Ketchum v. City of Vallejo

• Decision Date: 15 October 2007
• Docket Number: No. Civ. S-05-1098 RRB JFM.,Civ. S-05-1098 RRB JFM.
• Citation: 523 F.Supp.2d 1150
• Parties: Wynathen KETCHUM, Ana Menjivar, acting for themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF VALLEJO, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

523 F.Supp.2d 1150

Wynathen KETCHUM, Ana Menjivar, acting for themselves and others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF VALLEJO, Defendant.

No. Civ. S-05-1098 RRB JFM.

United States District Court, E.D. California.

October 15, 2007.

David E. Mastagni, Willy Masaichi Yamada, Mastagni Holstedt Amick Miller Johnsen & Uhrhammer, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.

John Robert Whitefleet, Terence John Cassidy, Porter Scott, APC, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant.

Memorandum of Opinion and Order

RALPH R. BEISTLINE, District Judge.

Plaintiffs Wynathen Ketchum ("Ketchum") and Ana Menjivar ("Menjivar") (collectively "Plaintiffs") filed an action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated Vallejo police officers against the City of Vallejo ("Defendant") seeking to recover unpaid compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. ("FLSA"). Defendant now moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs' FLSA claim is time-barred. Alternatively, Defendant moves for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiffs are not entitled to the compensation they seek under the FLSA. Plaintiffs have filed a cross-motion for summary adjudication seeking a determination that time spent training and transporting Mounted Patrol Unit horses is compensable work under the FLSA.

For the reasons stated below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks a determination that the instant action has not been properly commenced. It is DENIED in all other respects. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary adjudication is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks a determination that the time spent training and transporting MPU horses is compensable work under the FLSA.¹

I. BACKGROUND

In or around 1995, the City of Vallejo created the Mounted Patrol Unit ("MPU") for the purpose of patrolling certain special events on horseback. Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("UMF") ¶¶ 1-4; Def.'s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("UMF") ¶ 15² MPU officers were trained to perform various law enforcement activities on horseback, including crowd control and making arrests. Pl's UMF ¶¶ 5-6. In order to join the MPU, officers were required to own their own horses and trailers as well as provide transportation to and from MPU events. Id. ¶¶ 8, 47-48.

Prior to assignment with the MPU, officers were required to complete a Basic Assessment Test ("BAT"), which was established as the minimum riding skills required for admission into the unit. Pl.'s UMF ¶ 12. Additionally, prospective MPU officers had to successfully graduate from a Peace Officer Services Training approved "Mounted Patrol" course. Id. ¶ 13. Once assigned to MPU, officers were required to satisfy continuing training requirements and pass an annual "in-service test," which was developed to measure horsemanship skills. Id. ¶¶ 19-20. MPU officers were also required to ensure that their horses were adequately trained and that they met certain criteria, including proper temperament, physical condition, appearance and vaccination. Id. ¶¶ 10, 22, 52-53.

Plaintiffs joined the MPU unit in 1996 and 1997, respectively. Pl.'s UMF ¶¶ 15, 17. Plaintiffs allege that MPU officers were required to work approximately four-to-five off-duty hours a week handling their horses in order to maintain the skills necessary to be an MPU officer. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiffs assert that they were routinely instructed by supervisors to train off-duty and, until July 2002, were required to spend six off-duty hours a week training their horses pursuant to a Vallejo Police Department policy. Id. ¶¶ 29-30, 32-33. Plaintiffs further assert that even after this requirement was eliminated, MPU officers were still required to train off-duty on a regular basis in order to be effective MPU officers and to pass the annual "inservice" test. Id. ¶¶ 29-33, 39-44. Id. ¶ 46.

Although Plaintiffs acknowledge that they received two extra hours of compensation for time spent handling their horses before and after MPU events, they maintain that they spent significantly more off-duty time handling their horses in preparation for MPU events. Pl's UMF ¶ 62.³ Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that they worked approximately four-to-seven uncompensated hours per week preparing their horses for MPU events from June 1, 2002 through June 1, 2005. Id. ¶¶ 45-46.⁴

On June 1, 2005, Plaintiffs filed the instant action on their own behalf, and on behalf of other similarly situated MPU officers, seeking to recover for unpaid compensation for off-duty time spent caring, training and transporting MPU horses. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 4-5, 27. More particularly, Plaintiffs seek the following relief: (1) unpaid compensation for all hours worked in excess of forty hours per week and eighty hours per pay period, at a rate of one and one-half their regular rate of pay; (2) a determination that Defendant's conduct was an intentional, knowing and willful violation of the FLSA, entitling Plaintiffs to liquidated damages and a three year period of recovery for unpaid compensation; and (3) attorney fees pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Id. ¶ 40.

II. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiffs have failed to properly commence this action within FLSA's two-year statutory period since they have not filed consent to suit forms with this court as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216. Alternatively, Defendant argues that summary judgment is appropriate because the time spent by Plaintiffs training and transporting their horses for MPU events is not compensable work under the FLSA. These claims are addressed individually below.

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. § 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a "genuine issue of material fact for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A material fact is "genuine," if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to establish, beyond the pleadings, and by his or her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [that party's] favor." Miller v. Glenn Miller Productions, Inc., 454 F.3d 975, 988 (9th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 552, 119 S.Ct. 1545, 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999)). "But the non-moving party must come forward with more than the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence.'" Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505). Thus, "`[w]here the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.'" Miller, 454 F.3d at 988 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). Where divergent ultimate inferences may reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts, summary judgment is improper. Miller, 454 F.3d at 988.

B. FLSA Statute of Limitations

Defendant argues that the instant action is time-barred because Plaintiffs have failed to properly commence it within FLSA's two-year statute of limitations since they have not filed consent to suit forms with this court as required by 29 U.S.C. § 216.

Plaintiffs filed the instant action as a collective action under the FLSA, which authorizes an employee to bring an action on behalf of "himself ... situated" if an employer has failed to pay overtime compensation. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); McElmurry v. U.S. Bank Nat. Ass'n, 495 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir.2007).⁵ The FLSA provides that no party may join a collective action "unless he gives his consent in writing to become such a party and such consent is filed in the court in which such action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).⁶ Under the FLSA, a "collective action" is considered to be commenced with respect to any individual claimant "on the date when the complaint is filed, if he is specifically named as a party plaintiff in the complaint and his written consent to become a party plaintiff is filed on such date in the court in which the action is brought." 29 U.S.C. § 256(a). A cause of action under the FLSA "may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrued." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a).

When a "collective action" is filed under § 216(b) all plaintiffs, including named plaintiffs are required to file a consent to suit form with the court in which the action is brought. Harkins v. Riverboat Services, Inc., 385 F.3d 1099, 1101 (7th Cir.2004); Bonilla v. Las Vegas Cigar Co., 61 F.Supp.2d 1129, 1133 (D.Nev.1999). A "collective action" is not deemed commenced with respect to each individual plaintiff until his or her consent has been filed. Harkins, 385' F.3d at 1101; Bonilla, 61 F.Supp.2d at 1133 (c...