Kenyon v. State, No. C 03-4038-MWB (N.D. Iowa 9/30/2003)
| Decision Date | 30 September 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. C 03-4038-MWB.,C 03-4038-MWB. |
| Parties | RICHARD KENYON, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF IOWA and HONORABLE GARY WENELL, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
In this action, filed May 12, 2003, plaintiff Richard Kenyon, the former Clerk of Court for Plymouth County, Iowa, asserts claims arising from his discharge from that position against the State of Iowa and the Honorable Gary Wenell, Judge of the Iowa District Court. Kenyon's first claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges violation of his federal constitutional rights to procedural and substantive due process. His second claim, pursuant to the Iowa Tort Claims Act, IOWA CODE CH. 669, alleges wrongful discharge in violation of rights and procedures governing employees of the Iowa Judicial Branch set forth in IOWA CODE CH. 602. This matter comes before the court pursuant to the defendants' July 28, 2003, Motion To Dismiss (docket no. 8). Kenyon resisted the defendants' Motion To Dismiss on August 19, 2003 (docket no. 10). The court heard oral arguments on the defendants' Motion To Dismiss on September 29, 2003. At the oral arguments, plaintiff Richard Kenyon was represented by Dewey P. Sloan, Jr., of Dewey P. Sloan, Jr., P.C., in Le Mars, Iowa. Defendants State of Iowa and Judge Wenell were represented by Grant K. Dugdale, Assistant Iowa Attorney General, in Des Moines, Iowa. This matter is now fully submitted.
On a motion to dismiss, the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). Therefore, the following factual background is drawn from plaintiff Kenyon's Complaint. However, the court will not recount here all of Kenyon's factual allegations, but only sufficient of them to put in context the defendants' motion to dismiss and Kenyon's resistance to that motion.
Plaintiff Kenyon was originally elected Clerk of Court for Plymouth County, Iowa, on January 1, 1985. On January 1, 1989, the position of Clerk of Court became appointive, rather than elective, but Kenyon continued in that position as the appointee of the Judges of Iowa's Third Judicial District pursuant to IOWA CODE § 602.1215. Kenyon alleges that he served subject to the conditions set forth in IOWA CODE §§ 602.1215 and 602.1218, the Iowa Supervisory Manual for the Judicial Branch, and the Iowa Personnel Manual for the Judicial Branch, which provide, generally, only for removal for cause.
Kenyon alleges that, in about 1993, defendant Gary Wenell, a Judge of the Iowa District Court, became the presiding judge for Plymouth County, and hence Kenyon's immediate supervisor. Prior to that time, Kenyon alleges that there had never been any complaints about his conduct. However, on August 22, 2001, Kenyon received a notice of hearing concerning seven allegations of misconduct by him during approximately the preceding ten-year period. Kenyon did not attach a copy of the notice of hearing to his Complaint and has not specified what the alleged incidents of misconduct were. The hearing, which was held on September 7, 2001, before all seven district judges of Iowa Judicial District 3B, lasted two-and-one-half hours. Kenyon alleges that, during the hearing, several incidents that were not in his personnel files were brought up and that the conduct of the judges indicated that the hearing was never intended to be fair, but was merely a formality to confirm a pre-determined outcome. Following the hearing, Kenyon received a letter dated September 14, 2001, terminating Kenyon's employment pursuant to IOWA CODE §§ 602.1215 and 602.1218. However, Kenyon asserts that the letter did not reference either the Iowa Supervisory Manual for the Judicial Branch or the Iowa Personnel Manual for the Judicial Branch, nor did it identify any specific misconduct by Kenyon justifying his removal. Kenyon has not attached a copy of the termination letter to his Complaint, either.
Upon his termination, Kenyon alleges that the Court Administrator had him escorted from the Plymouth County Courthouse by deputies of the Plymouth County Sheriff's Department, which caused him great humiliation. He also alleges that he was unable to find comparable employment in this area and he was, therefore, eventually forced to move with his family to Kansas City to obtain employment at a substantially reduced wage.
