Kershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co.

CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtHARWELL; GREGORY
CitationKershaw County Bd. of Educ. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 396 S.E.2d 369, 302 S.C. 390 (S.C. 1990)
Decision Date23 May 1990
Docket NumberNo. 23270,23270
Parties, 62 Ed. Law Rep. 1240, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,611 KERSHAW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent, v. UNITED STATES GYPSUM COMPANY, Appellant. . Heard

Edward J. Westbrook of Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, Charleston, for respondent.

Steven W. Ouzts of Turner, Padget, Graham & Laney, P.A., Columbia; Thomas B. Kenworthy and Dennis J. Valenza of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

HARWELL, Justice:

This case involves issues pertaining to the discovery and removal of asbestos contaminated materials from several Kershaw County Schools. From a jury verdict in favor of Respondent Kershaw County Board of Education (Kershaw), United States Gypsum Company (Gypsum) appeals.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Between 1956 and 1958, asbestos-containing acoustical ceiling plasters known as Audicote and Sabinite, manufactured by Gypsum, were installed in several schools in the Kershaw County School District. Since the time of this installation, considerable development in the asbestos field has resulted in an increased awareness of the dangers to the public from exposure to asbestos. Consequently, in the early 1980's, with the encouragement and assistance of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Kershaw began an inspection process of its area schools. After an initial inspection, DHEC recommended removal of the ceiling tiles in three schools, and enclosure and encapsulation as a temporary measure in another school. Subsequently, Kershaw employed "The Survey Group", an environmental consulting firm, which tested and evaluated each of the school buildings at issue and recommended that the acoustical ceiling plaster be removed from the schools. In July 1983, Kershaw began its asbestos removal project, which was completed in the winter of 1984.

Thereafter, Kershaw brought this suit against Gypsum seeking money damages for the costs of inspection, testing, and the removal of the hazardous asbestos material from the school buildings. In its complaint, Kershaw alleged causes of action for negligence, restitution, fraud and misrepresentation, warranty, and a claim for punitive damages. Gypsum's Answer asserted a general denial and several affirmative defenses including the statute of limitations, failure to give notice, laches, waiver, estoppel, misuse of product, no damages, and compliance with state-of-the-art. At the close of all the evidence pertaining to liability, the trial judge dismissed the restitution and fraud causes of action. The trial judge denied Gypsum's directed verdict motions as to the causes of action in negligence and warranty and also as to Kershaw's claim for punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for $200,000.00 on the negligence cause of action and $25,000 on the warranty cause of action. This appeal follows.

II. DISCUSSION
A. ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

Gypsum first argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled that asbestos property damage is recoverable in a tort cause of action for negligence. Gypsum relies on what is commonly referred to as the "economic loss rule." In Kennedy v. Columbia Lumber & Manufacturing Company, 299 S.C. 335, 345, 384 S.E.2d 730, 736 (1989) we explained the economic loss rule as follows:

[t]his rule exists to assist in determining whether contract or tort theories are applicable to a given case. Where a purchaser's expectations in a sale are frustrated because the product he bought is not working properly, his remedy is said to be in contract alone, for he has suffered only 'economic' losses. Conversely, where a purchaser buys a product which is defective and physically harms him, his remedy is in either tort or contract. This is so, the analysis provides, because his losses are more than merely 'economic'.

As we noted in Kennedy, the economic loss rule is the general rule that there is no tort liability for a product defect if the damage suffered by a plaintiff is only to the product itself. 299 S.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734. We also noted our difficulty with the economic loss rule generally, and we partially rejected the rule in the residential home building context. Id. 1 We have not yet been presented with the question of whether the rule should be so rejected in all contexts, including the commercial arena, and we need not address that issue here, as this case may be disposed of on narrower grounds.

