Keri v. Board of Trustees of Purdue University

• Decision Date: 14 August 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-4400.,05-4400.
• Citation: 458 F.3d 620
• Parties: Gabe KERI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

458 F.3d 620

Gabe KERI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PURDUE UNIVERSITY, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 05-4400.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued May 12, 2006.

Decided August 14, 2006.

Swaray E. Conteh (argued), Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Deborah Berry Trice, Trenten D. Klingerman (argued), Stuart & Branigin LLP, Lafayette, IN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before MANION, KANNE, and ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Gabe Keri filed suit against the Board of Trustees of his former employer, Indiana University-Purdue University Fort Wayne ("IPFW"),¹ alleging race and national origin discrimination, as well as a whole host of related federal and state law claims. The district court granted summary judgment for IPFW on all claims in a 44-page opinion, and Keri appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm and adopt the thorough opinion of the district court.

I. HISTORY

Keri is an African-American man and a native of Ghana. Keri began working for IPFW in 2000 as an assistant professor in the School of Education. He was on tenure track, and he was subject to annual reappointments by the Chancellor. The Chancellor would base his decision on the recommendations of Keri's immediate supervisor, Dr. William Utesch, along with those of the Dean of the School (Dr. Roberta Wiener) and the Vice Chancellor of Academic Affairs (Dr. Susan Hannah).

Keri's first and second evaluations went well, although students began complaining about Keri's inappropriate classroom behavior during his second year. Keri's third evaluation went well, in that he garnered recommendations for reappointment. However, student complaints continued and became more serious. Although attempts were made to counsel Keri and to improve the situation, complaints continued during the following year. In Utesch's fourth evaluation, Utesch did not recommend Keri for reappointment for the following year, citing Keri's unsatisfactory teaching performance, among other reasons. Weiner recommended appointment, although she expressed some trepidation. Hannah, faced with contradictory recommendations, investigated further, and elected not to recommend Keri for reappointment. Chancellor Michael Wartell ultimately concurred with Hannah, and Keri was not selected for reappointment.

Keri filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and his case ultimately wound up in federal court. Keri based his claims on race and national origin discrimination. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. In attempting to establish his prima facie case, Keri introduced a variety of statements made by former students and colleagues indicating Keri was a good teacher. He also introduced a variety of race-disparaging comments allegedly made by Utesch. Finally, Keri argued that the students' complaints and allegations against him were baseless; in fact, he contended at least two of the complaining students were part of a conspiracy with Utesch to concoct false complaints.

II. ANALYSIS

As Judge Springmann's opinion indicates, Keri has failed to establish his prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Herron v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 388 F.3d 293, 299-302 (7th Cir.2004). For starters, there was a lack of evidence that Keri was meeting the legitimate expectations of his employer. See Herron, 388 F.3d at 299 (citation omitted). There was ample evidence of widespread complaints from both students and supervisors. In fact, at least one investigation was performed by IPFW that found evidence supporting the allegations against Keri. Keri attempts to show these were simply a pretext for his lack of reappointment, but he introduces no evidence other than some race-related comments made by Utesch.² But even that is insufficient, as Utesch was a relatively low-level decisionmaker, and it was the Chancellor who made the ultimate decision, based on the opinions of three different individuals after further investigation.

The second hurdle Keri faced is his lack of evidence of similarly situated employees who were treated more favorably. See id.; Snipes v. Ill. Dep't of Corrs., 291 F.3d 460, 463 (7th Cir.2002). While Keri points to 17 current and former members of the faculty as similarly situated, many of them were tenured professors. Due to their tenure, they were subject to a separate and entirely different means of oversight, making them dissimilarly situated. In other words, there was no evidence they were subject to the same standards for promotion and tenure as Keri, nor was there any evidence the tenured professors were supervised by the same individuals. As for the remaining employees, there was simply too little evidence regarding their respective situations. For example, there was no evidence whatsoever that the remaining employees were supervised by Utesch or had ever stood accused of the same or similar conduct as Keri's. Finally, Keri failed to explain when and how the non-tenured employees were treated more favorably than he.

III. CONCLUSION

In rendering her opinion, Judge Springmann thoroughly and carefully analyzed all the issues raised in this appeal. Accordingly, we AFFIRM and adopt the excellent opinion of the district court. A copy of the district court's order is attached.

OPINION AND ORDER

On June 10, 2004, the Plaintiff, Dr. Gabe Keri, sued in this Court his former employer, Indiana Purdue Fort Wayne University (IPFW), and Does 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5. The Plaintiff, a black man and a native of Ghana, claims that IPFW discriminated against him on the basis of his race and national origin when it did not reappoint him as a teacher for the 2004-2005 academic year. He also believes that the university's decision not to reappoint him was further motivated by its desire to retaliate against him for voicing concerns that he was being mistreated by his supervisor and that the university engaged in discriminatory practices. In addition, the Plaintiff claims that the Defendant conspired to smear his reputation by falsely alleging that he sexually harassed some of his students and used ineffective teaching methodologies. Finally, the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendant is liable under the Indiana Tort Claims Act for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent supervision, and common law wrongful termination.

On September 9, 2004, the Plaintiff moved the Court to amend the caption of the case to reflect that he was suing the Board of Trustees of Purdue University, not IPFW. The Court granted the motion on September 10, 2004.

On April 7, 2005, Defendant Board of Trustees of Purdue University moved for summary judgment. On May 28, the Plaintiff filed a Response, and on June 10, the Defendant filed its Reply. On that same day, the Defendant moved to strike parts of the Plaintiff's Response. On June 22, the Plaintiff responded to the Defendant's motion to strike, and on June 28, the Defendant filed its Reply in support of the motion to strike.

On July 22, 2005, the Defendant filed a Motion to Bifurcate Damages Issues to which the Plaintiff did not respond.

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT¹

A. Summary Judgment Standard

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandate that motions for summary judgment be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "In other words, the record must reveal that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party." Dempsey v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 16 F.3d 832, 836 (7th Cir.1994) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Rule 56(c) further requires the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery, against a party "who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing a court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party may discharge its "initial responsibility" by simply "`showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548. When the non-moving party would have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Green v. Whiteco Indus., Inc., 17 F.3d 199, 201 n. 3 (7th Cir.1994); Fitzpatrick v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 916 F.2d 1254, 1256 (7th Cir. 1990). However, the moving party may, if it chooses, support its motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other materials and thereby shift to the non-moving party the burden of showing that an issue of material fact exists. Kaszuk v. Bakery & Confectionery Union & Indus. Int'l Pension Fund, 791 F.2d 548, 558 (7th Cir. 1986); Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 617 (7th Cir.1982); Faulkner v. Baldwin Piano & Organ Co., 561 F.2d 677, 683 (7th Cir.1977).

Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the non-moving party cannot resist the motion and withstand summary judgment by merely resting on its pleadings. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 947 (7th Cir.1994). Federal Rule of Civil...