Ketring v. State

• Citation: 200 N.E. 212,209 Ind. 618
• Decision Date: 05 March 1936
• Docket Number: No. 26476.,26476.
• Parties: KETRING v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

209 Ind. 618
200 N.E. 212

KETRING
v.
STATE.

No. 26476.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

March 5, 1936.

Lloyd Ketring pleaded guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and from the judgment on such plea, he appeals.

Reversed, with directions.

ROLL, C. J., dissenting.

[209 Ind. 619]

[200 N.E. 213]

Appeal from Koscuisko Circuit Court; Donald Vandervier, judge.
Sheehan & Lyddick, of Gary, for appellant.

Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Ralph E. Hanna, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

HUGHES, Judge.

An affidavit in two counts, the first, charging voluntary manslaughter, and the second, involuntary manslaughter, was filed against the appellant on July 18, 1934. The appellant, on the same day the affidavit was filed, pleaded guilty to the first count of the affidavit and was sentenced to the Indiana State Prison for a period of not less than two nor more than twenty-one years. At the time the appellant entered his plea of guilty he had not consulted with an attorney nor any one else other than the prosecuting attorney and the sheriff of the county. On the 23d day of July, 1934, the appellant, by his attorney, moved to set aside and vacate the submission and judgment and permit him to enter a plea of not guilty. The motion was overruled. The appellant then [209 Ind. 620]moved to modify the judgment and sentence to read involuntary manslaughter with a sentence of from one to ten years. This motion was also overruled. The appellant then moved the court to strike out and vacate the whole judgment and sentence as being contrary to law, which motion was overruled.

The appellant states eight propositions in his assignment of errors, but we will only consider the second, which is as follows: ‘The court erred in overruling the appellant's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment and to permit the appellant to withdraw the plea of guilty.’

The special bill of exceptions show that the motion and request to withdraw the plea of guilty and to vacate and set aside the judgment and sentence was made orally, and the state consented to the oral motion and waived that it be reduced to writing and sworn to. It is also shown that the court acted upon said oral motion without it being reduced to writing.

The facts as set out in the special bill of exceptions are in substance as follows: ‘That the defendant (appellant) was not accustomed to legal procedure and did not know the full force and effect of his plea of guilty; that he understood he was pleading guilty to involuntary manslaughter and did not...