Keyes Fibre Co. v. Lamarre
| Court | Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US) |
| Citation | 617 A.2d 213 |
| Parties | KEYES FIBRE COMPANY v. Stephen LAMARRE. |
| Decision Date | 22 December 1992 |
Page 213
v.
Stephen LAMARRE.
Decided Dec. 22, 1992.
H. Peter DelBianco, Jr. (orally), Black, Lambert, Coffin & Rudman, Portland, for plaintiff.
Robert J. Daviau, Michaela Murphy (orally), Daviau, Jabar & Batten, Waterville, for defendant.
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.
GLASSMAN, Justice.
Stephen Lamarre appeals from the summary judgment entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Chandler, J.) awarding to Keyes Fibre Company on Count II of its complaint 1 the amount of money alleged to have been converted by Lamarre. We vacate the judgment.
The following facts are undisputed: On April 21, 1987, Lamarre, an employee of Keyes, suffered a work-related back injury. Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, 39 M.R.S.A. §§ 1-195 (1989 & Supp.1992), Keyes accepted the compensability of the injury and began payment of benefits to Lamarre. In November 1987, Keyes filed a petition with the commission for a review of Lamarre's incapacity, see 39 M.R.S.A. § 100, 2 and Lamarre filed a petition for reinstatement to suitable work. See 39 M.R.S.A. § 66-A. The petitions were consolidated for a hearing before the commission. Keyes continued to pay Lamarre benefits until December 21, 1988, when the commission by its decision denied
Page 214
Lamarre's petition, granted Keyes' petition and found that Lamarre was "no longer disabled and [could] perform his customary or most recent work." In response to Lamarre's motion for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law, the commission found further that Lamarre had completely recovered from his back injury by June 30, 1987. Benefits in the amount of $31,404.72 were paid by Keyes to Lamarre between June 30, 1987 and December 21, 1988. Seeking to recover the amount of the benefits it had paid Lamarre during this period of time, Keyes instituted the present action against Lamarre. After a hearing on Keyes' motion for a summary judgment on Count II of its complaint, the trial court held as a matter of law that Keyes was entitled to a judgment in the amount paid to Lamarre in benefits between June 30, 1987 and December 21, 1988 and directed an entry of final judgment on Count II, pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 54(b), and Lamarre appeals."When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment has been...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Enercon v. Global Computer Supplies, Inc., 09-cv-394-P-S.
...(3) Global has refused a demand for its return. See Withers v. Hackett, 1998 ME 164, ¶ 7, 714 A.2d 798, 800; Keyes Fibre Co. v. Lamarre, 617 A.2d 213, 214 (Me. 1992). With regard to Enercon's present property interest, Enercon must remember that it transferred the $90,888.80 to Global in ex......
-
Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift v. Superior Serv., Civ. 99-19-P-C.
...if [the defendant] acquired possession rightfully, a demand and a refusal by [the defendant] to surrender." Keyes Fibre Co. v. Lamarre, 617 A.2d 213, 214 9. Because it is impossible to tell from the complaint and the summary judgment materials submitted by the plaintiff whether any "obligat......
-
Brackett v. Inhabitants of Town of Bristol, LIN AP-01-006
...the court on its motion for a summary judgment.'" Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995) (quoting Keyes Fibre Co. v. Lamarre, 617 A.2d 213, 214 (Me. 1992)). Defendant moves for summary judgment on the due process claim in Count II. That is the only present remaining claim subjec......
-
Moen v. Town of Fairfield, Docket No. K
...in a light most favorable to the appealing party and review the trial court's decision for errors of law. See Keyes Fibre Co. v. Lamarre, 617 A.2d 213, 214 I. Procedural Due Process ¶9 Moen first argues that a genuine issue of material fact exists concerning whether he had a meaningful oppo......