Key West Harbour Development Corp. v. City of Key West, Fla.
| Citation | 987 F.2d 723 |
| Decision Date | 02 April 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 92-4038,92-4038 |
| Parties | KEY WEST HARBOUR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, a Florida Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF KEY WEST, FLORIDA, Tom Sawyer, Mayor of the City of Key West, George Halloran, Salley Lewis, Jimmy Weekly, individually and in their official capacities as City Commissioners, The Key West Redevelopment Agency, Charles Majors, Chairman of the Key West Redevelopment, Lou Hernandez, Treasurer of the Key West Development Agency, Bob Kruse, Vice Chairman of the Key West Redevelopment Agency, individually and in their official capacities, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
Joel Hirschhorn, Coral Gables, FL, for plaintiff-appellant.
Michael T. Burke, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
Before HATCHETT and BLACK, Circuit Judges, and DYER, Senior Circuit Judge.
The main questions presented in this case are whether the appellant, a developer, had a constitutionally protected property interest to redevelop the Harry S. Truman Annex Naval Base in Key West, Florida, ("Annex"), and if so, whether the appellees deprived the appellant of those constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law. Answering the first question in the negative, we affirm the district court.
In 1973, the General Services Administration ("GSA") offered to sell the Harry S. Truman Annex Naval Base in Key West, Florida. The City of Key West ("City"), appellee, expressed an interest in purchasing the Annex.
On March 19, 1979, the Key West City Commission ("Commission"), and individual appellees, passed Resolution 79-41, which acknowledged that redeveloping the Annex was in the interest of the City and further recognized the need for a community redevelopment agency to supervise the redevelopment of the Annex. On May 7, 1979, the Commission passed Ordinance 79-15, which created the Key West Redevelopment Agency ("Agency") to supervise the redevelopment of the Annex pursuant to the Community Redevelopment Act of 1969 1 ("Act").
On June 18, 1979, the Commission passed an ordinance amending Ordinance 79-15, which appointed the Agency as the City's agent to acquire the Annex. In January, 1980, the Agency and an independent consultant prepared and published the "Revised Conceptual Plan for the Redevelopment of the Truman Annex, Key West, Florida" ("Conceptual Plan"). On March 3, 1980, in Resolution 80-30, the Commission approved and adopted the Conceptual Plan.
During the fall of 1980, the Agency chose the Key West Harbour Development Corporation ("KWHDC"), appellant, to perform the Annex predevelopment services. In October, 1980, KWHDC began performing these predevelopment services for the Agency. In July, 1981, the Florida Legislature abolished and recreated the Agency in Ch. 405, 1981 Fla.Laws 144.
On July 16, 1982, KWHDC and the Agency executed an agreement which, among other things, designated KWHDC as master developer of the Annex redevelopment project. On May 29, 1984, KWHDC and the Agency executed the "Disposition and Development Agreement." Under this agreement, the Agency would purchase the Annex with funds advanced from KWHDC; in exchange, the Agency would grant KWHDC a ninety-nine year lease on the Annex. On September 5, 1984, the Commission adopted Ordinance 84-32, which created a "Planned Redevelopment District" to accommodate the redevelopment of the Annex. On June 4, 1985, the City passed Resolution 85-107, which allowed the City to enter into the "Key West Harbour Project Agreement." In June, 1985, the Commission, the Agency, KWHDC, and the State of Florida Department of Community Affairs ("DCA") entered into this undated agreement. The Key West Harbour Project Agreement provided the procedures for the City to review the redevelopment of the Annex.
On July 18, 1985, the Agency officially offered to purchase the Annex from GSA for $13.8 million. On September 24, 1985, the GSA accepted the offer and scheduled the closing for March 31, 1986.
