Ketron v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY HOSP., 1:95-CV-92.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1996
• Docket Number: No. 1:95-CV-92.,1:95-CV-92.
• Citation: 919 F. Supp. 280
• Parties: Paul KETRON and Thomas Randall White, Plaintiffs, v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d/b/a Erlanger Medical Center, Mack McCarley, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President of Support Services, and Joel Heaton, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Construction Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee

919 F. Supp. 280

Paul KETRON and Thomas Randall White, Plaintiffs, v. CHATTANOOGA-HAMILTON COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, d/b/a Erlanger Medical Center, Mack McCarley, individually and in his official capacity as Vice President of Support Services, and Joel Heaton, individually and in his official capacity as Director of Construction Services, Defendants.

No. 1:95-CV-92.

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee.

January 23, 1996.

Harlan S. Miller, Matthew C. Billips, Kirwan, Goger, Chesin & Parks, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for plaintiffs.

Carlos C. Smith, Christine Mabe Scott, J. Robin Rogers, Strang, Fletcher, Carriger, Walker, Hodge & Smith, Chattanooga, TN, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

COLLIER, District Judge.

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and the Amended Complaint filed by Defendants pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) (Court File No. 6). Plaintiffs moved the Court to allow a Second Amended Complaint (Court File No. 8) and responded to Defendants' motion to dismiss (Court File No. 10). The parties filed a Consent Order allowing Plaintiffs to file the Second Amended Complaint (Court File No. 13). Plaintiffs argue the Second Amended Complaint at least partly cures the grounds for Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Second Amended Complaint brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 (Court File No. 14). For the following reasons, the Court will GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART the motion to dismiss.

I. FACTS

The facts in this action are largely uncontested. Toward the end of 1993, Paul Ketron ("Ketron") held the position of Associate Director of Engineering at Erlanger Medical Center ("EMC"). Thomas White ("White") held the position of Zone Maintenance Mechanic under Ketron's supervision. Ketron reported to Bob Sachuk ("Sachuk"), EMC's Director of Engineering, who, along with Defendant Joel Heaton ("Heaton"), reported to Defendant Mack McCarley ("McCarley").

During late 1993, Plaintiffs claim they became aware of and complained about an alleged "pervasive practice of malfeasance" in EMC's "Maintenance" and "In House Construction" Departments (Court File No. 10, p. 2). Plaintiffs also complained of safety violations. Plaintiffs registered their complaints of these alleged "incidents of illegal activities in three memoranda to Defendant Heaton and EMC's Board of Directors in late 1993" (Id.). Heaton purportedly responded in a memorandum to Sachuk in September 1993 criticizing Ketron's "attitude" and suggesting disciplinary action (Id.). Soon thereafter, Plaintiffs contend they both suffered adverse employment actions, "under the pretext of a reduction in force," in retaliation for reporting alleged illegal activities: Ketron at first took a demotion and transfer, which resulted in a "constructive discharge" in October 1994; White lost his job in April 1994 (Id. at pp. 2-3, 5-6).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants moved the Court to dismiss this action under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c), which is technically a motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, the standard of review applicable to a Rule 12(c) motion is the same as that for a Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion. Scheid v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 n. 1 (6th Cir.1988). A motion to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) requires the Court to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept all the complaint's factual allegations as true, and determine whether the plaintiff undoubtedly can prove no set of facts in support of the claims that would entitle relief. Meador v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 475 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 867, 111 S.Ct. 182, 112 L.Ed.2d 145 (1990); see also Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 270 (6th Cir.1994). The Court may not grant such a motion to dismiss based upon a disbelief of a complaint's factual allegations. Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1199 (6th Cir.1990); Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that courts should not weigh evidence or evaluate the credibility of witnesses). The Court must liberally construe the complaint in favor of the party opposing the motion. Miller, 50 F.3d at 377. However, the complaint must articulate more than a bare assertion of legal conclusions. Scheid, 859 F.2d at 436. "The complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory." Id. (citations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304

Behind the motions to amend the complaint lay Plaintiffs' interest in characterizing the EMC as a "public non-profit corporation" (Court File No. 14, p. 2), rather than "a political subdivision operating and existing under the Constitution and laws of the State of Tennessee" (Court File No. 4, p. 2). Defendants in part premised their motion to dismiss on EMC's status as a political subdivision of Tennessee and the resulting immunity from liability given by the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act ("TGTLA"), Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-20-101 et seq. (Court File No. 7, p. 7). While not contesting Plaintiffs' amendment to the complaint, Defendants' nonetheless do not concede the status of the EMC as a public non-profit corporation (See Court File No. 11).