The sole issue which needs to be addressed here is whether the economic loss rule applies when a plaintiff claims and proves "other property damage". We held in Kennedy that the rule does not apply where other property damage is proven. 299 S.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 734. In addition, we agree with and adopt the reasoning of the recent District Court decision in City of Greenville v. W.R. Grace & Co., 640 F.Supp. 559 (D.S.C.1986), aff'd827 F.2d 975 (4th Vir.1987). In W.R. Grace, an asbestos case, the District Court held that the economic loss rule does not preclude an action in tort for damages sustained where a defendant's product caused damage to other property of the plaintiff. We therefore need only follow Kennedy and W.R. Grace in order to dispose of Gypsum's argument here, since Kershaw has alleged and offered proof of other property damage. See also Town of Hooksett School District v. W.R. Grace & Co., 617 F.Supp. 126 (D.N.H.1984); Cinnaminson Twp. Board of Education v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 552 F.Supp. 855 (D.N.J.1982). Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's refusal of Gypsum's motion for a directed verdict on the negligence cause of action.

B. DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE

In August 1983, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, Judge John Hamilton Smith issued an order requiring that Gypsum and other asbestos defendants be notified prior to removal of asbestos from the schools at issue. Despite this order, asbestos abatement was conducted in one school, Camden High School, prior to Gypsum being notified and given an opportunity to inspect the building. Counsel for Kershaw informed the trial court that he was not aware that abatement had been completed at Camden High and did not deliberately conceal any information from Gypsum as to the project. Counsel for Gypsum conceded during his questioning of Kershaw's attorney that he was not suggesting that counsel for Kershaw intentionally withheld information from Gypsum regarding the removal.

Gypsum moved for judgment in its favor on the claims related to Camden High School because Kershaw had violated Judge Smith's order by removing asbestos prior to Gypsum's inspection. The trial judge refused this motion, but did include a jury instruction on the destruction of evidence. The trial court permitted Kershaw to explain the circumstances surrounding its failure to notify Gypsum and instructed the jury that when evidence is lost or destroyed by a party an inference may be drawn by the jury that the evidence which was lost or destroyed by that party would have been adverse to that party. See Welch v. Gibbons, 211 S.C. 516, 46 S.E.2d 147 (1948).

We believe the trial court's decision was proper under the facts of this case. Judge Smith's order was drawn to facilitate discovery in these asbestos cases. Although the order itself contains no provision regarding sanctions, as a discovery order, it is subject to those measures contained in SCRCP Rule 37. The relief sought by Gypsum is contained in Rule 37(b)(2)(C), which provides for failure to comply with a discovery order the sanction of "striking out pleadings or parts thereof, ... or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof...." A dismissal under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) is not mandatory; rather, the trial court is allowed to make such orders as it deems just under the circumstances, and the selection of a sanction is within the court's discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 499, 502, 381 S.E.2d 734, 735 (1989); Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Cook, 294 S.C. 135, 137, 363 S.E.2d 112, 113 (Ct.App.1987). Whatever sanction is imposed should serve to protect the rights of discovery provided by the rules. Downey v. Dixon, 294 S.C. 42, 45, 362 S.E.2d 317, 318 (Ct.App.1987). The burden is upon the appealing party to show that the trial court abused its discretion. Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. at 502, 381 S.E.2d at 735. An abuse of discretion may be found where the appellant shows that the conclusion reached by the trial court was without reasonable factual support and resulted in prejudice to the rights of appellant, thereby amounting to an error of law. Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974) cited in Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. at 502, 381 S.E.2d at 735.

We conclude that the trial judge in this case exercised appropriate discretion in denying Gypsum's motion to dismiss the claim pertaining to Camden High School. Such a sanction would have been too severe under the facts of this case. Gypsum has not demonstrated on appeal that the ruling was unreasonable, that it was unduly prejudiced thereby, or that a sanction of dismissal would serve to protect the rules of discovery. We believe this is particularly true in light of the fact that there was no evidence of any intentional misconduct on the part of Kershaw or its counsel. Accordingly, we hold that the procedure followed by the trial court in this case was appropriate.

C. ADMISSIBILITY OF STATE AND FEDERAL REGULATIONS

Gypsum next asserts it is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly allowed Kershaw to admit into evidence a DHEC regulation promulgated in 1982 and a NESHAP 2 regulation first promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1973. Gypsum also asserts error in the admission of testimony concerning these regulations as well as testimony concerning AHERA 3 regulations promulgated in 1987.

The DHEC regulation was offered by Kershaw to show that asbestos is unreasonably dangerous and that Kershaw therefore...

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