On January 7, 1986, in Ordinance 86-2, the Commission imposed a 180-day moratorium on the issuance of building permits for any building, project, development, or structure to evaluate the City's estimated growth projections. On February 7, 1986, KWHDC requested an opportunity to speak at the February 18 commission meeting and further requested assurances that the moratorium would not delay continued development of the Annex under the existing laws and ordinances after the moratorium expired. On February 18, 1986, the Commission adopted Resolution 86-49, which requested that GSA delay the proposed sale and transfer of the Annex for ninety days while the City evaluated the proposed purchase and transfer. During this time, the City also published a notice for a special commission meeting and workshop regarding the Annex. On February 25, 1986, in Resolution 86-58, the Commission arguably rescinded its approval of the Conceptual Plan. On March 11, 1986, the Commission passed Resolution 86-76, which explained that Resolution 86-58 was a modification, not a rescission, and requested that the Agency recommend amendments to the Conceptual Plan to reflect the City's current needs.
On March 14, 1986, KWHDC informed the Agency that it would no longer perform because of Resolution 86-58, and that it may require the Agency to reimburse it for predevelopment services. The Agency requested that KWHDC comply with the Disposition and Development Agreement, but it refused. GSA declared the Agency in breach of the Annex Purchase and Sale Agreement.
In September, 1986, GSA sold the property to another developer for $17.2 million. Four years later, KWHDC sued for damages.
On February 22, 1990, the appellant filed a complaint in the district court alleging a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Count I"), conspiracy to deprive the appellant of its rights without due process of law ("Count II"), breach of contract ("Count III"), and tortious interference with a business relationship ("Count IV"). On March 27, 1990, the appellees (the City and the Commission) filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a federal claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. The district court denied the motion to dismiss in Key West Harbour Development Corp. v. City of Key West, Florida, 738 F.Supp. 1390 (S.D.Fla.1990). On June 8, 1990, the appellees answered the complaint.
On February 26, 1991, the appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment; on March 8, 1991, the appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. The district court held a hearing on May 31, 1991. On December 16, 1991, the district court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment and denied the appellant's motion for partial summary judgment in Key West Harbour Development Corp. v. City of Key West, Florida, No. 90-10027 (S.D.Fla.1990).
The appellant contends that the three agreements coupled with the Community Redevelopment Act provided it with a protected property interest pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Hence, the appellant asserts that the Commission deprived it of those property interests without due process of law when it rescinded the Conceptual Plan without a public hearing and proper notice. Additionally, the appellant contends that the appellees' adoption of Resolution 86-58 rescinding the Conceptual Plan constituted a breach of contract. Furthermore, the appellant contends that neither absolute legislative nor qualified immunity is available to shield the individual appellees from liability for their wrongful actions of rescinding the Conceptual Plan without a hearing and notice.
The appellees contend that the appellant did not have a protected property interest to redevelop the Annex because the appellant did not own, lease or have a contract to buy the Annex; consequently, the appellees did not deprive the appellant of any alleged property interests without due process of law. Moreover, the appellees contend that the appellant fails to show how Resolution 86-58 breached any of the agreements. Lastly, the appellees contend that the individual appellees have absolute legislative immunity because they acted in a legislative capacity; in the alternative, they have qualified immunity because in February, 1986, it was not clearly established that the appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest; thus, no reasonable official would have known that the adoption of Resolution 86-58 would violate any constitutional right of the appellant.
To determine whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment, we must decide whether the appellant had a constitutionally protected property interest to redevelop the Annex, and if so, whether the appellees deprived the appellant of those constitutionally protected property interests without due process of law. Additionally, we must decide whether the appellees breached any agreement with the appellant. Finally, we must consider whether absolute legislative or qualified immunity shields the individual appellees from liability.
On appeal, a grant of summary judgment is subject to de novo review. MacKenzie v. City of Rockledge, 920 F.2d 1554, 1558 (11th Cir.1991). We review the evidence and all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party to determine whether any genuine issue of material fact exists and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. MacKenzie, 920 F.2d at 1558. We find no genuine issues of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Thus, we must decide whether the district court's determinations were proper as a matter of law. See West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir.1987).
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