KERNS v. USA
| Decision Date | 28 March 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. CCB-07-1006 |
| Parties | STACIA LYNN KERNS v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Plaintiff Stacia Lynn Kerns brought this action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). Her claims arise from an automobile accident caused by the allegedly negligent conduct of Debra Scott ("Scott") that resulted in the death of the plaintiff's husband, Dennis Kerns, Jr. ("Kerns"). The United States now moves to dismiss her claims or for summary judgment on the grounds that Scott was not acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Kerns has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment or, in the alternative, for certification of questions of law to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The issues have been fully briefed and no oral argument is necessary. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons stated below, the defendant's motion will be granted, and the plaintiff's motion will be denied.
At approximately 9:30 p.m. on June 24, 2005, Scott and Kerns were involved in a traffic accident on Maryland Route 175 near the Fort Meade Army Base in Anne Arundel County, Maryland. Kerns subsequently died from injuries sustained in the accident. The Anne Arundel County Police concluded that the accident was caused by Scott's negligent driving and failure to yield to oncoming traffic when turning left from Route 175 into a parking lot. (See Fatal Accident Report, Def.'s Ex. 5.)'
At the time of the accident, Scott was in Maryland to attend the 99th Regional Readiness Command's ("RRC") Key Volunteer and Staff Training Meeting, which was being held from June 24 to June 26, 2005. (See Wilson Email & Meeting Agenda (June 15, 2005) ("Agenda"), Def.'s Ex. 2, at Scott 002.) Scott was invited to attend in her capacity as a contract employee of the RRC. On April 27, 2005, she received an email from her supervisor, Barbara Wilson, regarding the meeting. It discussed three forms of transportation attendees might use to travel from their homes to the Radisson Hotel in Annapolis, Maryland, where the meeting was to take place. They could fly to Baltimore-Washington International Airport ("BWI"). Alternatively, an attendee could drive to the hotel in his or her personal automobile or a rental car. The email suggested that those flying into BWI could travel from the airport to the hotel using the "Super Shuttle," which would cost twenty-nine dollars per person or, "[i]f there [were] sufficient persons flying, a van may be rented for all to travel to the hotel." Those planning to rent a car were instructed to "fill out the registration form accordingly," and all attendees' travel plans were to be "reflected on [their] orders." (25-26 June Key Vol Training Meeting Email Chain ("Wilson Email"), Def.'s Ex. 1, at Scott 007-08.)
Scott received invitational travel orders, dated May 20, 2005, to travel from her home in Pennsylvania to the Radisson Hotel in Annapolis. The orders instructed that "[i]f traveling by non-government procured commercial transportation, the maximum reimbursement will be limited to the least costly service which would have permitted satisfactory completion of the mission." Although they did not specify how Scott was to travel from BWI to the hotel, the orders expressly stated, "Rental car is not authorized." (Scott Travel Voucher, Def.'s Ex. 7, at US 00290.)
On June 24, Scott flew from Pittsburgh International Airport to BWI, landing at approximately 1:06 p.m. (Scott Decl., Def.'s Ex. 9, ¶¶ 3.) She could not check into the Radisson until 4:00 p.m., and there were no events related to the meeting scheduled for that day. (Wilson Email at Scott 008; Agenda at Scott 002.) Prior to the flight, Scott had a conversation with Barbara Wilson and Thomas Cannon, a coworker, in which they asked Scott if she would like to rent a car or be listed as a driver on one of their rental cars. (Wilson Dep. 33:4-33:8, June 11, 2010; Cannon Dep. 20:13-20:18, Apr. 14, 2010.) Wilson reports that Scott declined because she was going to "do her own thing with her own rental car." (Wilson Dep. 33:10-33:11; see also id. at 68:18-68:21.) After her flight landed, Scott picked up a rental car from Alamo Rent-a-Car; in order to receive the government rate, she had previously reserved the vehicle through the Carlson Wagonlit travel office at Fort Dix. (Scott Dep. 57:1-57:13, Apr. 14, 2010.) Scott paid for the rental car, which was expected to cost $132.00, with her personal credit card. (Scott's Alamo Contract, Def.'s Ex. 4.)
