Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd.
Decision Date | 28 September 2018 |
Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 49A02-1710-PL-2502 |
Citation | 112 N.E.3d 1106 |
Parties | KENWORTH OF INDIANAPOLIS, INC., Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. d/b/a ITC Acceptance Company, and Paccar Inc., Appellants-Defendants, v. SEVENTY-SEVEN LIMITED, Convey All, LLC, Keller Trucking, Inc., K & K Aggregate, Inc., Huber Transport, LLC, Triple H Trucking, LLC, and Custom Hauling, Inc., Appellees-Plaintiffs |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorneys for Appellants: David T. Schaefer, Anthony M. Zelli, Dinsmore & Shohl LLP, Louisville, Kentucky
Attorneys for Appellees: Scott A. Benkie, Benkie & Crawford, Indianapolis, Indiana, Rodney V. Taylor, Hilary A. Barnes, Christopher & Taylor, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc., et al. (collectively "the Defendants"),1 manufactured and sold to Seventy-Seven Limited, et al. (collectively "the Plaintiffs"),2 a fleet of dump trucks that vibrated excessively while idling or at specific RPMs. The Defendants were unable to correct the problem within the one-year/100,000-mile basic vehicle warranty period specified in the parties' warranty agreement, and they extended the warranty period to four years/250,000 miles. More than four years after the trucks were delivered, the Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Defendants asserting claims for breach of warranty and breach of contract. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that the Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued when the trucks were delivered and thus were barred by the warranty agreement's one-year time limit for commencing legal action. The trial court denied the Defendants' motion. In this interlocutory appeal, the Defendants argue that the trial court erred. We disagree and therefore affirm.
[2] Paccar Inc. manufactured a fleet of dump trucks that Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. ("the Dealership"), sold to the Plaintiffs, who took delivery of the trucks from November 2005 through January 2006. For each truck, the respective buyer signed a warranty agreement that reads in pertinent part as follows:
Appellants' App. Vol. 3 at 13 ( ). Pursuant to the warranty schedule, the Defendants agreed to "provide 100% parts & labor for defective material or workmanship" related to the basic vehicle (with certain exceptions) for twelve months or 100,000 miles, "whichever shall occur first." Id. at 14.
[4] "Immediately after delivery of the first set of trucks, several of the buyers complained to [the Dealership] that the trucks vibrated excessively while idling" or at specific RPMs. Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd. , 49A02-1504-PL-249, slip op. at *1, 2016 WL 1158460 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2016) (" Kenworth 1 "), trans. denied . The Dealership "contacted Paccar, who then consulted with the manufacturers of the engine, transmission, and engine mounts, to resolve the vibration problem." Id. Id. In March 2008, Paccar agreed to extend the "basic vehicle warranty" to four years/250,000 miles. Appellees' App. Vol. 3 at 64; Appellants' App. Vol. 3 at 11. This warranty extension is documented in Paccar interoffice emails, which contain no further details regarding the extension.
[5] Also in 2008, Kenworth 1 , slip op. at *1. By November 2008, however, the vibration problem was reoccurring in several of the trucks. At that point, Paccar agreed to provide free engine mount replacements for as long as the Plaintiffs owned the trucks. Around this time, one of the Plaintiffs, Seventy-Seven Limited, returned eight of the trucks to the Dealership and stopped making payments on them.
[6] In September 2010, the Dealership, through its financing company, ITC Acceptance Company, filed a replevin action against two of the Plaintiffs based on their default on loans obtained to purchase the trucks. On October 4, 2010, the Plaintiffs filed this action against the Defendants, asserting claims for breach of express and implied warranties, breach of contract, constructive fraud, and rescission.4 In March 2011, the Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim of estoppel and a claim of nonconforming goods under the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"). An additional amended complaint was filed in 2013.5 In their answers to the complaints, the Defendants asserted as an affirmative defense that the Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred.
[7] The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the warranty agreement's one-year time limit for commencing legal action and by Indiana Code Section 26-1-2-725 ("Section 2-725"), which is part of Indiana's codification of the UCC. Section 2-725 is entitled "Statute of limitations in contracts for sale" and reads in relevant part as follows:
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs' causes of action accrued at tender of delivery and that their complaint was filed long after the one-year limitation period expired.
[8] The Plaintiffs asked the trial court to deny the summary judgment motion, asserting that the Defendants had waived their timeliness argument by failing to raise it in response to a purported cross-motion for summary judgment. The trial court agreed with the Plaintiffs. On appeal, another panel of this Court determined that the Defendants had not waived their timeliness argument and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Kenworth 1 , slip op. at *10.
[9] On remand, the Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment asserting that the Plaintiffs' complaint was untimely filed. In September 2017, after a hearing, the trial court issued an order denying the motion.6 This interlocutory appeal ensued.
[10] The Defendants argue that the trial court erred in denying their summary judgment motion. "The purpose of summary judgment is to terminate litigation about which there can be no factual dispute and which can be determined as a matter of law." Lamb v. Mid Indiana Serv. Co. , 19 N.E.3d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). "The party moving for summary judgment has the...
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...mean what it said in a passing footnote. Compare Kenworth , 134 N.E.3d at 379 n.3, with Kenworth of Indianapolis, Inc. v. Seventy-Seven Ltd. , 112 N.E.3d 1106, 1112, 1117 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). Thor calls the state high court's statements dicta ; but, even if so, the court must give consider......
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