Kersting v. UnitedHealth Grp.

• Docket Number: 23-CV-159 TWR (AHG)
• Decision Date: 29 June 2023
• Parties: TERESA KERSTING, an individual, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of California

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TERESA KERSTING, an individual, Plaintiff, v. UNITEDHEALTH GROUP, a Delaware corporation; and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.

No. 23-CV-159 TWR (AHG)

United States District Court, S.D. California

June 29, 2023

ORDER (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION, (2) ORDERING PARTIES TO ARBITRATION, AND (3) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE THIS ACTION (ECF NO. 8)

HONORABLE TODD W. ROBINSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Presently before the Court is Defendant UnitedHealth Group's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Stay the Matter (“Mot.,” ECF No. 8), as well as Plaintiff Teresa Kersting's Response in Opposition to (“Opp'n,” ECF No. 10) and Defendant's Reply in Support of (“Reply,” ECF No. 13) the Motion. The Court held a hearing on June 15, 2023. (See ECF No. 15.) Having carefully considered the Parties' arguments, Plaintiff's Unlimited Civil Complaint (“Compl.,” ECF No. 1 at 11-38^[1]), the record, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion ORDERS the Parties to submit their claims to arbitration, and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE this action.

BACKGROUND

I. Factual Background^[2]

A. The Parties

Plaintiff is “a practicing and devout Christian” who “regularly attends church and actively participates in church activities.” (See Compl. ¶ 18.) “Among Plaintiff's sincerely held religious beliefs . . . is that human life is pre[c]ious.” (Id. ¶ 19.) “[T]herefore, abortion is immoral and taking vaccines developed using fetal cells that descended from elective abortions in their development (such as the Johnson and Johnson COVID-19 vaccine) or testing (such as the Pfizer and Moderna COVID-19 vaccines) [is] unethical, immoral, and in violation of Plaintiff's sincerely held religious beliefs.” (Id.) Plaintiff was a Registered Nurse, (see id. ¶ 20), employed by Defendant as a Senior Clinical Transformation Consultant. (See id. ¶ 21.)

“Defendant is a medical service provider that operates a clinic in Carlsbad in the County of San Diego, California and/or a health plan payor with contracted practices and providers in the State of California, including a clinic in Carlsbad in the County of San Diego, California.” (Id. ¶ 22.)

B. The Parties' Arbitration Agreement

On May 25, 2017, Defendant offered Plaintiff a position as Senior Clinical Practice Consultant in the “Clin Leadership & Accountability division” of Clinical Services. (See ECF No. 8-3 (“Weedman Decl.”) ¶ 6.) In its offer letter, Defendant “advised Plaintiff that the offered position included an Arbitration Policy” as follows:

Included with this letter is UnitedHealth Group's Employment Arbitration Policy. The Policy is a binding contract between you and UnitedHealth Group to resolve through arbitration all covered employment-related disputes that are based on a legal claim, and mutually waive the right to a trial before a judge or jury in court in favor of final and binding arbitration. Your agreement to be bound by the terms of the Policy is a condition of your employment. Once you are on board, you will be required to electronically acknowledge in Employee Self Service your understanding of the Policy.

By accepting employment, you will have agreed to all terms of this offer letter and its attachments.

(See id. ¶ 7; see also ECF No. 8-3 Ex. A at 7.) “[T]he Arbitration Policy was accessible electronically via a link in the electronically delivered Offer Letter, permitting Plaintiff to fully consider before accepting her employment.” (Weedman Decl. ¶ 8.)

Plaintiff later signed the Arbitration Agreement during her onboarding on June 19, 2017. (See id. ¶ 9; see also ECF No. 8-3 Ex. B.) “At no time did Plaintiff question the policy, request any changes, or conduct herself in any manner contrary to her express acceptance of the agreement, and implied agreement though continued employment.” (Weedman Decl. ¶ 11.)

C. Plaintiff's Employment by and Separation from Defendant

Plaintiff began working for Defendant in June 2017. (See Weedman Decl. ¶ 12.) She worked fully remote from her home in Carlsbad, California. (See Compl. ¶ 21.)

On August 5, 2021, the California Department of Public Health issued an order requiring healthcare workers, unless exempted, to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. (See Id. ¶ 26; see also ECF No. 10-1 Ex. 1.) Under the order, workers could be exempted from the vaccination requirement if they “declined the vaccination based on Religious Beliefs.” (See Compl. ¶ 26.)

In October 2021, Defendant notified its non-remote employees that they would be required to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. (See id. ¶ 24.) On November 9, 2021, Defendant also informed Plaintiff, a remote employee, that she would be required to get the COVID-19 vaccine by November 30, 2021. (See id. ¶ 25.)

