Kerrigan v. Bd. of Educ. of Carroll Cnty.

• Decision Date: 05 February 2016
• Docket Number: CIVIL NO. JKB-14-3153
• Parties: BRANDON KERRIGAN, Plaintiff v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARROLL COUNTY, Defendant
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

BRANDON KERRIGAN, Plaintiff v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CARROLL COUNTY, Defendant

CIVIL NO. JKB-14-3153

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

February 5, 2016

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Brandon Kerrigan ("Plaintiff") filed an action against the Board of Education of Carroll County ("Defendant"), charging Defendant with disability discrimination/retaliation and wrongful termination in violation of Maryland public policy.¹ Now pending before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Third Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 44.)² The issues have been briefed (ECF Nos. 44-3, 45 & 46), and no hearing is required, see Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2014). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiff's Motion to Amend will be GRANTED.

I. Background and Procedural History³

Plaintiff was employed by Defendant from January 21, 2014, through June 23, 2014, as a custodian at Eldersburg Elementary School and Liberty High School. (ECF No. 44-1 ¶ 6.) On April 9, 2014, Plaintiff suffered a foot injury during his shift. (Id. ¶ 7.) He continued working for the following three weeks despite pain and swelling—but on May 1, he a filed a claim formedical expenses and wage replacement with the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission. (Id. ¶ 8.) Beginning on May 2, Plaintiff attended a series of medical appointments with his primary physician and two orthopedic specialists. Pursuant to the doctors' instructions, Plaintiff was absent for several days of work in early May; he took a lengthier absence beginning on May 20. (Id. ¶¶ 9-17.)⁴ However, as of June 9, Plaintiff was cleared to return to work on June 30 without restriction. (Id. ¶ 17.)

On May 9, Plaintiff, at Defendant's request, signed a document stating that he had satisfactorily completed his ninety-day probation period. (Id. ¶ 11.) Nevertheless, on June 12, Defendant advised Plaintiff that—due to his disability-related absences—his probationary period would be extended to mid-August. (Id. ¶ 18.) Then, on June 23, Defendant's human-resource ("HR") agents advised Plaintiff that he had "failed 'to demonstrate the ability to be a dependable asset' and that, accordingly, his 'probationary employment as custodian was terminated.'" (Id. ¶ 20.)⁵

Following his termination, Plaintiff applied for and secured unemployment benefits; he claims that Maryland's Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation found Defendant discharged him because of "absenteeism due to illness" and that Plaintiff's absences were "compelling and necessitous." (Id. ¶ 22.) Plaintiff subsequently filed two charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). (Id. ¶¶ 23, 25.)⁶ Plaintiff received EEOC right-to-sue letters in relation to each charge. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 26.)

Plaintiff filed the present action on October 7, 2014, claiming that his termination constituted unlawful discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and claiming further that his termination violated Maryland public policy—specifically, a provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act that forbids employers from discharging covered employees solely because such employees have filed claims for compensation, see Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 9-1105(a). Plaintiff thereafter moved to amend for the narrow purpose of adding detail about his second EEOC charge; Defendant moved to dismiss. (ECF Nos. 27 & 29.) In a July 28, 2015, Memorandum and accompanying Order, Judge William D. Quarles, Jr., denied Defendant's motion and granted Plaintiff's motion in substantial part. (ECF Nos. 35 & 36.) Plaintiff then filed the presently controlling Corrected Second Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 39.)

On August 12, 2015, Judge Quarles entered a Scheduling Order that established, inter alia, a September 28, 2015, deadline for joinder of additional parties and amendment of pleadings. (ECF No. 41.) On September 21, 2015, Plaintiff filed his pending Motion to Amend (ECF No. 44), seeking to complement his ADA claims with parallel claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Section 504"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).⁷ Defendant filed aresponse in opposition (ECF No. 45), and Plaintiff replied (ECF No. 46). The case was transferred to the undersigned on January 22, 2016; Plaintiff's Motion to Amend is ripe for decision.

