenile court's remand of a 16-year-old male to adult criminal court was proper. We agree with the reasoning of the juvenile court judge and hence uphold the order of remand. The facts are undisputed.
The juvenile involved in this case was first referred to the juvenile court system in Oregon when he was eight years old, after some minor vandalism. The juvenile was again referred to juvenile court in 1972, after he ran away from home twice. He was referred to juvenile court in 1973 for being beyond parental control and in 1974 on a charge of burglary. In 1975, the juvenile was referred to juvenile court several times after he ran away from home and made unauthorized use of a motor vehicle.
In April 1976, the juvenile moved to Seattle, Washington, with his natural father and stepmother. While in Washington, he once took his father's automobile and did over $4,000 worth of damage to it. As a result of this incident, the juvenile was cited for reckless driving, driving without an operator's license and failure to leave his name at the scene of an accident. The juvenile also once shot some bullets into the wall of his parents' home while in Seattle.
The juvenile returned to Oregon in November 1976 to live with his adoptive father and natural mother. Approximately two days after his sixteenth birthday in March 1977, the juvenile and his brother went to a party. He and his brother were almost ready to leave the party when a "biker," who was six feet four inches in height and weighed 275 pounds, asked the juvenile to arm wrestle him. Later, the "biker" hit the juvenile and began to beat his brother. The juvenile became frightened when his brother could not get up immediately after the beating. He ran home, grabbed a rifle, ran back to the party and killed the "biker" by firing the rifle through the window of the house where the party was being held.
The juvenile was then placed in Washington County Juvenile Detention pending a juvenile court hearing. Before the hearing, he escaped once from the detention center. The juvenile was charged in juvenile court with murder and escape. The state filed a petition with the court requesting that the juvenile be remanded to adult criminal court.
At the remand hearing, the General Superintendent of MacLaren and Hillcrest Schools testified for the state. He noted that the average age of the children who enter the MacLaren School for Boys is 16. The superintendent stated that between 1963 and 1977 the school had handled approximately 36 juveniles involved in homicides. He stated that he could recall no case in which a homicide was involved in which the school had requested that the juvenile court terminate its jurisdiction prior to a juvenile's twenty-first birthday. He did concede, however, that many juveniles who had not committed homicides were released at age 18. The superintendent also noted that in all but two percent of the cases the school handled, the juveniles were sufficiently rehabilitated to return to society without further supervision at age 21. However, he also stressed that it was difficult to predict, at the time a juvenile entered MacLaren, exactly when he would respond to treatment and hence be released. He concluded by stating that the school's poorest rehabilitative results are with juveniles who are in constant flight and who are constantly breaking attachments to people, places and activities.
A state-appointed psychologist who had examined the juvenile next testified. Psychological tests administered by him indicated that the juvenile was a suspicious and paranoid person who lacked guilt about what he had done because he did not feel loved. The psychologist recommended that the juvenile be remanded to the adult criminal court system but be placed under the care of the juvenile system. He reached this conclusion because he believed that it would take "some time" to deal with all of the juvenile's problems. The psychologist stated that since the juvenile system could supervise the juvenile only until age 21, continued correctional supervision over the child could be assured past age 21 only by placing him in the adult corrections system. We note that the psychologist concluded his testimony by noting that he believed it was probable the juvenile would be rehabilitated by age 21.
The juvenile's current Washington County Juvenile Department counselor was the last person to testify at the remand hearing. She stated that the juvenile is immature and lacks impulse control and apparently acts without thinking about the consequences of his actions. The counselor stated that she believed the juvenile should be placed in Oregon State Hospital where a special adolescent treatment center was in operation. She concluded her testimony by stating that she had no "concrete opinion" as to whether the juvenile should be placed in the adult corrections system or the juvenile court system.
The juvenile court judge ordered that the juvenile be remanded to adult criminal court. In so doing, he made the following written findings of fact:
Appeals from the juvenile court are reviewed de novo. ORS 419.561(4); State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Slack, 17 Or.App. 57, 520 P.2d 905, rev. den. (1974), with the findings of the juvenile court given no weight except on matters of credibility of witnesses. 1 State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Cole, 28 Or.App. 367, 373, 559 P.2d 918, aff'd 280 Or. 173, 570 P.2d 365 (1977).
ORS 419.476(1)(a) provides:
ORS 419.533(1) sets forth the factors which a juvenile court must consider in determining whether to remand a juvenile to adult criminal court:
"(b) The juvenile court having jurisdiction so orders." ORS 419.509(1)(a) and (b).
A juvenile who is a student at a juvenile training school may be either voluntarily or involuntarily committed to an institution for the mentally ill (e. g., Oregon State Hospital) under the statutory procedures set forth in ORS 420.500 to 420.515.
If a juvenile is remanded to adult criminal court and subsequently convicted and sentenced to a prison term, ORS 137.124 delegates the decision as to where the juvenile will be confined to the Corrections Division:
When the Corrections Division determines that a male convicted of a crime should not be imprisoned in the Oregon State Penitentiary, ORS 421.705 and 421.710 give the division the authority to imprison the male in the Oregon State Correctional Institution:
"The Oregon State Correctional Institution in Marion County is to be maintained for the confinement, discipline, education, rehabilitation and reformation of such male persons as are committed to its custody or transferred to it...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Link
... ... court from considering important mitigating characteristics of an offender whose culpability is necessarily and categorically reduced as a matter of law, making the ultimate sentence categorically inappropriate. This new subset carries with it the advantage of simultaneously being more flexible ... few years after Oregon enacted the Juvenile Code, the United States Supreme Court gave juvenile waiver hearings constitutional significance in Kent v. United States , 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). In Kent, the Court held that, when a state creates a juvenile jurisdiction ... ...
-
State in Interest of C. A. H.
... ... When the matter was first presented to the judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in this case, she concluded that the first two criteria of the waiver ... S., 586 P.2d 607, 613-616 (Alaska 1978); J. T. P. v. State, 544 P.2d 1270, ... Page 346 ... 1278-79 (Okl.Cr.App.1975); Matter of Kent, 31 Or.App. 1219, 572 P.2d 1059, 1064-1065 (1977). We choose to understand the reasoning in cases that have approved the waiver of juveniles who had ... ...
-
United States v. EK
... ... Id. A transfer hearing was held March 29, 1979. I took the matter under advisement ... On April 4, 1979, I delivered a brief oral opinion denying the motion to transfer. The substance of the ... and fair treatment," since that hearing is a "`critically important' action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile." Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554, 556, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1055 (1966) ... While the Supreme Court has ruled upon the due process ... ...
-
United States v. JD
... ... that a juvenile or other appropriate court of the State of New York does not have jurisdiction over these defendants with respect to this matter. This case is therefore within the jurisdiction of this court. 18 U.S.C. § 5032. See United States v. Vancier, 515 F.2d 1378, 1379 (2d Cir ... This reading of the federal statute is consistent with state court interpretations of state juvenile laws. See Matter of Kent, 31 Or.App. 1219, 572 P.2d 1059 (1977); State v. Gibbs, 94 Idaho 908, 500 P.2d 209, 217 (1972). In light of this determination, I conclude, ... ...