Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc.

Decision Date08 August 1990
Docket NumberNo. 89-1337,89-1337
PartiesKENTUCKY OAKS MALL COMPANY, Appellant, v. MITCHELL'S FORMAL WEAR, INC., Appellee.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

A commercial nonresident lessee, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, is "transacting any business" within the plain and common meaning of the phrase where the lessee negotiates, and through the course of dealing becomes obligated, to make payments to its lessor in Ohio. (R.C. 2307.382[A] and Civ.R. 4.3[A], construed and applied.)

Appellee, Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc. ("Mitchell's"), a Georgia corporation, allegedly defaulted on a lease agreement between it and appellant, Kentucky Oaks Mall Company, an Ohio-based limited partnership. Appellant sued Mitchell's in the Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, to recover "leasehold charges" due and owing to appellant.

The lease agreement between appellant as lessor, and Mitchell's as lessee, concerned a storeroom known as Unit No. 640 in the Kentucky Oaks Mall, Paducah, Kentucky. Mitchell's is engaged in the retail sale and rental of formal wear. Mitchell's operates one hundred one stores in eleven states primarily in the Southeastern United States. It is undisputed that at least part of the negotiations concerning the lease were conducted by telephone calls to and from Ohio. Mitchell's signed the lease in Georgia and mailed the document to Ohio where, it appears from the record, appellant signed the contract. The lease is for a term of ten years and requires that all communications be sent to appellant's home office in Youngstown, Ohio. All lease payments are to be sent to a Cleveland, Ohio address. In addition, Mitchell's is required on a periodic basis to pay a "common area maintenance" cost and "merchants association" fee to appellant. Rental payments consist of a minimum yearly amount to be paid monthly and a percentage of gross sales if sales reach a fixed level. As a result, Mitchell's is required to submit monthly and annual sales reports to appellant. The lease, among other matters, requires Mitchell's to obtain approvals from appellant and restricts or regulates many activities. Furthermore, clause 44 of the lease states that the lease shall be governed and construed by Kentucky law.

On January 8, 1988, appellant filed its complaint against Mitchell's. The trial court granted Mitchell's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Appellant appealed to the Court of Appeals for Mahoning County. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court and reasoned in part:

"In the instant case, based upon the contract between the parties, the appellee's activities, very specifically, were not shielded by the benefits and protections of Ohio law. The parties very specifically provided that the conditions of the lease would be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Kentucky.

"Based upon the agreement as to the pertinent law, it is our opinion that, under the test of foreseeability, it could not be said that the appellee, upon the execution of the subject lease, should have reasonably anticipated being haled into a court within the State of Ohio."

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

David A. Fantauzzi and Daniel P. Daniluk, for appellant.

Fleck, Mostov & Schwartz, Jeffrey B. Fleck, Mary DeGenaro, Harmon Smith & Bridges and Archer D. Smith, III, for appellee.

DOUGLAS, Justice.

Pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(2), Mitchell's moved to dismiss appellant's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court, on that basis, dismissed the complaint and the court of appeals affirmed. Thus, we must first decide whether Mitchell's conduct falls within Ohio's "long-arm statute" or applicable civil rule, and if the statute or civil rule confers personal jurisdiction, then we must determine whether granting jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Fallang v. Hickey (1988), 40 Ohio St.3d 106, 532 N.E.2d 117.

I

In this appeal, personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is governed by R.C. 2307.382, which states in relevant part:

"(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:

"(1) Transacting any business in this state;

" * * *

"(C) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against him." (Emphasis added.)

Likewise, the applicable civil rule is Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1), which authorizes out-of-state service of process on a defendant who is " * * * [t]ransacting any business in this state[.]" Mitchell's argues that, pursuant to Section 5(B), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution, 1 Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) supersedes R.C. 2307.382(A)(1). We disagree and find that the statute and civil rule are consistent and in fact complement each other. R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) authorizes a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, whereas Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) provides for service of process to effectuate that jurisdiction. Both require that the nonresident defendant be "transacting any business" in Ohio.

Appellant asserts that the negotiations prior to the signing of the lease, and the subsequent duties and obligations created by the agreement, are sufficient to establish that Mitchell's is transacting business in Ohio. Mitchell's, on the other hand, contends that because the physical location of the leased storeroom is in Kentucky, it is Kentucky, not Ohio, where all business is transacted. We again disagree.

It is clear that R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1) are very broadly worded and permit jurisdiction over nonresident defendants who are transacting any business in Ohio. "Transact," as defined by Black's Law Dictionary (5 Ed.1979) 1341, " * * * means to prosecute negotiations; to carry on business; to have dealings * * *. The word embraces in its meaning the carrying on or prosecution of business negotiations but it is a broader term than the word 'contract' and may involve business negotiations which have been either wholly or partly brought to a conclusion * * *." (Emphasis added.)

In the case at bar, Mitchell's negotiated the lease by telephone contact to Ohio with an Ohio-based limited partnership. Mitchell's intentionally and voluntarily entered into a ten-year contract by signing the document in Georgia and mailing it to Ohio. The document creates ongoing duties and obligations for the life of the contract. Undoubtedly, both parties sought the benefit of each other's bargain in hopes of realizing a pecuniary gain. The fact that Mitchell's maintained no physical presence in Ohio does not preclude a finding that it transacted business in this state.

Thus, we are convinced that Mitchell's conduct falls unequivocally within the plain and broad language of R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1). Similarly, our finding is reinforced by the fact other courts have passed on this issue reaching the same result, to-wit: that a lease agreement, in certain circumstances, is "transacting business" within the forum state's long-arm statute. See, e.g., Wright Internatl. Express, Inc. v. Roger Dean Chevrolet, Inc. (S.D.Ohio 1988), 689 F.Supp. 788; Vena v. Western General Agency, Inc. (N.D.Ill.1982), 543 F.Supp. 779; Klippel v. Heintz (1982), 231 Kan. 312, 644 P.2d 428; Schanno Transp., Inc. v. Smith (Minn.1981), 312 N.W.2d 114; SD Leasing, Inc. v. Al Spain & Assoc., Inc. (1982), 277 Ark. 178, 640 S.W.2d 451.

Accordingly, we hold that a commercial nonresident lessee, for purposes of personal jurisdiction, is "transacting any business" within the plain and common meaning of the phrase, where the lessee negotiates, and through the course of dealing becomes obligated, to make payments to its lessor in Ohio.

II

Once having decided that the conduct of Mitchell's falls within the purview of R.C. 2307.382(A)(1) and Civ.R. 4.3(A)(1), the question becomes whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction by an Ohio court over Mitchell's comports with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Over forty years ago, in International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, the court announced that a state may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the nonresident has " * * * certain minimum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " (Citation omitted.) Id. at 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. Since 1945, the court, on numerous occasions, has elected to address the Due Process Clause as it pertains to personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. In particular, for purposes of this appeal, we turn our attention to Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, which involved a contract dispute substantially similar to the issue presented before us today.

In Burger King, Rudzewicz, a franchisee residing in Michigan, was sued in Florida by Burger King, a Florida-based corporation, for breach of contract and trademark infringement. The contract was negotiated with both the Florida-based headquarters of Burger King and its Michigan district office. The twenty-year lease provided that the relationship would be governed by Florida law and it required that all monthly fees and relevant notices be sent to the Florida headquarters. The court ruled that the assertion of jurisdiction did not offend due process and stated:

" * * * Rudzewicz established a substantial and continuing relationship with Burger King's Miami headquarters, received fair notice from the contract documents and the course of dealing that he might be subject to suit in Florida, and has failed to demonstrate how...

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