Kentucky Press Ass'n, Inc. v. Kentucky

Decision Date01 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. CIV.A.3:04CV42-JMH.,CIV.A.3:04CV42-JMH.
Citation355 F.Supp.2d 853
PartiesKENTUCKY PRESS ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky

Jeremy Stuart Rogers, Dinsmore & Shohl, LLP, Jon L. Fleischaker, Dinsmore & Shohl, R. Kenyon Meyer, Dinsmore & Shohl, Louisville, KY, for Kentucky Press Association, Inc., Plaintiff.

D. Brent Irvin, Office of the Attorney General, Frankfort, KY, for Commonwealth of Kentucky, Janice Marshall, in her official capacity as the Clerk of the Franklin Circuit Court and The Franklin District Court and on behalf of all other similarly situated, Eleanore Garber, in her official capacity as Family Court Judge and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Deborah Deweese, in her official capacity as District Judge and on behalf of all others similary situated, Defendants.

Gail Robinson, Public Advocate's Office, Timothy G. Arnold, Frankfort, KY, for Unnamed Juveniles 1-13, On Behalf of Themselves and Others Similarly Situated, Movant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HOOD, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss or certify [Record No. 5 & 6] to which Plaintiff responded [Record No. 9] and Defendants replied [Record No. 13]. The defendants have also filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint [Record No. 15]. The plaintiff responded [Record No. 23] and the defendants replied [Record No. 26]. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental response to the defendants' motion to dismiss [Record No. 33].

I. Procedural Background

On July 15, 2004, Plaintiff, Kentucky Press Association, Inc. ("KPA"), filed a complaint against Defendants, the Commonwealth of Kentucky and Janice Marshall in her official capacity as Clerk of the Franklin District and Circuit Courts. The complaint alleged that various sections of Kentucky's Uniform Juvenile Code ("KUJC") violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution's right of access because the statutes closed juvenile proceedings and records to the public.

The KUJC provides that "[t]he general public shall be excluded" from juvenile court proceedings unless the judge finds the party seeking admittance has "a direct interest in the case or in the work of the court." KRS § 610.070(3). As for records, the KUJC provides that "[a]ll law enforcement and court records regarding [juveniles] shall not be opened to scrutiny by the public" except certain records concerning juveniles found delinquent for an offense that would be a capital offense or a felony. KRS § 610.320(3). Further, "[t]he court shall order sealed all records" if the juvenile is not convicted of a felony. KRS § 610.330(3). "[A]ll juvenile court records ... shall be deemed to be confidential and shall not be disclosed except to the child, parent, victims, or other persons authorized to attend a juvenile court hearing... unless ordered by the court for good cause." KRS § 610.340(1)(a).

On August 20, 2004, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or in the alternative to certify state law issues to the Kentucky Supreme Court and to abstain on all the remaining issues. Immediately thereafter, on September 3, 2004, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file an amended complaint and on the same day responded to the defendants' motion to dismiss. On September 13, 2004, the Court granted the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, as it was clear to the Court that pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 15, the plaintiff could amend the pleading once as a matter of course because the defendants had not yet filed a responsive pleading.

The amended complaint no longer named the Commonwealth of Kentucky as a party, added Eleanore Garber in her official capacity as a Family Court Judge and on behalf of all others similarly situated, changed Janice Marshall to include all others similarly situated, added Deborah Deweese in her official capacity as District Judge and on behalf of others similarly situated, and made more specific allegations about members of KPA seeking and being denied access to juvenile proceedings and records.

On the same day the Court filed its Order granting leave to file an amended complaint, the defendants filed a response to the motion to file an amended complaint that also functioned as a reply to its motion to dismiss the original complaint.

II. Motion to Dismiss the Original Complaint [Record Nos. 5 & 6]

Defendants argue in the reply to the motion to dismiss the original complaint that while the amended complaint cured many of the defects of the original complaint, the amended complaint should still be dismissed because it did not cure the issues of standing or abstention. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the amended complaint rendered the defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint moot. The Court agrees.

Plaintiff's amended complaint supercedes the original complaint, thus making the motion to dismiss the original complaint moot. Parry v. Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 306 (6th Cir.2000) (holding that the amended complaint supersedes all previous complaints and becomes the operative pleading). Further, the defendants' request to dismiss the amended complaint in the reply to the motion to dismiss the original complaint is not in the form of a motion, in which case the Court may not grant said relief. L.R. 7.1(a).

The defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which the Court discusses below. In evaluating the motion to dismiss the amended complaint, the Court only considers those arguments in the first motion to dismiss that are specifically incorporated or referred to in the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint.

III. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint [Record No. 15]

Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the amended complaint for several reasons. First, the defendants argue that the Court does not have jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing and due to sovereign immunity. The defendants also argue that the Court should abstain and certify questions to state court, or use the Court's discretion to withhold equitable relief. If the Court does have jurisdiction over the matter, the defendants argue that the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim because the complaint asserts a "facial" as opposed to an "as applied" challenge.

1. Jurisdiction Arguments

The defendant makes several arguments that the Court should dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argue that: the Court does not have jurisdiction because the plaintiff does not have standing; the case is not ripe; the doctrine of sovereign immunity applies; and, the Court should abstain and certify questions to the Kentucky Supreme Court.

The defendants did not specify if the jurisdictional arguments were made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(b)(1). "A Rule 12(b)(1) motion can either attack the claim of jurisdiction on its face, in which case all allegations of the plaintiff must be considered as true, or it can attack the factual basis for jurisdiction, in which case the trial court must weigh the evidence and the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that jurisdiction exists." DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 516 (6th Cir.2004) (analyzing abstention, ripeness, and sovereign immunity pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1)). The defendants' motion to dismiss attacked the Court's subject matter jurisdiction on the face of the plaintiff's complaint, and therefore, in order to determine whether the Court has jurisdiction, the Court will assume as true the plaintiff's allegations.

A. Standing

Article III, § Section of the United States Constitution provides that federal courts shall only have jurisdiction over cases and controversies. If the plaintiff does not have standing to sue, then the Court does not have jurisdiction over the matter because there is no "case" or "controversy". Kardules v. City of Columbus, 95 F.3d 1335, 1346 (6th Cir.1996). There are constitutional requirements for standing, as mandated by Article III, and there are prudential considerations which are "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction." Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). In order for the plaintiff to establish the requirements for Article III standing to sue, the plaintiff must show:

(1) it has suffered an `injury in fact' that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000); Ailor v. City of Maynardville, 368 F.3d 587, 596 (6th Cir.2004).

The defendants assert that the plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because it presents generalized examples of unidentified members' attempts to gain access to unidentified court proceedings and court records. They argue that the complaint does not state whether the members or the association sought to intervene in accordance with the KUJC procedures for gaining access to proceedings or records, which is another way of framing their argument that the plaintiff should have brought an "as applied" challenge. Further, the defendants argue that the complaint does not link any of the named judges or the clerk to the denial of access. (Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, Abstain, or Certify Am. Compl. at 6.)

The Court finds that the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently alleges Article III standing to sue on its own behalf and on the behalf of its...

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