At the time Scott rented the car, it was not authorized under her travel orders, but the parties dispute whether, had the accident not occurred, the orders would have been amended. On previous occasions, travel orders that initially provided that a rental car was not authorized were later amended to permit the rental of a vehicle. (Scott Dep. 48:21-49:12, 76:20-77:9; Wilson Dep. 25:17-26:7; Cannon Dep. 24:17-25:11.) Indeed, Cannon's May 20, 2005, travel orders for the meeting did not authorize him to rent a car, but, on June 24, the orders were amended to authorize a rental car. At BWI, Cannon rented a car, which he used to transport multiple people to and from the airport, and he was reimbursed for the cost of the rental. (Cannon Travel Voucher, Def.'s Ex. 13, at US 00314-17; Wilson Dep. 39:8-39:14; Cannon Dep. 39:3-39:13.) Scott's travel orders, however, were never amended, and she did not request or receive reimbursement for her rental car. In her deposition, she claimed she failed to request reimbursement because she was involved in the accident, but she insisted she would have received reimbursement had she requested it. (Scott Dep. 53:20-54:4, 74:2-75:2.) Nevertheless, she acknowledged that in prior instances in which she was reimbursed for a rental car not initially authorized under her travel orders, she had used it to transport multiple people or perform a job-related task. (Id. at 99:8-100:4.)
Unlike Cannon, Scott did not use her rental car to transport other attendees to the conference. Rather, after renting a car at BWI at 1:34 p.m. (Scott's Alamo Contract, Def.'s Ex. 4), she proceeded directly to Baltimore's Inner Harbor to sightsee and shop. Between 5:00 and 5:30 p.m. that afternoon, Scott left Baltimore and began to drive to Annapolis. Encountering heavy traffic, she decided to stop at the Fort Meade PX, to which she had access because her husband was a member of the military. She did not purchase anything while there, and at no point after leaving BWI did she purchase any supplies for the RRC meeting or perform any other job-related task. (Scott Dep. 60:16-62:15.) She left Fort Meade shortly after 9:00 p.m., intending to drive to the Radisson Hotel in Annapolis. At approximately 9:30 p.m., while attempting to turn into a parking lot to look at a map, she drove directly in front of Kerns's motorcycle. (Id. at 63:3-67:15.) Kerns later died from his injuries.
After the accident, Scott took a taxi to the Radisson in Annapolis. She was too upset to participate in the meeting, so the following morning she took a taxi to BWI and returned to Pittsburgh. (Id. at 69:11-70:6.) Subsequently, she requested and received reimbursement for the mileage between her home and the Pittsburgh airport and the cost of the taxis to and from the Radisson. She was not reimbursed for the rental car. (Scott Travel Voucher, Def.'s Ex. 7, at US 00287-92.)
Ms. Kerns brought suit against the United States on April 19, 2007. On February 2, 2008, this court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to show Scott was acting in the scope of her employment, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, held that this question was sufficiently intertwined with the merits that the plaintiff should be permitted to conduct discovery. See Kerns v. United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009). Having now completed discovery, both parties move for summary judgment.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that a court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1 The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any factual dispute will defeat the motion. "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) (emphasis in original). Whether a fact is material depends upon the substantive law. Id. at 248.
"A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings, but rather must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Bouchat v. Balt. Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (alteration in original). The court must "view the facts and draw reasonable inferences 'in the light most favorable to the party opposing the [summary judgment] motion,'" Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Diebold, 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962)), but the court also must abide by the "affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and defenses from proceeding to trial." Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-79 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Where a plaintiff has been injured as a result of the tort of a federal employee acting within the scope of her...
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