II. Standard of Review

Because Plaintiff filed his Motion to Amend within the period prescribed by the Scheduling Order, his Motion is governed by the liberal standard of Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 15(a)(2) instructs district courts to "freely give leave" to amend "when justice so requires." See Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir. 2006) ("This liberal rule gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits instead of disposing of them on technicalities."). Despite this liberal standard, a court may deny leave to amend if (1) the movant has acted in bad faith; (2) the new pleading would prejudice the nonmovant; or (3) the new pleading would be futile. Id. at 426 (citing Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)).

"Whether an amendment is prejudicial will often be determined by the nature of the amendment and its timing." Id. at 427. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned district courts to be wary of prejudice where a "proposed amendment raises a new legal theory that would require the gathering and analysis of facts not already considered by the opposing party" and where such amendment is offered "shortly before or during trial." Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510. Conversely, where an amendment is proposed in the earlier stages of litigation, before significant discovery has commenced, the risk of prejudice is minimal. Cf. Mayfield v. Nat'l Ass'n for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc., 674 F.3d 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2012) ("The amount of discovery is . . . a relevant consideration in determining whether prejudice would result from the granting of a 15(a) motion.").

A futile amendment is one that could not withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Thus, a futile amendment is one that fails to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In evaluating the plausibility of a claim, the Court construes all facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997). Even so, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

III. Analysis

Defendant attacks Plaintiff's Motion to Amend on two grounds: first, that the proposed amendments would be prejudicial; second, that the proposed amendments would be futile. The Court addresses each contention in turn.

As for prejudice, Defendant's argument is not persuasive. Apparently conceding that Section 504 claims are not subject to a damage cap under the Code of Maryland,⁸ Defendant frets that the proposed Third Amended Complaint would "significantly expand[] the potential liability [it] faces in this suit." (ECF No. 45 at 3.) While Plaintiff's Section 504 claims may increase Defendant's exposure, that is not a valid reason to deny Plaintiff's timely Motion to Amend. Litigants routinely add claims and counterclaims through Rule 15(a)(2) motions; if the mere risk of heightened exposure for the nonmovant were an adequate reason to deny such motions, the policy of liberal amendment underlying the rule would be severely hampered. See 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure §1487 (3d ed. 2010) ("[P]laintiff typically will not be precluded from . . . adding a claim to an otherwise proper complaint simply because that amendment may increase defendant's potential liability.").

Defendant also objects to the timing of Plaintiff's Motion to Amend, observing that nearly a year elapsed between the filing of his initial Complaint and the filing of his Motion. (ECF No. 45 at 3.)⁹ But as Plaintiff observes, as of September 21, 2015 (the date on which he filed his Motion), the parties had only recently exchanged written discovery requests, and no depositions had been taken or even scheduled. (ECF No. 44-3 at 2.) Moreover, the parties subsequently filed joint motions to modify certain dates in the Scheduling Order; consequently, the discovery deadline has been extended to April 29, 2016, with requests for admission due May 6, 2016, and dispositive motions due June 3, 2016. (ECF No. 50.) These extensions should afford Defendant plenty of time to account for Plaintiff's proposed Section 504 claims, particularly given that such claims arise from the same set of facts as his ADA claims.¹⁰

While the Court has little difficulty rejecting Defendant's strained theory of prejudice, Defendant's futility theory is somewhat more complicated. Defendant contends that (1) in order to recover under Section 504, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was subject to discriminationsolely because of his disability; (2) Plaintiff here has inadequately pleaded the Section 504 causation standard; and (3) Plaintiff's proposed Section 504 claims are therefore "fatally flawed." (ECF No. 45 at 6.)

Defendant's understanding of Section 504 causation is correct. While employment discrimination claims brought under Section 504 are generally evaluated pursuant to the same framework as those brought under Title I of the ADA, see Reyazuddin v. Montgomery Cty., 789 F.3d 407, 413 (4th Cir. 2015),¹¹ the two statutes...