Kenyon's grievances to the State of Iowa and pursuit of administrative remedies under the Iowa Tort Claims Act failed to overturn his discharge. This lawsuit followed.
As mentioned above, on May 12, 2003, Kenyon filed a Complaint asserting claims arising from his discharge. In Count I of his Complaint, Kenyon asserts a claim, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the State of Iowa and Judge Wenell were state actors acting under color of state law, and that these defendants, while serving as his employers, violated his federal constitutional rights in discharging him in the following respects: (1) they violated Kenyon's right to procedural due process by failing to consider material presented by Kenyon at his termination hearing; and (2) they violated his rights to procedural and substantive due process by failing to follow the statutory guidelines for his termination as set forth in IOWA CODE §§ 602.1215 and 602.1218 and the pertinent supervisory and personnel manuals. Kenyon alleges, further, that the State of Iowa has intentionally attempted to circumvent his statutory rights and rights under pertinent manuals to removal only for cause by attempting to carve out an exemption for "at-will, appointed officials," in violation of his substantive and procedural due process rights. As a result of this wrongful conduct, Kenyon alleges that he has suffered and will continue to suffer pain and suffering and economic loss, including the loss of earnings, employment benefits, and job opportunities. He, therefore, seeks compensatory damages, prejudgment interest, and other remedies as determined by the court.
In Count II of his Complaint, Kenyon asserts a claim of removal in violation of the standards and procedures set forth in IOWA CODE §§ 602.1215 and 602.1218. More specifically, in this count, Kenyon alleges that he was never notified of the specific cause for his removal and never notified of the extent of any conferencing or voting for his removal by the judges, and that, instead, the decision to terminate him had been made before his termination hearing. He also alleges that the defendants failed to follow the procedures set forth in the pertinent supervisory and personnel manuals. Therefore, Kenyon contends that his termination violated public policy as well as statutory and contractual rights afforded by the State of Iowa. Kenyon again alleges that the defendants' misconduct caused him economic damage and pain and suffering, for which he seeks compensatory damages and prejudgment interest.
The defendants waived personal service of Kenyon's Complaint on June 19, 2003. On July 21, 2003, the defendants moved for an extension of time to file a motion to dismiss, to which Kenyon objected. However, the court granted the extension to and including July 25, 2003. On July 28, 2003, the defendants filed the Motion To Dismiss presently before the court, which bears a certificate of service on July 25, 2003. In essence, the Motion To Dismiss asserts that the defendants have Eleventh Amendment immunity to Kenyon's claims and that he has failed to join necessary and indispensable parties. Kenyon resisted the defendants' motion on August 19, 2003, and, with the oral arguments on September 29, 2003, the defendants' Motion To Dismiss was fully submitted.
The defendants' Motion To Dismiss is pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that, by pre-answer motion, a defendant may move to dismiss a complaint or claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). The issue on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence in support of his or her claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chem. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1376 (8th Cir. 1989). In considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must assume that all facts alleged in the plaintiff's complaint are true, and must liberally construe those allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). "A motion to dismiss should be granted as a practical matter only in the unusual case in which a plaintiff includes allegations that show on the face of the complaint that there is some insuperable bar to relief." Frey v. City of Herculaneum, 44 F.3d 667, 671 (8th Cir. 1995) (); accord Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 122 F.3d 539, 546 (8th Cir. 1997) (). The court will apply these standards to the defendants' Motion To Dismiss the claims asserted by Kenyon, considering each claim in turn.
The defendants make two challenges to Kenyon's § 1983 claim: (1) that the claim is barred by the defendants' Eleventh Amendment or "sovereign" immunity; and (2) the claim fails, because Kenyon has failed to join necessary or indispensable parties. The court will consider these challenges in turn.
a. Arguments of the parties
The defendants contend, first, that Count I of Kenyon's Complaint, the § 1983 claim, should be dismissed, because the State of Iowa and Judge Wenell, who the defendants...
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