Plaintiffs correctly argue Section 19, Private Acts of the Tennessee General Assembly, 1976 Tenn.Priv. Acts ch. 297 ("enabling act"), as amended by, 1977 Tenn.Priv. Acts ch. 125, specifically denotes the EMC "shall be a public nonprofit corporation." They contend the enabling act thus fails to clearly establish the EMC as a political subdivision of the state. Furthermore, they emphasize case law proffered by Defendants indicates a "highly fact specific" inquiry into the documents creating the EMC is necessary to resolve this issue and they must be allowed discovery toward that end (See Court File No. 12, pp. 2-3).

Defendants point to case law, which they argue establishes the EMC as a political subdivision of Tennessee. The Court agrees. The Tennessee Supreme Court in Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority v. City of Chattanooga, 580 S.W.2d 322 (Tenn. 1979) found constitutional the enabling acts creating the Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority ("Hospital Authority," now d/b/a "EMC"). The court recognized the "gist" and "primary thrust" of the Tennessee General Assembly's actions as the "autonomous establishment of the Hospital Authority." Id. at 327. In context, the court reviewed the enabling act in light of the "home rule" amendment to the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 324. The court analyzed Paragraph 9, § 9 of art. XI of the Tennessee Constitution, which addresses "the consolidation of any or all of the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in municipal corporations with the governmental and corporate functions now or hereafter vested in the counties in which such municipal corporations are located; ..." Id. at 327. Moreover, the court found the office of trustee of the Hospital Authority to be "an independent governmental entity." Id. at 329.

In Johnson v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hospital Authority, 749 S.W.2d 36 (Tenn.1988), the Tennessee Supreme Court examined the applicability of the Workers' Compensation Act of Tennessee ("WCA"), Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-101 et seq., to the Hospital Authority. The court reviewed Sections 1 (noting the creation of a "governmental Hospital Authority"), 18 (noting the Hospital Authority as "a public instrumentality acting on behalf of the county"), and 19 (noting the Hospital Authority "shall be a public nonprofit corporation") of the enabling act. Id. at 37. The court concluded the Hospital Authority was a "subdivision of the state and county" as contemplated by the WCA, Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-106(5), which exempts "the state of Tennessee, counties thereof and municipal corporations" from coverage.

Plaintiffs read these cases narrowly, arguing they do not specifically relate to the TGTLA (See Court File No. 12, pp. 2-3). The Court understands the cases broadly stand for the proposition that the Hospital Authority, now d/b/a EMC, is a governmental entity and a subdivision of the state. The TGTLA grants immunity to "all governmental entities" when they "are engaged in the exercise and discharge of any of their functions, governmental or proprietary." Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a) (1995), quoted in Lockhart v. Jackson-Madison County General Hospital, 793 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tenn.Ct. App.1990) (applying the TGTLA to a county hospital). A recent case followed Lockhart and specifically applied the TGTLA to EMC. See Moses v. Erlanger Medical Center, 1995 WL 610243 (Tenn.Ct.App. Oct. 18, 1995) (denying the plaintiffs' claim of mental anguish). Moses recognized EMC as a "governmental hospital authority," Id. at *1, and then applied provisions of the TGTLA to the plaintiffs' claims in that case. See id. at *2-*3.

Plaintiffs' state law claim is one for retaliatory discharge (See Court File No. 14, pp. 6-7). Tennessee courts have held the TGTLA grants immunity to governmental entities for claims of retaliatory discharge. See Montgomery v. Mayor of City of Covington, 778 S.W.2d 444, 445 (Tenn.Ct.App.1988); Williams v. Williamson County Bd. of Ed., 890 S.W.2d 788, 790 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994). Given the Court's analysis of applicable case law from Tennessee, the Court concludes EMC is a political subdivision of the state of Tennessee and is immune to a claim against it for retaliatory discharge under the provisions of the TGTLA. The claims brought against EMC under Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304 will be DISMISSED.¹

The Court finds the claims brought against Heaton and McCarley as individuals should not be dismissed. Plaintiffs admit Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-1-304(c) provides a cause of action against an employer and not usually a supervisor (Court File No. 10, p. 11). However, Plaintiffs also point to Johnson v. Johnson, 1992 WL 184743 (Tenn.Ct. App. Aug....