Ketnor v. Automatic Power, Inc.

• Decision Date: 10 November 1987
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 87-679.
• Citation: 684 F. Supp. 907
• Parties: Buddy KETNOR, et al., v. AUTOMATIC POWER, INC., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

684 F. Supp. 907

Buddy KETNOR, et al., v. AUTOMATIC POWER, INC., et al.

Civ. A. No. 87-679.

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana, M.D.

November 10, 1987.

Dan C. Garner, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.

Wood Brown, III, New Orleans, La., for defendants.

BEER, District Judge.

This matter came on for hearing on October 21, 1987, on motion of defendant, Automatic Power, for summary judgment. At issue is plaintiff's status under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a service technician. His duties were to check and repair navigational aids (lights and horns) on oil and gas wells in the Gulf of Mexico and inland waters of Louisiana. He was allegedly injured on the job when the platform on which he was located exploded.

Ketnor's job required that he reach the platforms aboard one of three small boats maintained by his employer. He inspected various navigational aids, including certain lighted fixtures aboard the rigs, spending approximately 75% of his time aboard the various structures tending to the aids and 25% of his time on the boats going from rig to rig. His duties did not include cleaning the boats, working on boat's engines or navigating it. He did clean the deck of one boat one time and changed the battery on one of the boats on a couple of occasions. He would sometimes assemble and/or repair the navigation aids from rigs while he was on one of the boats going from rig to rig. Part of his job was to complete the paper work on each platform and this was sometimes done on the boat. Plaintiff had just finished "writing up a well" that he had serviced, when he disembarked onto the well in question.

Defendant claims that plaintiff is not a Jones Act seaman. Defendant contends that plaintiff utilized the boats merely for transportation, and that he had no regular part of his work duties aboard any particular boat, nor was he assigned to any particular vessel.

In Barrett v. Chevron USA, Inc., 781 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir.1986), the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, noted:

"The status determination as a whole, is an inherently factual question, and, as our cases since Offshore Co. v. Robison 266 F.2d 769 (5th Cir.1959) make clear, it is generally a question for the factfinder. ... however, that status may be determined by summary judgment in the appropriate situation. Thus, we have held that where the facts establish beyond question as a matter of law (lack of seaman's status) ... a court ... may, in the proper case, hold that there is no reasonable evidentiary basis to support a jury finding that the injured person is a seaman ... under the Jones Act. Similarly, when the evidence can lead to the conclusion that the injured person was a crew member, summary judgment declaring his status is proper."

Id. at 1074.

The defendants must demonstrate a "complete absence of probative facts" in support of the plaintiff's status as a seaman to prevail on such a motion. Springborn v. American Commercial Barge Lines, Inc., 767 F.2d 89 (5th Cir.1985).

"Moreover, once the movant has `informed the district court of the basis of its motion and identified those portions of the record.... which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact', the burden shifts to the nonmovant `to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'" Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also Leonard v. Dixie Well Service & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291 (5th Cir.1987).

The Fifth Circuit in Barrett reiterated the test set forth in Offshore Co. v. Robison, 266 F.2d 769, 775 (5th Cir.1959) for determination of seaman status: 1. whether the worker was assigned permanently to a vessel or performed a substantial portion of his work on the vessel, and 2. if the capacity in which he was employed or the duties which he performed contributed to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission, or to the operation or welfare of the vessel in terms of its maintenance during its movement or during anchorage for future trips. 781 F.2d at 1072.

Barrett was not permanently assigned to the vessel. However, the Court concluded that if a worker was not permanently assigned to a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels, he could be found to be a seaman if a substantial amount of his work was performed aboard a vessel or identifiable fleet of vessels:

"... it must be shown that (the claimant)

...