Kesson, Inc v. Provident Securities Company
| Decision Date | 13 January 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-742,FOREMOST-M,74-742 |
| Parties | cKESSON, INC., Petitioner, v. PROVIDENT SECURITIES COMPANY |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Respondent, a personal holding company contemplating liquidation, sold assets to petitioner corporation. Respondent received from petitioner as part of the purchase price convertible debentures which if converted into petitioner's common stock would make respondent a holder of more than 10% Of petitioner's outstanding common stock. A few days later, pursuant to an underwriting agreement, one of the debentures was sold to a group of underwriters for cash in an amount exceeding its face value. After making debenture and cash distributions to its stockholders, respondent dissolved. Under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act) a corporation may recover for itself the profits realized by an officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than 10% Of its shares from a purchase and sale of its stock within a six-month period. An exemptive provision specifies, however, that § 16(b) shall not be construed to cover any transaction where the beneficial owner was not such both "at the time of" the purchase and sale of the securities involved. Since the amount of petitioner's debentures received by respondent was large enough to make respondent a beneficial owner of petitioner within the meaning of § 16, and its disposal of the securities within the six-month period exposed respondent to a suit by petitioner to recover profits realized by respondent on the sale to the underwriters, respondent sought a declaratory judgment of its nonliability under § 16(b). The District Court granted summary judgment to respondent, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, though for different reasons. Held: By virtue of the exemptive provision a beneficial owner is accountable under § 16(b) in a purchase-sale sequence such as was involved here only if he was such an owner "before the purchase." Thus, the fact that respondent was not a beneficial owner before the purchase removed the transaction from the operation of § 16(b). Pp. 239-259.
(a) The legislative history of the exemptive provision reveals a legislative intent to deter beneficial owners from making both
a purchase and a sale on the basis of inside information, which is presumptively available only after the purchase. Pp. 251-252.
(b) Had it been Congress' design when it enacted § 16(b) to impose liability in cases such as this, it should have done so expressly or by unmistakable inference. Pp. 251-252.
(c) Congress may have sought to distinguish between purchases by persons who have not yet acquired inside status through stock ownership of at least 10% And purchases by directors and officers because the latter are more intimately involved in corporate affairs. Pp. 253-254.
(d) Other sanctions remain available against fraudulent use of inside information in transactions not covered by § 16(b). Pp. 254-256.
(e) Other provisions exempting certain transactions from § 16(b) are not inconsistent with the "before the purchase" construction reached here. Pp. 256-259.
506 F.2d 601, affirmed.
This case presents an unresolved issue under § 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), 48 Stat. 896, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b). That section of the Act was designed to prevent a corporate director or officer or "the beneficial owner of more than 10 per centum" of a corporation 1 from profiteering through short-swing securities transactions on the basis of inside information. It provides that a corporation may capture for itself the profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or beneficial owner.2 Section 16(b)'s last sentence however, provides that it "shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved . . . ." The question presented here is whether a person purchasing securities that put his holdings above the 10% Level is a beneficial owner "at the time of the purchase" so that he must account for profits realized on a sale of those securities within six months. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit answered this question in the negative. 506 F.2d 601 (1974). We affirm.
Respondent, Provident Securities Co., was a personal holding company. In 1968 Provident decided tentatively to liquidate and dissolve, and it engaged an agent to find a purchaser for its assets. Petitioner, Foremost-McKesson, Inc., emerged as a potential purchaser, but extensive negotiations were required to resolve a disagreement over the nature of the consideration Foremost would pay. Provident wanted cash in order to facilitate its dissolution, while Foremost wanted to pay with its own securities.
Eventually a compromise was reached, and Provident and Foremost executed a purchase agreement embodying their deal on September 25, 1969. The agreement provided that Foremost would buy two-thirds of Provident's assets for $4.25 million in cash and $49.75 million in Foremost convertible subordinated debentures.3 The agreement further provided that Foremost would register under the Securities Act of 1933 $25 million in principal amount of the debentures and would participate in an underwriting agreement by which those debentures would be sold to the public. At the closing on October 15, 1969, Foremost delivered to Provident the cash and a $40 million debenture which was subsequently exchanged for two debentures in the principal amounts of $25 million and $15 million. Foremost also delivered a.$2.5 million debenture to an escrow agent on the closing date. On October 20 Foremost delivered to Provident a $7.25 million debenture representing the balance of the purchase price. These debentures were immediately convertible into more than 10% Of Foremost's outstanding common stock.
On October 21 Provident, Foremost, and a group of underwriters executed an underwriting agreement to be closed on October 28. The agreement provided for sale to the underwriters of the $25 million debenture. On October 24 Provident distributed the $15 million and $7.25 million debentures to its stockholders, reducing the amount of Foremost common into which the company's holdings were convertible to less than 10%. On October 28 the closing under the underwriting agreement was accomplished.4 Provident thereafter distributed the cash proceeds of the debenture sale to its stockholders and dissolved.
Provident's holdings in Foremost debentures as of October 20 were large enough to make it a beneficial owner of Foremost within the meaning of § 16.5 Having acquired and disposed of these securities within six months, Provident faced the prospect of a suit by Foremost to recover any profits realized on the sale of the debenture to the underwriters. Provident therefore sued for a declaration that it was not liable to Foremost under § 16(b). The District Court granted summary judgment for Provident, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Provident's principal argument below for nonliability was based on Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 93 S.Ct. 1736, 36 L.Ed.2d 503 (1973). There we held that an "unorthodox transaction" in securities that did not present the possibility of speculative abuse of inside information was not a "sale" within the meaning of § 16(b). Provident contended that its reluctant acceptance of Foremost debentures in exchange for its assets was an "unorthodox transaction" not presenting the possibility of speculative abuse and therefore was not a "purchase" within the meaning of § 16(b). Although the District Court's pre-Kern County opinion had adopted this type of analysis, 331 F.Supp. 787 (N.D.Cal.1971), the Court of Appeals rejected it, reasoning that Provident's acquisition of the debentures was not "unorthodox" and that the circumstances did not preclude the possibility of speculative abuse. 506 F.2d, at 604-605.
The Court of Appeals then considered two theories of nonliability based on § 16(b)'s exemptive provision: "This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase . . . ." The first was Provident's argument that it was not a beneficial owner "at the time of . . . sale." After the October 24 distribution of some debentures to stockholders, the debentures held by Provident were convertible into less than 10% Of Foremost's outstanding common stock. Provident contended that its sale to the underwriters did not occur until the underwriting agreement was closed on October 28. If this were the case, the sale would not have been covered by § 16(b), since Provident would not have been a beneficial owner "at the time of . . . sale." 6 The Court of Appeals rejected this argument because it found that the sale occurred on October 21 upon execution of the underwriting agreement.7
The Court of Appeals then turned to the theory of nonliability based on the exemptive provision that we consider here.8 It held that in a purchase-sale sequence the phrase "at the time of the purchase," "must be construed to mean prior to the time when the decision to purchase is made." 506 F.2d, at 614. Thus, although Provident became a beneficial owner of Foremost by acquiring the debentures, it was not a beneficial owner "at the time of the purchase." Accordingly, the exemptive provision prevented any § 16(b) liability on Provident's part.
The meaning of the exemptive provision has been disputed since § 16(b) was first enacted. The discussion has focused on the application of the provision to a purchase-sale sequence, the principal disagreement being whether "at the time of the purchase" means "before the purchase" or "immediately after the purchase." 9 The...
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