Kenworthy v. The Journal Co.
Decision Date | 05 March 1906 |
Citation | 93 S.W. 882,117 Mo.App. 327 |
Parties | LOUIS S. KENWORTHY, Respondent, v. THE JOURNAL COMPANY, Appellant |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. Hermann Brumback, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Cause reversed and remanded.
Frank P. Sebree for appellant.
(1) The court committed error in refusing the demurrers to the evidence, offered at the close of plaintiff's evidence and at the close of all the evidence, because there was no cause of action proven against the defendant. 2 Starkie on Slander, 661; 1 Jaggard on Torts, 484; Odgers on Libel and Slander, p. 127; Caruth v. Richeson, 96 Mo. 186; Creceliue v. Bierman, 59 Mo.App. 513; Leonard v Allen, 11 Cush. 241 (Mass.); Smart v Blanchard, 42 N.H. 147; Harvey v. Coffin, 5 Blackford 566; Jones v. Davers, 1 C. R. 496, case No. 16; Wiseman v. Wiseman, Cro. Jac. 107. (2) The case ought to be reversed without remanding. Authorities supra; Heller v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 153 Mo. 205 Sands v. Marquardt, 113 Mo.App. 490, 87 S.W. 1011.
Halstead & Halstead and Reed, Yates, Mastin & Howell for respondent.
(1) The petition states a cause of action. Magnet v. O'Neill, 51 Mo.App. 35; Price v. Whitely, 50 Mo. 439; 18 Am. and Eng. Ency. Law (2 Ed.), pp. 867 and 989; Johnson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch Co., 65 Mo. 539; McGinnis v. Knapp, 109 Mo. l. c. 150. (2) The demurrer to the evidence was properly overruled. McGinnis v. Knapp, 109 Mo. l. c. 149; Johnson v. St. Louis Post-Dispatch Co., 150 Mo. l. c. 540; Forbes v. Johnson, 50 Ky. 48; Hardy v. Williamson, 86 Ga. 551; Wofford v. Meeks, 129 Ala. 349; Maybee v. Fisk, 42 Barb. (N. Y.), 326; Cook v. Rief, 52 N.Y.S. 302; Fernstermaker v. Tribune Co., 12 Utah 439, and 13 Utah 532; State v. Armstrong, 106 Mo. 395; Farley v. Evening Chronicle Co., 113 Mo.App. 216, 87 S.W. 564.
The plaintiff's suit is for libel. The following taken from defendant's statement embraces sufficient of the petition for the purposes of the case:
The principal question raised in the case is: Did the defamatory publication designate plaintiff as one of the persons defamed? The decisions are almost uniform that, where publication is defamatory in its character, an allegation by way of innuendo that plaintiff was the person defamed, other proper averments made, the petition alleges a good cause of action. Under this rule, the petition herein is held to be sufficient. And, although the plaintiff's petition alleges that the defamatory matter was published of and concerning him, yet if it does not so appear by the publication itself, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover as he offered no extraneous evidence showing to prove that fact.
The libel charges that a certain person in the Decoo case named Allen V. Ellis had been arrested for perjury, and that among the witnesses called on a certain day, there appeared and claimed one day's attendance, as such witnesses, the said Ellis and six other persons named, including plaintiff, and that, It is argued at length, and authorities cited to the effect, that the publication does not identify plaintiff as one of the witnesses who would probably be arrested and charged with giving perjured testimony. [Caruth v. Richeson, 96 Mo. 186, 9 S.W. 633.] The foregoing was quoted by the court from Addison on Torts, and the court further quoted from Odgers on Lib. and Slan. the following: The court seems to have based its decision upon the authorities quoted. The charge was a general one against a corrupt combination of unprincipled and notorious persons holding offices of State under appointment of the Governor, none of whom were named. The petition was sufficient, but the evidence failed to show to the satisfaction of the jury that plaintiff was intended to be charged as a member of the combination, and as a result the plaintiff failed to make out his case.
In Harvey v. Coffin, 5 Blackf. 566, the plaintiff was one of three sons of Jethro Coffin. The defendant was charged with having said that one of the three stole corn, etc. The court held that it was not actionable to charge one of three persons with having committed larceny unless the one of whom the defendant spoke can be identified. In Jones v Davers, 1...
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