Key Safety Sys., Inc. v. Bruner, A15A0960.
| Decision Date | 19 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. A15A0960.,A15A0960. |
| Citation | 780 S.E.2d 389,334 Ga.App. 717 |
| Parties | KEY SAFETY SYSTEMS, INC. v. BRUNER et al. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Ashley Webber Broach, Charles B. Marsh, Frank Mitchell Lowrey IV, Atlanta, Michael P. Cooney, Brian T. Smith, for Appellant.
Craig C. Avery, Athens, Robin Frazer Clark, Atlanta, Melody Allen Glouton, Anthony O. L. Powell, Lawrenceville, Christopher Dean Glover, for Appellee.
This appeal arises out of the death of Penney Louise Bruner after the Jeep Wrangler automobile in which she was riding in the front passenger seat was involved in a rollover crash, ejecting her despite her wearing the seatbelt, which was designed, constructed, and integrated into the Jeep by Key Safety Systems, Inc. ("Key").1 William A. Bruner, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ms. Bruner (collectively "the plaintiff"), filed suit against Key and various other private and governmental entities, alleging claims of failure to warn, failure to recall/retrofit, strict products liability, and negligence regarding the seatbelt restraint system installed in the passenger side of the Jeep. The jury awarded over $4.6 million to the plaintiff, apportioning 80 percent fault to Key and 20 percent to the driver, Mr. and Ms. Bruner's daughter, Amanda. Key filed a motion for new trial, motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a revised motion for new trial, which motions were denied by the trial court.
Key appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) denying its motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict as to the plaintiff's failure to warn claim; (2) admitting expert testimony regarding certain seatbelt retractor mechanism testing over its objection at the motion in limine and at trial; and (3) allowing the jury to view the video of that same test over its objection at the motion in limine and at trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The standard for [a] directed verdict is as follows: [If] there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue, and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict, such verdict shall be directed. The appellate review standard of a trial court's denial of a directed verdict motion is the any evidence standard. In considering a ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the evidence must be construed most favorably to the party opposing the motion.2
Viewed in this light, the record shows that Mr. Bruner owned three vehicles at the time of the instant events, the 2003 Jeep in question, as well as a 2000 Volkswagon Beetle and a Ford F–150 pickup truck. Mr. Bruner testified that among his family of two adults and two driver-aged children, all four were allowed to operate the Jeep, but he was the main driver. His daughter, Amanda, was 17 at the time of the events but driving on a learner's permit.
On September 23, 2007, Amanda and Ms. Bruner were involved in a rollover accident in the Jeep.3 Amanda was driving, while Ms. Bruner rode in the passenger seat, and although both were wearing their seatbelts, Ms. Bruner was ejected from the vehicle, sustaining severe injuries, including having portions of body tissue around her lower abdomen and upper legs torn off by the lap portion of the seatbelt. Ms. Bruner survived for a short time after the accident, telling witnesses that she was confused about why she was ejected because she had been wearing her seatbelt. Ms. Bruner eventually succumbed to her injuries.
Mr. Bruner testified that Ms. Bruner was "fanatical" about proper seatbelt usage, which made it surprising to him that the police at the scene initially reported that she was unbelted. He testified that in the event of a rollover, he "expected [the seatbelts] to keep you in the seat" and if he had known that there was a chance of ejection, he would not have purchased the vehicle. Mr. Bruner testified that he was not warned that properly belted occupants could be ejected from the vehicle, but if a warning had appeared on the belt, he would have read it. Mr. Bruner could not recall whether he "as part of the accident" read the Jeep's owner's manual, nor could he recall what other vehicles he was considering at the time he bought the Jeep.
Steven Meyer, a mechanical engineer, testified regarding the seatbelt retractor mechanism and its behavior during a rollover accident. After speaking generally about the variety of tests he had performed on various types of restraint systems, Meyer turned to the restraint system in question and his hypothesis of the accident. Meyer explained that the latch plate at the top portion of the shoulder belt became loose at various points during the rollover, which allowed slack to form in the lap belt, which then allowed Ms. Bruner to be ejected from the vehicle. In arriving at his conclusion that the seatbelt restraint system was defective, he examined the belt in question and compared it to his existing knowledge gleaned from previous investigations.
Meyer described the restraint system in question as having a ball and cup crash sensor, which was designed to sense when the vehicle was in an accident and lock the seatbelt retractor from allowing any movement of the belt; he compared the device in the passenger side to other crash sensors, such as the web sensor or locking latch plate, which operated differently than the ball and cup.
During his testimony, Meyer referred to a video of the internal workings of a seatbelt retractor mechanism like the one installed in the plaintiff's Jeep. The video included a closeup of the mechanism showing when it detached from the belt, allegedly allowing slack to form in the belt, and in the corner of the screen the front of a Jeep Cherokee rolling to show the angle of the vehicle during the detachment of the restraint from the belt. Meyer repeatedly explained that this was not designed to be a simulation of the exact events of the crash in question, but merely a visual depiction of how the restraint system operates under rollover forces; he explained how it would vary given different rates or directions of rotation.
At the close of evidence, Key argued that the trial court should grant a directed verdict on the plaintiff's claim of failure to warn because (1) the plaintiff had failed to show causation via evidence showing what product he would have purchased instead of the Jeep had he been warned; (2) the plaintiff had not produced evidence of an appropriate warning; and (3) the plaintiff had not produced evidence that Chrysler would have allowed Key to add a warning to the product.
After the verdict, Key filed its revised motion for new trial, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff's expert to present the retractor rotation test and that the trial court improperly allowed the failure to warn claim to go to the jury because there was insufficient evidence to support the claim. The trial court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
1. Key first argues that the trial court erred by denying its motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the plaintiff's failure to warn claim because there was insufficient evidence to establish a claim.
[If] a duty to warn arises, as it does in this case, this duty may be breached by (1) failing to adequately communicate the warning to the ultimate user or (2) failing to provide an adequate warning of the product's potential risks. While failure to read instructions or printed warnings will prevent a plaintiff from recovering on a claim grounded on failure to provide adequate warning of the product's potential risk, failure to read a warning does not bar recovery when the plaintiff is challenging the adequacy of the efforts of the manufacturer or seller to communicate the dangers of the product to the buyer or user. Failure to communicate an adequate warning involves such questions, as are here at issue, as to location and presentation of the warning.4
Moreover, "such suits are grounded on either a strict liability or negligence theory, [and] proximate cause is a necessary element of the plaintiff's case."5 Questions of adequacy of a warning and proximate cause resulting from a complete lack of warning or an inadequate warning are "peculiarly questions for the jury."6
Key contends that the trial court...
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