Plaintiff spoke with her supervisor, Tim Monk, regarding her concerns about losing her employment due to the conflict between her religious beliefs and the COVID-19 vaccination mandate. (See id. ¶ 28.) Mr. Monk encouraged her to complete a Request for Religious Exemption but also informed her that no exemption would be granted. (See id.)

Plaintiff submitted her Request for Religious Exemption through Defendant's Human Resources link on November 12, 2021. (See id. ¶ 29.) “Her Request for Religious Exemption described in detail her religious beliefs, practices, and observances, including, but not limited to, her body being a temple of the Holy Spirit and the use of fetal cells descended from elective abortions is immoral, unethical, and in violation of her religious beliefs.” (Id.)

Although Plaintiff believes that other employees received medical and religious accommodations, Plaintiff's Request was denied on November 15, 2021. (See id. ¶ 31.) On November 19, 2021, Plaintiff also received an email from Jen St. George denying the request. (See id. ¶ 33.) Plaintiff responded to ask for an explanation of the denial, (see Id. ¶ 34), and Ms. St. George responded on November 29, 2021, explaining that Plaintiff's request had been denied because Plaintiff would need to travel to provide face-to-face interactions in the office. (See id. ¶ 35.) Ms. St. George also referred Plaintiff to Defendant's “Frequently Asked Questions for Employees for COVID-19,” which explained that there was no appeals process for requests for religious exemption. (See Id. ¶ 36.)

“Consistent with her sincerely held religious beliefs, Plaintiff did not comply with Defendant's” vaccination requirement. (See id. ¶ 44.) On November 30, 2021, Defendant informed Plaintiff that she would be placed on an unpaid 30-Day Administrative Leave. (See id. ¶ 45.) The notice also explained that Plaintiff's employment could be terminated at the end of her administrative leave if she failed to comply with the COVID-19 vaccination policy. (See id.)

Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on January 7, 2022. (See id. ¶ 46; see also Weedman Decl. ¶ 12.)

II. Procedural History

On December 15, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action by filing her Complaint against Defendant and Does 1 through 20 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of San Diego. (See generally ECF No. 1 at 11-38.) Plaintiff asserted six causes of action for (1) religious discrimination-failure to accommodate in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a)(1); (2) religious discrimination-disparate treatment in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(a)(1); (3) harassment in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(j); (4) retaliation in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(h); (5) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of Cal. Gov't Code § 12940(k); and (6) wrongful termination in violation of public policy. (See generally id.)

Defendant's counsel emailed Plaintiff's counsel on January 13, 2023, to transmit a copy of the Parties' Arbitration Agreement and to inquire whether Plaintiff was willing to stipulate to arbitration. (See ECF No. 8-2 Ex. D at 52; ECF No. 10-1 Exs. 3-4; see also ECF No. 8-2 (“Presser Decl.”) ¶ 4; ECF No. 10-1 (“Sollestre Decl.”) ¶ 5.) Plaintiff's counsel responded on January 17, 2023, that he would review the Arbitration Agreement “and get back to [defense counsel].” (See Ex. D at 51; ECF No. 10-1 Ex. 5; see also Presser Decl. ¶ 5; Sollestre Decl. ¶ 7.) He added, “We should have plenty of time to address before your client's pleading is due, however, please be aware that I will grant on extension if time gets close and this issue has not been addressed.” (See Ex. D at 51; ECF No. 10-1 Ex. 5; see also Presser Decl. ¶ 5; Sollestre Decl. ¶ 7.)

Defendant answered Plaintiff's Complaint on January 26, 2023, (see generally ECF No. 2), and removed to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on January 27, 2023.

(See generally ECF No. 1.) As a result, Plaintiff's counsel believed that Defendant had chosen not to pursue arbitration. (See Sollestre Dec. ¶ 11.) Based on Defendant's filing of an Answer, on January 30, 2023, the Honorable Allison H. Goddard set an Early Neutral Evaluation (“ENE”) and Case Management Conference (“CMC”) for March 9, 2023. (See ECF No. 4.)

On February 3, 2023, defense counsel contacted Plaintiff's counsel by phone to follow up on whether Plaintiff would stipulate to arbitrate. (See Presser Decl. ¶ 6.) Plaintiff's counsel declined, believing the Arbitration Agreement to be unenforceable. (See id.; see also ECF No. 8-1 Ex. E at 54.)

The Parties engaged in a teleconference on February 14, 2023, to discuss case management and discovery issues in anticipation of the March 9, 2023 ENE and CMC. (See Sollestre Decl. ¶ 13; see also ECF No. 5 at 1.) They filed a Joint Discovery Plan on February 28, 2023. (See ECF No. 5; see also Sollestre Decl. ¶ 16.)

Plaintiff timely submitted her confidential ENE statement to Magistrate Judge Goddard...